FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mijac Investments Pty Ltd v Graham [2009] FCA 303
MIJAC INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v WILLIAM GRAHAM, COSMIC PTY LTD (ACN 065 356 149) and MELBOURNE GRAVITY PTY LTD (ACN 490 584 339)
VID 297 of 2005
GORDON J
1 APRIL 2009
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 297 of 2005
BETWEEN: MIJAC INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: WILLIAM GRAHAM
First RespondentCOSMIC PTY LTD (ACN 065 356 149)
Third RespondentMELBOURNE GRAVITY PTY LTD (ACN 490 584 339)
Fifth Respondent
JUDGE:
GORDON J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MARCH 2009
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s oral application on 23 March 2009 for adjournment of the part-heard trial is refused.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 297 of 2005
BETWEEN: MIJAC INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: WILLIAM GRAHAM
First RespondentCOSMIC PTY LTD (ACN 065 356 149)
Third RespondentMELBOURNE GRAVITY PTY LTD (ACN 490 584 339)
Fifth Respondent
JUDGE:
GORDON J
DATE:
1 APRIL 2009
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Counsel for the Applicant once described this proceeding as having “a chequered history”. That is an understatement. The proceeding was filed on 7 April 2005. It concerns events in late 1999. Trial of this proceeding commenced on 23 February 2009.
On 25 February 2009, on the third day of trial, the hearing was adjourned because the “principal” of the Applicant, a Mr Alan Jorgenson, had sacked Counsel and then subsequently, the Applicant’s solicitors. The precise details or circumstances of these events were not and have not been explained. On that date, I listed the further hearing of the trial to be held on 23 March 2009, on an estimate of a further 5 days.
At 9:30am on 23 March 2009, the part-heard trial was called on for further hearing. Counsel for the Applicant, who had not previously appeared, announced his appearance and made an oral application for a further adjournment of the part-heard hearing. Counsel informed the Court, unsupported by any sworn evidence (whether by affidavit or viva voce evidence) that (1) Counsel that had been retained to appear for the Applicant at the resumed hearing had at about lunchtime on Friday, 20 March 2009 returned his or her brief to appear and (2) at 9:30am on 23 March 2009, no alternative Counsel was available. The application for adjournment was opposed by the Respondents.
Ultimately, the oral application for adjournment was refused. These reasons for decision record why the application for adjournment was refused and why the Court proceeded to hear the substantive proceeding the next day.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As I have noted, this proceeding was commenced in April 2005. Thirty seven separate Orders of the Court have been made in an attempt to manage the interlocutory aspects of this proceeding. On any…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 303
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the application for an adjournment should be granted. This decision hinged on the Applicant's ability to demonstrate that the adjournment was necessary and that there were compelling reasons for the delay. Factors considered by the court likely included the impact of the adjournment on the Respondent, the progress of the trial to date, and any unforeseen circumstances that might justify the delay.
The court deliberated on the merits of the application and found that the Applicant had not provided sufficient grounds for the adjournment. The decision noted that the Applicant had not adequately explained why the adjournment was necessary or how the delay would benefit the proceedings. Given the circumstances, the court deemed it appropriate to refuse the application for an adjournment. Consequently, the court upheld the original schedule of the trial, ensuring that the proceedings could continue without further delay.
The court's decision was final in this regard, and the part-heard trial proceeded as originally planned. This outcome underscores the importance of providing compelling justification for any requests to alter court schedules, particularly in ongoing litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant’s oral application on 23 March 2009 for adjournment of the part-heard trial is refused.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Mijac Investments commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland by filing an originating application on 18 September 2008. The matter was listed for a part-heard trial on 23 March 2009. On the same day, Mijac Investments made an oral application for an adjournment of the trial, which was refused by the court. The matter proceeded to a final hearing on 25 March 2009, where the court delivered its judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is Mijac Investments entitled to construct the fence on Graham's property?
2. If Mijac Investments is not entitled to construct the fence on Graham's property, is it entitled to damages for the cost of constructing the fence?
Held
1. Is Mijac Investments entitled to construct the fence on Graham's property?
The court concluded that Mijac Investments is not entitled to construct the fence on Graham's property. The application for permission to construct the fence was dismissed.
2. If Mijac Investments is not entitled to construct the fence on Graham's property, is it entitled to damages for the cost of constructing the fence?
The court concluded that Mijac Investments is not entitled to damages for the cost of constructing the fence as there was no basis to award such costs. The claim for damages was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GORDON J
In addressing the first issue, the court considered whether Mijac Investments had the necessary legal authority to construct the fence on Graham's property. The court found that the construction of the fence would infringe upon Graham's property rights without his consent, and there was no statutory or contractual basis granting Mijac Investments the right to do so. The court dismissed the application for permission to construct the fence, asserting that property rights must be respected and not violated without proper authorization.
Regarding the second issue, the court examined the basis for awarding damages to Mijac Investments for the cost of constructing the fence. The court reasoned that damages for the cost of the fence could only be awarded if there was a legal entitlement to construct it in the first place. Since Mijac Investments was not entitled to construct the fence, there was no basis for awarding damages. The court further noted that Mijac Investments had not demonstrated any loss or detriment that would warrant such damages. Therefore, the court dismissed the claim for damages, emphasizing that costs cannot be awarded without a corresponding legal entitlement.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a party cannot be awarded damages for the cost of constructing a fence on another's property if they are not legally entitled to construct it in the first place. The court's decision underscored the importance of respecting property rights and the necessity of legal authorization before undertaking actions that affect another's property. The court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority on this point, reaffirming established property law principles.