Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mateo [2003] FCAFC 26
BANKRUPTCY – Transaction allegedly void against Official Trustee – Transfer of husband’s one-half interest in matrimonial home pursuant to consent orders made by Family Court of Australia – Whether s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act has application to a transfer effected by/or pursuant to an order of the Family Court - Whether transferred legal interest has more than a nominal value following the Family Court orders – Discussion of difficulty in relating non-financial matrimonial contributions to market value of a property – Relationship between application under Bankruptcy Act and application to vary or set aside the Family Court order under s 79A of Family Law Act.
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY v CORAZON BES MATEO, JEREMY MATEO, JENNIFER JOY MATEO and JUSTIN JAMES MATEO
N 310 of 2002
WILCOX, BRANSON and MERKEL JJ 28 FEBRUARY 2003 SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 310 of 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY APPELLANT
AND:
CORAZON BES MATEO FIRST RESPONDENT
JEREMY MATEO SECOND RESPONDENT
JENNIFER JOY MATEO THIRD RESPONDENT
JUSTIN JAMES MATEO FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
WILCOX, BRANSON and MERKEL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
28 FEBRUARY 2003
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The matter of costs be reserved.
3. The parties have leave to file submissions concerning any application for costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 310 of 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY APPELLANT
AND:
CORAZON BES MATEO FIRST RESPONDENT
JEREMY MATEO SECOND RESPONDENT
JENNIFER JOY MATEO THIRD RESPONDENT
JUSTIN JAMES MATEO FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
WILCOX, BRANSON and MERKEL JJ
DATE:
28 FEBRUARY 2003
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WILCOX J:
This is an appeal against a decision of a judge of the Court (Tamberlin J) in proceedings arising out of the administration of the bankrupt estate of Arturo Mateo (“the bankrupt”): see Mateo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2002] FCA 344. The appeal raises some issues of general importance concerning the interaction of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the Family Law Act1975 (Cth).
Corazon Bes Mateo, the former wife of the bankrupt, applied to this Court for an order setting aside a notice under s 139ZQ of the Act issued by the Official Receiver for the Bankruptcy District of the State of New South Wales. The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (“the Official Trustee”) filed a cross-claim in which he named as cross-respondents, not only Mrs Mateo, but also the three children of her marriage to the bankrupt: Jeremy Mateo, Jennifer Joy Mateo and Justin James Mateo.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, as appellant, sought to set aside a transfer of property from Mr Mateo to Mrs Mateo as void against the Official Trustee under s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The primary judge dismissed the Official Trustee's appeal, and the Official Trustee appealed the decision. The issue before the court was whether s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act had application to a transfer effected by, or pursuant to, an order of the Family Court. The court found that s 121 did not apply to the transfer in question, as the transfer was not made for a consideration less valuable than the market value of the property at the time of the transfer. The court held that the consideration given by Mrs Mateo for the transfer of the property was not of less value than the market value of the interest transferred to her. The consideration given by Mrs Mateo included her unremunerated work in the home and the raising of the children, which the court found to be of significant value. The court also found that the Family Court's orders should be given full faith and credit, and that there was no basis to set aside those orders.
The court dismissed the Official Trustee's appeal. The matter of costs was reserved, and the parties were granted leave to file submissions concerning any application for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The matter of costs be reserved.
