MHCZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration)

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MHCZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 4259 (21 October 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2019/0782

Re:MHCZ

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Home Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC
Emeritus Professor P A Fairall, Senior Member

Date:21 October 2019

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal decides that:

1.The reviewable decision, being the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs dated 6 February 2019 to refuse the applicant’s XA-866 (permanent protection) visa, is set aside.

2.The matter is remitted to the Minister with a direction that the applicant is not a danger to the Australian community.

...............................[SGD]..........................

Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC

CATCHWORDS

MIGRATION – refusal of XA-866 (permanent protection) visa – where the applicant convicted by final judgment of particularly serious crime – whether applicant will be a danger to the Australian community if released back into the community – application of WKCG – where mental health issues impacted on offending – whether applicant can receive adequate treatment – question of compliance with treatment and support measure – decision set aside

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5M, 36, 65, 501

CASES

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96, (2017) 248 FCR 456

BHYK and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] AATA 662
DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63
MVLW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1557
NDBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1631
Re Salazar-Arbelaez and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 1 ALD 98
SZOQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 40

WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Ministerial Direction No 75 – Refusal of protection visas relying on section 36(1C) and section 36(2C)(b)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President B W Rayment OAM QC
Emeritus Professor P A Fairall, Senior Member

21 October 2019

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant was born in March 1996 in the Janghori district of Afghanistan.[1] He came to Australia as a child on a Class XB Subclass 202 Global Special Humanitarian visa on in August 2010. His father was killed by Taliban extremists in 2008.[2]

    [1] Protection Visa Decision Record (“PVDR”): T2, pp 12 and 13.

    [2] The sentencing remarks refer only to the killing of the applicant’s father by the Taliban: T5, p 89. The PVDR refers to the applicant’s claim that his father was killed by the Taliban and that he was hit with a rifle butt: T2, p 15.

  2. There is some evidence that he was born in 1994.[3]

    [3] His mother told the delegate that she had mistakenly understated the age of each of her three children by two years during the off-shore visa processing: T2, p 13. The delegate declined to adjust the birthdate from 1996 to 1994 on the basis that the Freedom of Information section considered the information provided in the initial visa application.

  3. In April 2015, the applicant was sentenced in the New…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4259
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MHCZ and the Minister for Home Affairs concerned an application for a permanent protection visa (XA-866) that was refused. The applicant had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The central dispute revolved around whether the applicant posed a danger to the Australian community if released, particularly in light of their mental health issues and the potential for adequate treatment. The matter was heard by Deputy B W Rayment Oam Qc P.

The court was required to determine whether the applicant was a person who, on reasonable grounds, posed a danger to the Australian community. This assessment was not a discretionary power, unlike that under section 501 of the Act. The court also had to consider the scope of the phrase "having been convicted" in section 36(1C)(b), specifically whether it limited the inquiry to dangers directly associated with the previous offending behaviour.

The court reasoned that the assessment of dangerousness was not confined to the nature of the past offending but required a holistic review of all circumstances up to the time of the tribunal's decision, including events that occurred after the convictions. The court applied the principle from *WKCG* that while the conviction is highly relevant, it is not conclusive. The court noted that a substantial period had elapsed since the offending, and events transpiring since then were pertinent to the assessment of dangerousness, which is to be made at large and at the time of the hearing. The court also clarified that it was not required to balance the danger to the community against the harm to the applicant if returned to Afghanistan.

The decision of the delegate was set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 65 provides:65 Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa(1)Subject to sections 84 and 86, after considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:(a)if satisfied that:(i) the health criteria for it (if any) have been satisfied; and(ii) the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied; and(iii) the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 40 (circumstances when granted), 91W (evidence of identity and bogus documents), 91WA (bogus documents and destroying identity documents), 91WB (applications for protection visas by members of same family unit), 500A (refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas), 501 (special power to refuse or cancel) or any other provision of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth; and(iv) any amount of visa application charge payable in relation to the application has been paid;is to grant the visa; or(b)if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa.PRELIMINARY MATTERS At the outset, we make some preliminary observations. First, in these proceedings we are not required to balance the danger to the community against the possible harm to the applicant if returned to Afghanistan: SZOQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 40 at [27]. In determining whether the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is not a person whom it considers, on reasonable grounds, is a danger to the Australian community, the Tribunal is not exercising a discretionary power (unlike the power provided for under s 501): MVLW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1557 at [29]–[32]. If we consider, on reasonable grounds, that the applicant is a danger to the Australian community, we must affirm the delegate’s decision. Section 65 of the Act requires that if the Tribunal is not satisfied that the criteria for the visa prescribed by the Act or the regulations have been satisfied, then it is required “to refuse the visa”: see also BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96, (2017) 248 FCR 456, at [48] and [49]. Second, the words “having been convicted” in s 36(1C)(b) do not limit the inquiry to danger of a kind associated with the previous offending behaviour. We accept the statement by Deputy President Tamberlin QC in WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512 (‘WKCG’) at [29]:Of course, the nature and circumstances of the conviction or convictions will generally be highly relevant to the question whether the person can be described as being a “danger”. However, it is not conclusive. It is necessary to look at the person's conduct in the light of all the circumstances that have occurred up to the time of making the tribunal decision both before and after the period of the convictions. Events that have transpired since the offending are relevant to the assessment of dangerousness, especially so where, as in the present case, substantial time has elapsed – nearly six years – since the offending in question. The assessment of danger is at large, and based on an assessment at the time of the hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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