Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2000] FCA 789

IMMIGRATION – Immigration Review Tribunal decided to cancel respondent’s student visa having accidentally failed to consider correspondence from respondent – on discovery of error Tribunal reconsidered the matter and decided in favour of respondent – application to set aside the Tribunal’s second decision – whether Tribunal is functus officio – whether Tribunal may of its own motion reconsider decision

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(1)

Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301 considered
Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly [1999] FCA 193 considered
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 considered
De Verteuil v Knaggs [1918] AC 557 referred to
Semunigus v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 240 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 considered
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400 considered
Federal Airports Corporation v Aerolineas Argentinas (1997) 76 FCR 582 referred to

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS V BHARDWAJ

NO N 77 OF 2000

JUDGES:      BEAUMONT, CARR & LEHANE JJ
DATE:           15 JUNE 2000
PLACE:         SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 77 OF 2000

APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

RAJIV BHARDWAJ
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT, CARR & LEHANE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 JUNE 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 77 OF 2000

APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

RAJIV BHARDWAJ
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT, CARR & LEHANE JJ

DATE:

15 JUNE 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT & CARR JJ:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of a judge of this Court, made on 22 December 1999, to dismiss the appellant’s application for an order of review of a decision by the Immigration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  The Tribunal was re-named as the Migration Review Tribunal (and certain changes were made to its manner of operating) by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (Cth). The Tribunal’s decision, made on 22 October 1998, was to revoke the cancellation by a delegate of the appellant of a student visa issued to the respondent.

    Factual Background

  2. The respondent, then aged 29 and a citizen of India, entered Australia on 4 July 1997 with a student visa.  The visa had been granted to him in order to undertake a Diploma of Information Technology course at Holmesglen Institute of Technical and Further Education at Chadstone in Victoria.  On…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 789
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj concerns an appeal against the decision of a judge of the Federal Court of Australia, who dismissed an application for an order of review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had revoked the cancellation of the respondent's student visa, which was initially cancelled by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The respondent, an Indian citizen, had entered Australia on a student visa to study a course at Holmesglen Institute of Technical and Further Education. However, the Institute reported to the Minister's department that the respondent had failed to complete the course, and subsequently, the respondent enrolled in another course which he also failed to attend. As a result, the delegate cancelled the respondent's student visa, a decision which the respondent sought to have reviewed by the Tribunal.

The legal issues in the case centred around whether the Tribunal had the authority to reconsider its decision after it had already informed the respondent that he was not entitled to a hearing. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had become functus officio and thus could not reconsider its decision. The respondent, however, contended that the Tribunal had the power to correct its own mistake where there had been a failure to accord him a fundamentally important right, namely a hearing, and the error was not in dispute. The primary judge had held that the Tribunal was not functus officio and could reconsider its decision in such circumstances.