3. The parties have leave to file submissions concerning any application for costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Tamberlin J held the notice should be set aside. He granted Mrs Mateo’s application and dismissed the cross-claim. The Official Trustee appeals against these orders.The facts Mr and Mrs Mateo were married in 1972. Their children were born, respectively, in 1974, 1979 and 1982. The matrimonial home, immediately prior to 18 November 1997, was at 3 Coolibah Street, Merrylands West. I will refer to this property as “the home”. The home was owned jointly by Mr and Mrs Mateo. On that day, they mortgaged the home to Citibank Limited in order to secure a debt of $178,000. On 10 January 2000 Mr and Mrs Mateo separated. On 18 April 2000 they signed a document entitled “Consent Orders”. On 22 June 2000 the Family Court of Australia, by consent, made a series of orders that carried the agreed terms into effect. The substantive orders made by the Family Court may be summarised as follows:(i)Within 28 days, the husband was to transfer to the wife his interest in the home.(ii)Upon transfer of the husband’s interest, the wife was to be responsible for all outgoings on the home, including mortgage repayments, council and water rates and insurance, and was to indemnify the husband in relation to them.(iii)The wife was to pay the husband a total sum of $10,000; $3,000 upon signing the “Consent Orders” document and $7,000 upon the husband signing the transfer of the home.(iv)If the home was sold by the end of the year 2000, the wife was to pay an additional $10,000 to the husband and $80,000 “to the three children of the marriage at the direction of the husband”.(v)If the home was not sold by the end of 2000 (as it was not), the wife was nevertheless to pay the husband an additional $10,000. However, in that eventuality, the wife’s obligation to the children was a different one. She had to preserve their “entitlements”, pursuant to the previous clause, and divide amongst them, equally, the greater of the sum of $80,000 or one-third of the net proceeds of sale of the home.(vi)Within 28 days the husband was to transfer to the wife his interest in a Honda car.(vii)The wife’s name was to be removed from a credit card account.(viii)The wife was to be the owner of all chattels and personal items located in the home. In making the orders, the Family Court noted, pursuant to s 81 of the Family Law Act, that “the parties intend that these Orders as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them”. On 26 April 2000 Mrs Mateo paid her husband $3,000. She paid a further sum of $3,000 on 10 July 2000. There was evidence before Tamberlin J about other payments, but his Honour was not satisfied about them. The property transfer was registered on or about 10 August 2000. Tamberlin J found the “net amount received by [Mrs Mateo] on the transfer of the husband’s interest was approximately $107,000”. His Honour did not explain how this sum was calculated. On 19 March 2001 Mrs Mateo contracted to sell the home for $398,000. The sale was settled on 1 May 2001. Mrs Mateo applied some of the proceeds of sale to the purchase of a property at Toongabbie.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
There was evidence before Tamberlin J concerning the breakdown of the marriage between Mr and Mrs Mateo, and also Mr Mateo’s financial position at the date of the Family Court orders. His Honour made findings about each of these matters which were not challenged on appeal. They were:(i)“there was a genuine breakdown of marriage prior to April 2000”, the parties having mainly lived apart during the previous two or three years; and(ii)Mr Mateo was insolvent at the dates of both the consent orders and the transfer of his interests to Mrs Mateo.The decision of Tamberlin J In the argument before Tamberlin J, the Official Trustee relied, in the alternative, on both s 120 and s 121 of the Act. His Honour dealt with each section separately. Section 120 relevantly provides:“(1)A transfer of property by a person who later becomes a bankrupt (the transferor) to another person (the transferee) is void against the trustee in the transferor’s bankruptcy if:(a)the transfer took place in the period beginning 5 years before the commencement of the bankruptcy and ending on the date of the bankruptcy; and(b)the transferee gave no consideration for the transfer or gave consideration of less value than the market value of the property.(2)…(3)…(4)The trustee must pay to the transferee an amount equal to the value of any consideration that the transferee gave for a transfer that is void against the trustee.(5)For the purposes of subsections (1) and (4), the following have no value as consideration:(a)the fact that the transferee is related to the transferor;(b)if the transferee is the spouse or de facto spouse of the transferor – the transferee making a deed in favour of the transferor;(c)the transferee’s promise to marry, or to become the de facto spouse of, the transferor;(d)the transferee’s love or affection for the transferor.(6)This section does not affect the rights of a person who acquired property from the transferee in good faith and by giving consideration that was at least as valuable as the market value of the property.(6)For the purposes of this section:(a)transfer of property includes a payment of money; and(b)a person who does something that results in another person becoming the owner of property that did not previously exist is taken to have transferred the property to the other person; and(c)the market value of property transferred is its market value at the time of the transfer.” (Original highlighting) In relation to the s 120 claim, Tamberlin J said:“19 The primary submission for Ms Mateo is that notwithstanding that the transfer took place in the period commencing five years before the commencement of the bankruptcy, the transferee gave consideration for the transfer which was at least equal to the market value of the property at the time of transfer. 20 This submission is based firstly on the premise that as a consequence of the signing of the Consent Orders on 18 April 2000, the making of the application to the Family Court and the making by the Family Court of the Consent Orders in the form originally agreed, the beneficial interest in the property was transferred at the latest by 22 June 2000, to Ms Mateo. 