Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1450

Citation: Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1450
Parties: METZ HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 059 264 210) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ZULU TRUST AND GROUP M PTY LTD (ACN 118 506 148) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ROUBAIX TRUST, MERVIN METZ and FARREL METZ v SIMMAC PTY LTD (ACN 062 327 397), PAUL CAMPBELL SIM, LINDA MCBRIERTY and LINDA MCBRIERTY AND EDWARD HUGH JENNINGS AS TRUSTEES FOR THE LINDA MCBRIERTY SUPERANNUATION FUND
File number: WAD 114 of 2009
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 15 December 2011
Catchwords: COSTS - offer of compromise - application for indemnity costs pursuant to O 23 r 11(4) of the Federal Court Rules - whether the Court should 'otherwise order'  - indemnity costs ordered
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 23 r 11(4)
Cases cited: Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd and others (1988) FCA 202; (1988) 81 ALR 397
Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 40
Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 981
Stambulich & Ors v Ekamper [2001] WASCA 283
Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 354
Timms v Clift [1998] 2 Qd R 100
Date of hearing: 31 August 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P Mendelow
Solicitor for the Applicants: Karp Steedman Ross-Adjie Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr BG Grubb
Solicitor for the Respondents: Metaxas & Hager

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 114 of 2009

BETWEEN:

METZ HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 059 264 210) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ZULU TRUST AND GROUP M PTY LTD (ACN 118 506 148) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ROUBAIX TRUST
First Applicants

MERVIN METZ
Second Applicant

FARREL METZ
Third Applicant

AND:

SIMMAC PTY LTD (ACN 062 327 397)
First Respondent

PAUL CAMPBELL SIM
Second Respondent

LINDA MCBRIERTY
Third Respondent

LINDA MCBRIERTY AND EDWARD HUGH JENNINGS AS TRUSTEES FOR THE LINDA MCBRIERTY SUPERANNUATION FUND
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first and second respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs, on a party and party basis until 23 February 2011 and thereafter on an indemnity basis.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 114 of 2009

BETWEEN:

METZ HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 059 264 210) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ZULU TRUST AND GROUP M PTY LTD (ACN 118 506 148) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ROUBAIX TRUST
First Applicants

MERVIN METZ
Second Applicant

FARREL METZ
Third Applicant

AND:

SIMMAC PTY LTD (ACN 062 327 397)
First Respondent

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1450
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Metz Holdings Pty Ltd (Applicants) sought indemnity costs against Simmac Pty Ltd (Respondents) under former O 23 r 11(4) of the Federal Court Rules following a successful application for rescission of the sale of a lighting business. The dispute centred on whether the Court should order indemnity costs based on the offer of compromise made by the Respondents. The Applicants had argued that the judgment was more favourable than the offer, thus justifying an indemnity costs order, while the Respondents contended that the judgment was not more favourable and that there was no good reason for the Court to order indemnity costs.

The Court considered whether O 23 r 11(4) created a statutory regime or if the Court retained a general discretion to award indemnity costs. The Applicants argued that the rule required the Court to make an assessment based on the favourability of the judgment relative to the offer and that, in the absence of a good reason to the contrary, indemnity costs should be awarded. The Respondents argued that the Court retains a broader discretion and that the decision in Timms v Clift supported this view. The Court noted that under the Federal Court Act, the Court has broad discretion in awarding costs, subject to the Federal Court Rules. The Court also considered the Full Court's dicta in Futuretronics.com.au, which suggested a rebuttable presumption in favour of indemnity costs once an offer is made and a no less favourable judgment is obtained.

The Court found that the Applicants had obtained a more favourable judgment, given that the rescission of the sale was considerably more advantageous than the monetary offer made by the Respondents. Although the Respondents argued that the true value of the offer was higher, considering the counterclaim, the Court deemed the substantive remedy of rescission to be significantly more favourable to the Applicants. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no good reason to deviate from the presumption in favour of indemnity costs, and ordered that the Respondents pay the Applicants' costs on an indemnity basis from 23 February 2011 onwards.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and second respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs, on a party and party basis until 23 February 2011 and thereafter on an indemnity basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Therefore, the respondents contend that by reason of the above, it cannot be said that the respondents had no chance of success in this action or otherwise defended it for an ‘ulterior motive’ – such that the applicants are entitled to costs on an indemnity basis. CONSIDERATION Counsel for the applicant submitted that O 23 r 11(4) created a statutory regime, and that the Court was required to make the assessment whether the offer received was more favourable or not, and if the offer was not more favourable and there was no good reason to otherwise order, indemnity costs ought to be awarded. Counsel for the respondent disagreed and submitted that the Court retains a general discretion for the award of indemnity costs made pursuant to O 23 r 11(4), and this is imported by the decision of Timms v Clift, on which the applicants rely. Section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) confers a broad discretion on the Court to award costs in proceedings such as these. The exercise of the discretion however is affected by Federal Court Rules such as O 23 r 11(4) as they applied at material times. The question then becomes how to approach an application such as the one before the Court which has been made pursuant to former O 23 r 11(4). I note the dicta of the Full Court in Futuretronics.com.au to the effect that once an offer is made, and a judgment no less favourable obtained, a rebuttable presumption in favour of indemnity costs is created. It then becomes incumbent on the defendant to show proper reasons why the presumption should not crystallise, and which in general only arise in an exceptional case. (It may be noted, in passing, that r 25.14 of the current rules appears to remove the discretion where an offer is refused and indemnity costs follow.) It is not in dispute between the parties that an offer was made pursuant to O 23 r 11(4). The first question is whether a judgment no less favourable has been obtained by the applicants. This is a proceeding where the applicants have been awarded rescission of the sale of the lighting business, and the offer made to the respondents in February was by way of a sum of money, namely, $420,000. The respondents submitted that the true effect of the proposed compromise was of an amount much more than that, as the offer required the respondents to forego the $250,000 on their counterclaim, a counterclaim that the respondent was ultimately successful in obtaining on judgment. This aggregate sum of $670,000 is, the respondents submit, nowhere near the ultimate flow of monies awarded to the applicants of $544,441.40. I consider it is reasonable to take these sums into account when assessing whether the judgment obtained was more favourable than the offer. However, this is a case in which rescission was ordered, and this is a remedy which I consider to be, on its face, considerably more favourable from the applicants’ point of view than the settlement proposed by the applicants. In this regard, I do not consider O 23 r 11(4) to be limited simply to the assessment of monetary claims. It is the substantive remedy or remedies given that matter.