JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: MIGHTY RIVER INTERNATIONAL LTD -v- MINERAL RESOURCES LTD [No 2] [2019] WASC 197
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 10 MAY 2019
DELIVERED : 12 JUNE 2019
FILE NO/S: CIV 2474 of 2016
BETWEEN: MIGHTY RIVER INTERNATIONAL LTD
Plaintiff
AND
MINERAL RESOURCES LTD
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Consent orders - Self-executing orders - Non-compliance with time stipulation - Consent orders for the payment of security for costs - Where consent orders provide for proceedings to be immediately dismissed if failure to comply with consent orders - Whether orders should be varied to provide extension of time for compliance - Whether plaintiff's explanation for non-compliance is adequate - Power to extend time discretionary - Grounds for exercising - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 3 r 5
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Ms V E Long-Droppert |
| Defendant | : | Mr M L Bennett & Mr D Banda |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Justice Legal |
| Defendant | : | Bennett + Co |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198
Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes & Bredenkamp [2017] WASC 69
Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes [2017] WASCA 152
Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes [2018] HCA 38
Mighty River International Ltd v Mineral Resources Ltd [2017] WASC 298
Paino v Hofbauer (1988) 13 NSWLR 193
Trust Co (Nominees) Ltd v Angas Securities Ltd (No 4) [2016] FCA 1240
LE MIERE J:
Summary
On 13 February 2019, I made an order by consent that the plaintiff give security for the defendant's costs of the action up to and including the preparation and attendance at mediation in the sum of $30,000 by payment of that amount into court by 1 May 2019. I further ordered that if the plaintiff failed to comply with the first order, the proceedings be immediately dismissed and the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings to be taxed if not agreed.
The plaintiff did not give security for the defendant's costs in the sum of $30,000 by payment of money into court by 1 May 2019. The plaintiff paid $30,000 into court on 3 May 2019.
The defendant seeks orders that the proceedings be dismissed and the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs to be taxed if not agreed.
On 10 May 2019, the plaintiff applied for an order extending the time for it to comply with the security for costs order to 3 May 2019. For the reasons which follow, the plaintiff's application should be dismissed.
The plaintiff's claim
It is necessary to make only a brief reference to the nature of the plaintiff's case and the issues in the proceeding.
A very broad outline of the case of the plaintiff, Mighty River International Ltd (Mighty River), is as…
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- Case
- [2019] WASC 197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed this issue by examining the relevant rules and precedents. It noted that RSC O 3 r 5(1) and RSC O 3 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules provide the court with the power to extend the time for compliance with any order, even if the application is made after the expiration of the specified period. This power, rooted in the notion of relieving against injustice, is discretionary. The court emphasised that the exercise of this discretion is fact-specific, and no single factor or set of factors determines the outcome. Instead, the court must consider what justice requires in the particular circumstances of the case. The court also considered the argument by Mineral Resources' counsel, Mr Bennett, who referred to Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that an exceptional case must be made out for an extension of time for compliance with consent orders based on an agreement. However, the court distinguished this case from Paino v Hofbauer, where the trial judge had extended the time for payment of instalments in accordance with a settlement agreement.
The court ultimately decided that the discretion to extend time is to be exercised based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. In this instance, the court found that Mighty River had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time. Consequently, the application to vary the consent orders to allow for a later compliance date was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
RSC O 3 r 5(1) provides that the court may extend the period within which a person is required by any order to do any act in any proceedings. RSC O 3 r 5(2) provides that the court may extend such period although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period. This gives the court power to extend the time for compliance with a self‑executing order (often referred to as a springing order), such as the February 2019 orders, even after judgment has been entered by its automatic operation: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268. The power to extend time is a power to extend time to relieve against injustice. It is a discretionary power. There is seldom one factor or one set of factors which are prescriptive of a particular result. Ultimately, the question is: what does justice, in all its notions or senses of it that are relevant, require in the circumstances of the case? Mighty River seeks an extension of time to comply with an order that was made by consent. Counsel for Mineral Resources, Mr Bennett, submitted that the party seeking an extension of time must make out an exceptional case before the court would vary times fixed by a consent order based on an agreement, where the underlying agreement could not be set aside or varied. Mr Bennett referred to Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the decision of the trial judge to refuse an application for an extension of time by which to comply with consent orders. The appellant contended that the trial judge had taken into account an irrelevant consideration in finding that it was necessary to establish an exceptional case to extend time to comply with consent orders that were based on an underlying contract. The trial judge had applied Paino v Hofbauer (1988) 13 NSWLR 193. The appellants submitted that Paino was plainly wrong and ought not be followed. In Paino, judgment had been entered in accordance with an agreement between the parties to settle the litigation. The judgment provided that the respondents pay to the appellants the sum of $750,000. Order 5 provided that execution of the judgment be stayed provided that the respondents pay the judgment sum by specified instalments. The respondents commenced paying the instalments in accordance with the judgment, but failed to pay the later instalments on time. The consequence was that, unless an order was made extending the time for payment of the instalments which were in default, the respondents became liable for the verdict of $750,000 and lost the right conferred by the judgment to a stay of the judgment upon payment of $530,000. The trial judge extended the time for making the payments to the date upon which the payment was actually made by the respondents. McHugh JA, with whom Samuels and Clarke JJA agreed, found that the trial judge had erred in the exercise of her discretion and therefore the Appeal Court must exercise the discretion itself.