21 It is submitted that since the equitable interest passed on 22 June 2000, there only remained in the husband a legal interest of nominal value and that by the time the ‘transfer’ took place, namely on or about 10 August 2000, the property had only a nominal market value and therefore there was no transfer for a consideration which was less than market value.22 This submission depends on the selection of the Memorandum of Transfer as the only operative transfer within the meaning of s 120 in isolation from the other elements in the transaction, namely the signing of the Consent Orders and the making of the Consent Orders.23 In my view, this is an artificial and unsupported approach to the interpretation of the meaning of the expression ‘transfer’ in s 120. The authorities indicate that one must look at the overall transaction which has been implemented rather than to simply isolate one individual component of the transaction as in itself comprising the transfer: see Silvera v Savic (1999) 46 NSWLR 124 at 140.24 In my view, the ‘transfer’ in this matter consisted of the whole transaction ranging from the signing of the Consent Orders on 18 April 2000 through to the completion of the transfer of the interest on or about 10 August 2000. There is no basis on which to isolate the making of the Consent Orders from the ‘transfer’ which took place and rely only on the formal instrument of transfer. Effectively, the transfer of the equitable interest to the applicant occurred when the orders were made on 22 June 2000. 25 I therefore reject the primary submission made for the applicant.26 However, I am not satisfied in the present case that the transfer which was effected by the above transaction was for a consideration which was less than the market value of the interest received by the applicant at the time of the transfer. 27 The language used in s 120(1)(b) is that the transferee gave no consideration for the transfer or gave consideration of less value than the market value of the property at the time of the transfer. In this case I am satisfied that consideration was given for the transfer. Further, I am not persuaded that consideration for the transfer was for less than the market value of the property. The burden of proof is on the party seeking to set aside the transaction and this has not been made out: P T Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Grellman (1992) 35 FCR 515 at 527-528. 28 The transfer in this case was carried out pursuant to orders of a superior Australian Federal Court, namely the Family Court and full faith and credit must be given to those orders unless they are set aside. No basis has been established before me to warrant the setting aside of any of these orders and indeed, if any ground had been raised, it might have been more appropriate to transfer the matter to the Family Court for determination of all the questions. No such application was made.29 The orders made in this case under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) were made in the exercise of statutory judicial discretion taking into account a broad range of matters, including financial contributions made by the parties to the marriage, together with other pertinent factors prescribed by the Act. The Court is enjoined not to make an order under s 79 unless it is satisfied that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to make the order.30 Evidence has been given by Ms Mateo in relation to extensive unremunerated work carried out by her in the home for the material benefit of herself and her husband during the approximate twenty-seven years that she and her husband lived together and the raising of the children. She has also given evidence as to mortgage payments having been met by her and rates having been paid by her over a period of nineteen months, which together amount to $11,037. I accept that these payments were made by her.31 The Consent Orders of 22 June 2000 require her to make payments of $20,000 to her husband, together with $80,000 to the three children of the marriage at the direction of the husband. Although the $80,000 has not been paid to date by the applicant, there is obligation under the Consent Orders to make the payment. As to the payment of the $20,000 I am not satisfied, on the evidence, that it has been paid, despite the obligation to do so in the Consent Orders. There are other steps required to be taken by the wife in the agreed Family Court orders. This is not a case where Ms Mateo seeks to rely on any of the matters excluded as consideration by s 120(5) of the Act.32 On the evidence, I am not persuaded that, taking into account the wife’s contribution and work in the joint enterprise, comprised by the marriage and bringing up of a family, that the consideration for the transfer of the husband’s interest in the property, was of less value than the market value of the interest transferred to her: cf Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Sabri (1996) 137 FLR 165 at 181-182. If account is taken of the duration of the marriage and the number of hours which she said she worked in caring for the children and in and around the home over the twenty-seven years of marriage for approximately thirty-five hours per week, I am not satisfied that the consideration given by her was of less value than the market value of the property. Indeed, even allowing a minimal amount per hour for the amount of work carried out by her, the value of the work would far exceed the fair net market value of the interest she received after taking into account the outstanding debts and charges.33 Accordingly, for the above reasons, I am not satisfied that the transaction resulting from the signing and making of the Consent Orders was a transfer for less than the market value of the property. 34 In relation to the transfer of the Honda Prelude motor vehicle, I am further satisfied on the evidence of Ms Mateo that the vehicle belonged to her. Although it was registered in joint names, I am satisfied that the husband had access to another motor vehicle in connection with his work and that the vehicle in question was treated as solely the property of Ms Mateo.”