FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 400
File number: NSD 918 of 2015 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 21 April 2016 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether proceeding should be summarily dismissed – whether applicants precluded by Anshun estoppel from obtaining claims under Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) – whether Supreme Court of New South Wales invested with federal jurisdiction with respect to such claims – whether unreasonable for applicants to refrain from making such claims in earlier proceedings – whether claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process have any reasonable prospect of success
Held: proceeding dismissed
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Contracts Review Act 1987 (NSW)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570(2)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) ss 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16
Independent Contractors Regulations 2007 (Cth) Reg 5
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 4
Cases cited: Australian Workers Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 232 FCR 428
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 531
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 505
Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419
Ian David Menzies & Anor v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2015] HCASL 42
Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446
Johnson v Emmerson and Sparrow (1871) 6 Exch 329
Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexam Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508
Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] NSWCA 210
Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd (No 5) [2014] NSWCA 258
Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 460
Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 551
Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies (No 4) [2013] NSWSC 743
Paccar Financial Pty Ltd v Menzies(No 5) [2013] NSWSC 772
Ramsay v Pigram (1967) 118 CLR 271
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (No 2) (1981) 147 CLR 589
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118
Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1
Date of hearing: 1 October 2015 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 74 Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr DW Rayment Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 918 of 2015 BETWEEN: IAN DAVID MENZIES
First Applicant
COLLEEN ANNE MENZIES
Second Applicant
AND: PACCAR FINANCIAL PTY LTD
First Respondent
PACCAR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 APRIL 2016
THE COURT ORDERS…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 400
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that the validity and enforceability of the guarantee, along with Mr. and Mrs. Menzies' indebtedness under the guarantee, had already been finally determined in the Supreme Court proceedings. The claim for orders setting aside the guarantee on the basis that it was never entered into by Mr. and Mrs. Menzies was precluded by an issue estoppel, which prevents them from asserting as against Paccar Financial that it was never signed by them. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of res judicata, the causes of action upon which Paccar Finance’s claims against Mr. and Mrs. Menzies were founded no longer had any independent existence, since they had merged into the order for payment. The court found that the proceeding should be summarily dismissed and that the applicants should pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding.
The court's decision was based on the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata, which prevent the applicants from raising the same issues and causes of action again in a different proceeding. The court also considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine whether the applicants had a reasonable prospect of success in their claims. Ultimately, the court found that the applicants' claims were not supported by a reasonable prospect of success and that the proceeding should be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The proceeding be summarily dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
French CJ and Gummow J said (at [25]) that subs 31A(2) “requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success” and that summary judgment should not be awarded to a respondent merely because the Court is of the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on some relevant factual issue. On the other hand, it is apparent from what their Honours said at [21] (when quoting with approval the observations of Lord Hope in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at 260-261) and at [26] that it may be open to the Court to conclude, upon an application under subs 31A(2), that the factual basis for a claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ emphasised (at [56]-[59]) the use of the phrase “no reasonable prospect” in s 31A and the undesirability of judicial glossing of those words. CONSIDERATION“Orders setting the contract and the guarantee” The validity and enforceability of the guarantee provided by Mr and Mrs Menzies to Paccar Financial, and Mr and Mrs Menzies’ indebtedness under the guarantee, was finally determined in the Supreme Court proceedings. The claim for orders setting aside the guarantee on the basis that it was never entered into by Mr and Mrs Menzies is precluded by an issue estoppel which prevents Mr and Mrs Menzies from asserting as against Paccar Financial that it was never signed by them: Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 531, Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446. In the latter case Fullagar J said at 466:The rule as to issue estoppel is generally stated in the words of Lord Ellenborough in Outram v Morewood [(1803) 3 East, at p. 355 [102 E.R. at p. 633]]. His Lordship said that parties and privies are “precluded from contending to the contrary of that point, or matter of fact, which having been once distinctly put in issue by them … has been, on such issue joined, solemnly found against them.” This is, I think a true case of estoppel, analogous to estoppel by deed and estoppel by representation. The same rule was concisely stated by Dixon J. in Blair v. Curran [(1939) 62 CLR at p. 534] where his Honour said: – “A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies.” Similarly, Mr and Mrs Menzies are also precluded by an issue estoppel which prevents them from asserting as against Paccar Financial that the amount payable by them under the guarantee was $572,442.96. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of res judicata the causes of action upon which Paccar Finance’s claims against Mr and Mrs Menzies were founded no longer have any independent existence, since they have merged into the order for payment: Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 505 at 507-510, Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexam Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 at 515. It is therefore no longer open to Mr and Mrs Menzies to challenge the validity or enforceability of guarantee or Paccar Financial’s entitlements thereunder which are now the subject of the order for payment.