Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 400

File number: NSD 918 of 2015
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 21 April 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether proceeding should be summarily dismissed – whether applicants precluded by Anshun estoppel from obtaining claims under Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) – whether Supreme Court of New South Wales invested with federal jurisdiction with respect to such claims – whether unreasonable for applicants to refrain from making such claims in earlier proceedings – whether claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process have any reasonable prospect of success

Held: proceeding dismissed

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2

Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)

Contracts Review Act 1987 (NSW)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) ss 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16

Independent Contractors Regulations 2007 (Cth) Reg 5

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 4

Cases cited:

Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 232 FCR 428

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 166

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 531

Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287

Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 505

Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419

Ian David Menzies & Anor v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2015] HCASL 42

Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446

Johnson v Emmerson and Sparrow (1871) 6 Exch 329

Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexam Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508

Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] NSWCA 210

Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd (No 5) [2014] NSWCA 258

Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 460

Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 551

Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 743

Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies(No 5) [2013] NSWSC 772

Ramsay v Pigram (1967) 118 CLR 271

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (No 2) (1981) 147 CLR 589

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1

Young v Lalic [2006] NSWSC 18

Date of hearing: 1 October 2015
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr DW Rayment
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 918 of 2015
BETWEEN:

IAN DAVID MENZIES

First Applicant

COLLEEN ANNE MENZIES

Second Applicant

AND:

PACCAR FINANCIAL PTY LTD

First Respondent

PACCAR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 400
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd concerned a dispute over the validity and enforceability of a guarantee provided by Mr. and Mrs. Menzies to Paccar Financial, along with the indebtedness under the guarantee. The matter was brought before the Federal Court of Australia, which had to decide whether the proceeding should be summarily dismissed, whether the applicants were precluded by Anshun estoppel from obtaining claims under the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth), whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales was invested with federal jurisdiction with respect to such claims, whether it was unreasonable for the applicants to refrain from making such claims in earlier proceedings, and whether the claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process had any reasonable prospect of success.

The court concluded that the validity and enforceability of the guarantee, along with Mr. and Mrs. Menzies' indebtedness under the guarantee, had already been finally determined in the Supreme Court proceedings. The claim for orders setting aside the guarantee on the basis that it was never entered into by Mr. and Mrs. Menzies was precluded by an issue estoppel, which prevents them from asserting as against Paccar Financial that it was never signed by them. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of res judicata, the causes of action upon which Paccar Finance’s claims against Mr. and Mrs. Menzies were founded no longer had any independent existence, since they had merged into the order for payment. The court found that the proceeding should be summarily dismissed and that the applicants should pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding.