The court addressed the issue of whether the Tribunal could reconsider its decision after it had made an initial determination. The court found that the Tribunal did have the power to reconsider its decision in certain circumstances, such as where it had made an error that deprived the respondent of a fundamentally important right. The court held that this did not infringe upon the doctrine of functus officio, as it was necessary to allow the Tribunal to fulfil its primary purpose of affording fairness to applicants. The court also found that, even if the Tribunal were functus officio, the court would in its discretion refuse to set aside the Tribunal's decision.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court holding that the Tribunal had the power to reconsider its decision and that the Minister's appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of a judge of this Court, made on 22 December 1999, to dismiss the appellant’s application for an order of review of a decision by the Immigration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal was re-named as the Migration Review Tribunal (and certain changes were made to its manner of operating) by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (Cth). The Tribunal’s decision, made on 22 October 1998, was to revoke the cancellation by a delegate of the appellant of a student visa issued to the respondent. Factual Background The respondent, then aged 29 and a citizen of India, entered Australia on 4 July 1997 with a student visa. The visa had been granted to him in order to undertake a Diploma of Information Technology course at Holmesglen Institute of Technical and Further Education at Chadstone in Victoria. On 25 February 1998 the Institute notified the appellant’s department (“the Department”) that the respondent had failed to complete the nominated course. In March 1998 the respondent enrolled in a Diploma of Information Technology Course at the Australian International College of Business in Sydney. On 20 May 1998, in response to an enquiry from the Department, the College advised the Department that the respondent had “… completely failed to attend the College”. The College also informed the Department that the respondent had failed to reply to a letter (sent by it on 23 April 1998) expressing concern at his apparent failure to attend any classes and asking him to make contact within one month. On 19 June 1998 a delegate of the appellant wrote to the respondent advising him that his visa might be cancelled under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and invited him to submit any written response indicating why that action should not be taken. No response was received. On 6 August 1998 an officer in the Department cancelled the respondent’s student visa. On 21 August 1998, through a migration agent, the respondent applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision to cancel his student visa. The letter accompanying that application stated that the respondent believed that there were no grounds for cancelling his visa and that a submission would be sent to the Tribunal. On 2 September 1998 the Tribunal wrote to the respondent and his migration agent advising that: · the Tribunal had considered the papers relating to the respondent’s case, but was unable to make a decision on that information alone and that therefore he was entitled to attend a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence; · if he wished to give oral evidence, arrangements had been made for a hearing to take place at the Tribunal’s office at 9.30 am on 15 September 1998;· he should immediately telephone the Tribunal (a contact person and telephone number were specified) to say whether he wished to have a hearing and that he should complete and return an enclosed form (“the Offer of Hearing Form”) within 14 days of the date of the letter; and · generally advising him about his rights and inviting him to submit any written arguments or written evidence to the Tribunal within 14 days of receipt of the letter.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We shall refer to that decision as “the October decision”. On 19 November 1998 the appellant filed an application for an order of review in this Court seeking review under Part 8 of the Act of the October Decision. The Decision at First Instance At first instance the appellant contended that the Tribunal had erred in law by purporting to make the October Decision because it had become functus officio after making the September Decision. The appellant sought to rely upon the decision of Goldberg J in Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301. Goldberg J there held that the Refugee Review Tribunal did not have the power to reconsider its decision that an applicant was not entitled to a protection visa; that it had acted correctly in informing the applicant that it was then functus; and that there was no implied power on its part to reconsider its decision. The learned primary judge held that the decision in Jayasinghe should be confined to cases where the relevant Tribunal had made a “lawful decision” and where reconsideration was sought “merely because evidence has later come to hand”. His Honour held that the September Decision was not a lawful decision because the respondent had not received the hearing to which he was entitled under s 360 of the Act and that there had been a denial of natural justice. The primary judge also held that the respondent was entitled to make what his Honour referred to as a “collateral challenge” to the September Decision as being beyond jurisdiction. His Honour further held that, in any event, there was no need for such a collateral challenge to have been made to the Court before what he described as “an errant tribunal” was able to correct its own mistake. His Honour said this (at para 27):“Whichever way one analyses it, it seems to me that the Tribunal does have a power, albeit unarticulated in express statutory language, to reconsider a decision at least in circumstances where, in coming to that decision it has by its own mistake failed to accord an applicant a fundamentally important right; the error is not in dispute between the interested parties; and the error is material to the case before it. Such a power does not infringe upon the doctrine of functus officio, which still operates as a general rule under the Act. To the extent that such circumstances may be considered an exception to the functus officio rule, such an exception is necessary to allow the Tribunal to fulfil its primary purpose under the Act: affording fairness to applicants and coming to the best reasonably possible decision in their cases.” Finally, his Honour held that, even if the Tribunal were functus officio, the Court would in its discretion refuse to set aside the October decision. The Appeal The appellant submitted that the Tribunal was functus officio once it had made the September Decision and that, accordingly, the October Decision should be set aside. The appellant relied upon the decision of French J in Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429, which was followed in Jayasinghe in that regard.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the power of the Tribunal to reconsider its decision after the initial decision that denied the respondent a hearing. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had no such power and relied on the decision of Goldberg J in Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301. However, the court held that the decision in Jayasinghe should be confined to cases where the relevant Tribunal had made a "lawful decision" and where reconsideration was sought "merely because evidence has later come to hand". In the present case, the Tribunal had denied the respondent a hearing to which he was entitled under s 360 of the Act, resulting in a denial of natural justice. The court held that the Tribunal had a power, albeit unarticulated in express statutory language, to reconsider a decision where it had failed to accord an applicant a fundamentally important right and the error was not in dispute between the interested parties. Such a power did not infringe upon the doctrine of functus officio, which still operated as a general rule under the Act. The court further held that the Tribunal's decision to revoke the cancellation of the respondent's visa should not be set aside, even if the Tribunal were functus officio. The court held that, in any event, there was no need for a collateral challenge to have been made to the Court before the Tribunal was able to correct its own mistake. The court held that the Tribunal's primary purpose under the Act was to afford fairness to applicants and to come to the best reasonably possible decision in their cases. The court held that, in the exercise of its discretion, it would refuse to set aside the Tribunal's decision. The ratio decidendi of the case is that the Tribunal has the power to reconsider its decision where it has failed to accord an applicant a fundamentally important right and the error is not in dispute between the interested parties, even if such a power is an exception to the functus officio rule. The court followed the decision of Goldberg J in Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301, but distinguished it on the basis that the Tribunal had denied the respondent a hearing to which he was entitled under s 360 of the Act, resulting in a denial of natural justice. The court departed from the decision of French J in Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429, which held that the Tribunal had no power to reconsider its decision where it had become functus officio. The court held that the Tribunal's primary purpose under the Act was to afford fairness to applicants and to come to the best reasonably possible decision in their cases.