Mingos v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mingos v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 834

File number: VID 205 of 2018
Judge: DAVIES J
Date of judgment: 7 June 2019
Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal from decision of the Commissioner of Taxation disallowing objection to inclusion of capital gain from sale of property in taxpayer’s assessable income for 2014 income year – where proceeds from sale distributed to taxpayer by trust – where title to property in name of trustee company – whether property had been held on beneficial “subtrust” for taxpayer such that main residence exemption applicable – where property transferred to trustee company with consent of taxpayer – where property treated as trust asset for relevant income years – where no contemporaneous evidence of relevant interest in or entitlement to property at time of sale – whether amount of capital gain on which taxpayer assessed excessive – onus not discharged – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Jones v Daniel (2004) 141 FCR 148; [2004] FCAFC 278

Kafataris v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 242; [2008] FCA 1454

Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mateo (2003) 127 FCR 217; [2003] FCAFC 26

Taras Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 94 ATR 751; [2014] FCA 1

Date of hearing: 28 and 29 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Taxation
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr B Orow
Solicitor for the Applicant: George Liberogiannis & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Ure
Solicitor for the Respondent: ATO Dispute Resolution

ORDERS

VID 205 of 2018
BETWEEN:

JOHN MINGOS

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

DAVIES J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s objection decision dated 29 January 2018 in respect of the applicant’s income tax liability for the year ended 30 June 2014 be varied so as to:

(a)allow the applicant’s objection against the inclusion of the capital gain to the extent necessary to reflect a cost base of $3,400,000;

(b)include the amount of $289,458 in the applicant’s taxable income; and

(c)adjust the applicant’s liability to penalty to reflect the shortfall amount arising as a result of (a) and (b) above.

2.The appeal otherwise be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DAVIES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. For the income year ended 30 June 2014 (“2014 income year”), Lemnian Investments Pty Ltd (“Lemnian”), as trustee of the Lemnian Investment Trust (“the Trust”), distributed the whole of the capital gain made on the sale of property at 35-37 Regent Street, Mt Waverley (“the property”) to the applicant (“the taxpayer”), a discretionary beneficiary of…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 834
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mingos v Commissioner of Taxation, the taxpayer, Mr Con Mingos, contested the Commissioner of Taxation’s disallowance of his objection to the inclusion of a capital gain from the sale of a property in his assessable income for the 2014 income year. The property in question was sold, and the proceeds were distributed to Mr Mingos by a trust, with the title to the property being in the name of the trustee company, Lemnian Pty Ltd. Mr Mingos argued that the property had been held on a beneficial subtrust for him, making it his main residence and thus exempt from capital gains tax. The Commissioner, however, maintained that the property was held as a trust asset, and Mr Mingos had no beneficial interest in it at the time of the sale.

The primary issue before the court was whether Mr Mingos had discharged the onus of proving that he held an ownership interest in the property. The court found that the evidence did not support the taxpayer's claim of beneficial ownership. The property was treated as an asset of the trust in the relevant financial accounts, and the net capital gain from the sale was distributed to Mr Mingos as a beneficiary under the trust deed. There was no contemporaneous evidence to support Mr Mingos's assertion that he had a beneficial interest in the property at the time of the sale.

The court dismissed Mr Mingos's appeal, holding that the onus of proof had not been discharged. The court found the documentary evidence more reliable than the oral testimony provided by Mr Mingos and his witnesses. Given the lack of clear evidence of Mr Mingos's ownership interest in the property, the court ruled that the Commissioner's assessment was correct.

The court ordered that the Commissioner's objection decision be varied to reflect a cost base of $3,400,000, include $289,458 in Mr Mingos's taxable income, and adjust his penalty liability accordingly. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and Mr Mingos was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s objection decision dated 29 January 2018 in respect of the applicant’s income tax liability for the year ended 30 June 2014 be varied so as to:

(a) allow the applicant’s objection against the inclusion of the capital gain to the extent necessary to reflect a cost base of $3,400,000;

(b) include the amount of $289,458 in the applicant’s taxable income; and

(c) adjust the applicant’s liability to penalty to reflect the shortfall amount arising as a result of (a) and (b) above.

2. The appeal otherwise be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons given above, I have not accepted the evidence of these witnesses where their testimony was contradicted by contemporaneous documents which I consider to be more reliable. Given the contradictory documentary evidence, I was left with the clear impression that there was a great deal of reconstruction in their evidence, rather than evidence based upon clear recollection.DECISION There are two primary issues. The first primary issue is whether the taxpayer has discharged the onus of proving that he had an ownership interest in the property. In the present case, the body of evidence available is against the proposition that the taxpayer did have an ownership interest. First, pursuant to the Orders, it was open to the taxpayer to nominate another entity as the transferee. Second, I find on the evidence that the taxpayer nominated Lemnian in its capacity as trustee of the Trust. That was the instruction given by Mr Munro to the Bank and, consistently, the property was brought to account as an asset of the Trust in the 2011 financial accounts which were compiled by Mr Munro. It may reasonably be inferred that Mr Munro did so consistently with his instruction to the Bank that the property and mortgage were to be in the name of the Trust. Third, under the terms of the Trust deed the Trust was able to acquire property. Fourth, the taxpayer and his brother, as the directors of Lemnian, signed the 2011 accounts as fairly representing the financial position of the Trust and it follows that it may be inferred that the treatment in the later accounts was also accepted by the taxpayer as correct, although he did not sign the directors’ declaration for those later years. Furthermore, the validity and effectiveness of the 2014 resolution was not the subject of any challenge. Fifth, there was no suggestion in the evidence that at any time the treatment of the property as an asset of the Trust was questioned by either the taxpayer or his brother. Sixth, consistently, on the sale of the property, the proceeds were accounted for as an asset of the Trust. Seventh, the taxpayer was a member of the class of potential beneficiaries under the Trust deed. Eighth, consistently with the terms of the Trust deed, the directors of Lemnian in its capacity as the trustee of the Trust had the power to allocate the net capital gain to a beneficiary. Ninth, consistently with treating the property as an asset of the Trust in the accounts, the net income of the trust referrable to the capital gain on the sale of the property was distributed to the taxpayer. Tenth, consistently with the recorded resolution for the 2014 income year, the tax return of the trust disclosed the distribution of the net capital gain to the taxpayer. Eleventh, Con Mingos’ evidence was that the resolutions were explained to him satisfactorily before he signed them. It may be inferred that he accepted at the time the correctness of both the accounting and tax treatment in relation to the proceeds of sale.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established