The court's decision was based on the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata, which prevent the applicants from raising the same issues and causes of action again in a different proceeding. The court also considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine whether the applicants had a reasonable prospect of success in their claims. Ultimately, the court found that the applicants' claims were not supported by a reasonable prospect of success and that the proceeding should be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be summarily dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Paragraphs 3-17 and 19 of the amended statement of claim dated 27 September 2015 allege as follows:3. This action is taken pursuant to the:-ŸIndependent Contractors Act 2006 (In General) and Sec 9; 32; 34; 36; 38.ŸThe Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No: 1 and 2) 2010. (in General) and Schedule 3; 4; 6; 7; 9; 10; 20; 21; 23 29; 31; 34; 35; 52; 53; 54; 278; 286;ŸIndustrial Relations Act 1996 No. 17. (In General) and Part 9.4.On or about April and May 2006 the Respondent via its New South Wales Finance Manager and its Dealer sold two Kenworth B-Double trucks and trailers to the Applicant (s) company together with work.The Respondent organised a letter and promises from Toll SPD guaranteeing the work.The Respondent also promised the Applicant's Flexible Finance which it also advertised on its website.5.In May 2006 the Respondent via its New South Wales Finance Manager had the Applicants sign a credit application that did not refer to terms that were thought to be a credit application by the Applicants and that were later claimed to be the final contract documents to which the parties had reached agreement as to how the trucks and trailers would be paid for.The Applicants were never given any opportunity to seek legal advice in regard to the credit application.6.The work lasted for approximately 16 months. Toll SPD did not require the trucks to do the work anymore and claimed that they never sold the Applicant's work.7.The Applicants advised the Respondent in about November 2007 and asked the Respondent to refinance pursuant to its promise and advertisements. All the vehicle payments were up to date and approximately $200,000 had been paid back at that time.8.The Respondent made various verbal and written undertakings that it would refinance from November 2007 until 17 July 2008. During that time the Applicants paid a further $90,000.9.On 24 June 2008 the First Applicant broke his neck, taking some 6 months to heal.10.On 17 July 2008 the Respondent refused to refinance. Approximately one week later it issued repossession notices for the trucks and trailers.11.The Applicants sought help from an accounting firm Hall Chadwick.Hall Chadwick brokered a Deed of Company Arrangement which would have had the Respondent's refinance the company Menzies Haulage Pty Ltd for the trucks and trailers and returned 100 cents in the dollar by the end of 2009.The Respondent threatened to sue Hall Chadwick as administrators if they attempted to assist the Applicants in dealing with the Applicant's claims in any way.12.The Respondent wound up the Applicants family company Menzies Haulage in September 2009.13.The Respondent sued the Applicants in the Victorian Supreme Court which was transferred to the New South Wales Supreme Court in late 2009.14.The Respondent bankrupted the Applicants in June 2010. The Applicants appealed that decision in the Federal Court in Melbourne. The bankruptcy was set aside with costs and incidental costs which the Respondent has refused to pay.15.The Respondent in the New South Wales Supreme Court took action against the Applicants. The matter was heard without any evidence from the Applicants and in their absence.16.The Applicants claim Damages pursuant to the Respondent failing to refinance in line with the Flexible Finance promised and advertised on its website and that the work said to be provided was not ongoing.17.The contract between the Applicant's and the Respondent's, which was a contract of guarantee was an unfair contract for the purposes of the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth). The Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act No.1 and 2. 2010 and The Industrial Relations Act 1996 No. 17.…19.The Applicants allege the Respondents Deed of Loan and Charge Terms and Conditions are unjust and unlawful pursuant to the Independent Contractors Act 2006 and the Trade Practices Amendment (ACL) Act.ŸProspective liability page 3 100 per cent more than the amount advanced.ŸClause 7 Increased CostsŸClause 19.4 Authority to fill in blanksŸClause 20 Rights a Lender may exercise at anytimeŸClause 20.1 Authority to dealŸClause 20.2 Lenders Right to EnterŸClause 20.4 Right to rectifyŸClause 21.4 Order to enforcementŸClause 22 Disposal of Secured PropertyŸClause 23.1 AppointmentŸClause 23.2 PowersŸClause 24 Exclusion of time periodsŸClause 24.1 [sic] No Notice required unless MandatoryŸClause 28.3 CertificatesThis is what Harrison As.J. accepted as to the amount alleged to be owed by Menzies without any evidence whatsoever.Clause 28.0 [sic] ConfidentialityClause 28.7 No Liability for LossClause 28.8 Conflict of InterestThe Lender’s and any Receiver’s rights and remedies under any Transaction Document may be exercised even if this involves a conflict of duty or the Lender Or Receiver has a Personal Interest in their exercise.The Applicants say without fail the entire Deed of Loan Terms and Conditions should be struck out and Paccar be ordered not to use them whatsoever. Menzies never sighted or signed them in any way, make shape or form.(emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

French CJ and Gummow J said (at [25]) that subs 31A(2) “requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success” and that summary judgment should not be awarded to a respondent merely because the Court is of the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on some relevant factual issue. On the other hand, it is apparent from what their Honours said at [21] (when quoting with approval the observations of Lord Hope in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at 260-261) and at [26] that it may be open to the Court to conclude, upon an application under subs 31A(2), that the factual basis for a claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ emphasised (at [56]-[59]) the use of the phrase “no reasonable prospect” in s 31A and the undesirability of judicial glossing of those words. CONSIDERATION“Orders setting the contract and the guarantee” The validity and enforceability of the guarantee provided by Mr and Mrs Menzies to Paccar Financial, and Mr and Mrs Menzies’ indebtedness under the guarantee, was finally determined in the Supreme Court proceedings. The claim for orders setting aside the guarantee on the basis that it was never entered into by Mr and Mrs Menzies is precluded by an issue estoppel which prevents Mr and Mrs Menzies from asserting as against Paccar Financial that it was never signed by them: Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 531, Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446. In the latter case Fullagar J said at 466:The rule as to issue estoppel is generally stated in the words of Lord Ellenborough in Outram v Morewood [(1803) 3 East, at p. 355 [102 E.R. at p. 633]]. His Lordship said that parties and privies are “precluded from contending to the contrary of that point, or matter of fact, which having been once distinctly put in issue by them … has been, on such issue joined, solemnly found against them.” This is, I think a true case of estoppel, analogous to estoppel by deed and estoppel by representation. The same rule was concisely stated by Dixon J. in Blair v. Curran [(1939) 62 CLR at p. 534] where his Honour said: – “A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies.” Similarly, Mr and Mrs Menzies are also precluded by an issue estoppel which prevents them from asserting as against Paccar Financial that the amount payable by them under the guarantee was $572,442.96. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of res judicata the causes of action upon which Paccar Finance’s claims against Mr and Mrs Menzies were founded no longer have any independent existence, since they have merged into the order for payment: Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 505 at 507-510, Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexam Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 at 515. It is therefore no longer open to Mr and Mrs Menzies to challenge the validity or enforceability of guarantee or Paccar Financial’s entitlements thereunder which are now the subject of the order for payment.