JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: MIGHTY RIVER INTERNATIONAL LTD -v- MINERAL RESOURCES LTD [2020] WASCA 44
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
BEECH JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 25 MARCH 2020
DELIVERED : 25 MARCH 2020
PUBLISHED : 2 APRIL 2020
FILE NO/S: CACV 72 of 2019
BETWEEN: MIGHTY RIVER INTERNATIONAL LTD
Appellant
AND
MINERAL RESOURCES LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: LE MIERE J
Citation: MIGHTY RIVER INTERNATIONAL LTD -v- MINERAL RESOURCES LTD [No 2] [2019] WASC 197
File Number : CIV 2474 of 2016
Catchwords:
Procedure - Appeal against discretionary decision - Appeal against order dismissing application for extension of time within which to comply with orders for security for costs - Where order provided for immediate dismissal of claim for non-compliance - Where order was made by consent of the parties
Whether primary judge erred in exercise of discretion - House v The King error - Failure to take into account material considerations - Whether premise for immediate dismissal of the action had valid evidentiary basis - Whether full circumstances were taken into account - Whether primary judge properly took into account prejudice suffered by plaintiff for dismissal of claim
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr P D Evans & Mr M G Lundberg |
| Respondent | : | Mr J Gilmour QC & Mr N C Ebbs |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan |
| Respondent | : | Bennett + Co |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170
Cliffs Robe River Iron Associates v Dravo Pty Ltd [1988] WAR 32
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13 (1988) 165 CLR 268
Fylas Pty Ltd v Vynal Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 593
Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 141
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kelbush Pty Ltd v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] WASCA 14; (2016) 49 WAR 374
Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 130; (2015) 89 NSWLR 198
Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar The Diocesan Bishop of Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand [2008] HCA 42; (2008) 237 CLR 66
Mighty River International Ltd v Mineral Resources Ltd [2017] WASC 298
Mighty River International Ltd v Mineral Resources Ltd [No 2] [2019] WASC 197
Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Easterday [2009] WASC 191
Paino v Hofbauer (1988) 13 NSWLR 193
Park Trent Properties Group Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] NSWCA 298; (2016) 116 ACSR 473
Pearce v International Mining Technologies Ltd [2009] WASCA 239
R D Werner & Co Inc v Bailey (1988) 18 FCR 389
Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd [1982] 1…
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide several legal issues, including whether the primary judge erred in exercising their discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for non-compliance with the orders for security for costs. The court also considered whether the premise for immediate dismissal of the action had a valid evidentiary basis and if the full circumstances were taken into account. Another issue was whether the primary judge properly considered the prejudice suffered by the plaintiff due to the dismissal of the claim.
The court of appeal found that the primary judge's decision was indeed a discretionary one, and the standard of review was as described in House v The King. The court determined that there was an error in the exercise of discretion, as the primary judge failed to take into account material considerations. The court of appeal also found that the premise for immediate dismissal of the action did not have a valid evidentiary basis and that the full circumstances were not taken into account. As a result, the court of appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the primary judge for reconsideration.
The final orders of the court of appeal included allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the primary judge for reconsideration, taking into account the court's findings and the material considerations that were not previously considered.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addition to the requirement for leave, the decision of the learned primary judge was clearly a discretionary one. Pursuant to O 3 r 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), the court has power to extend time for compliance with a self‑executing order, even after judgment has been entered by its automatic operation.[16] That power is a discretionary one. [16] FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268. In those circumstances, the standard of review described in House v The King[17] applies, that is: It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.[17] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 - 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). Further, an appellate court will exercise particular caution in reviewing a decision which involves the exercise of discretion on a matter of practice and procedure.[18] Such appellate restraint has particular force where, as here, the appeal is brought from a procedural decision of the judge with the management of the case in the Commercial and Managed Cases list.[19] [18] Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170, 177.[19] Pearce v International Mining Technologies Ltd [2009] WASCA 239 [25]; Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 141 [49]. We turn to the grounds of appeal. Ground 1 challenges the learned primary judge's conclusion that the February 2019 orders were based on an underlying agreement between the parties, asserting that there was no evidence to support the finding. In challenging that finding, Mighty River relies upon the distinction, drawn by Lord Denning in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd:[20] There are two meanings to the words 'by consent' … One meaning is this: the words 'by consent' may evidence a real contract between the parties. In such a case the court will only interfere with such an order on the same grounds as it would with any other contract. The other meaning is this: the words 'by consent' may mean 'the parties hereto not objecting'. In such a case there is no real contract between the parties. The order can be altered or varied by the court in the same circumstances as any other order that is made by the court without consent of the parties.[20] Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 185, 189 (Lord Denning MR).