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Mejia v The Queen

Mejia v The Queen

Case [2016] VSCA 296 28 November 2016

Appeal

Breach of Trust

Admissibility of Evidence

Inconsistencies in Evidence

Criminal Law

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2016 0029

ALBERT MEJIA (A PSEUDONYM)[1]	Applicant
v
THE QUEEN	Respondent

[1]To ensure there is no possibility of identification of the victim of the sexual offending, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.

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JUDGES:	MAXWELL P, KYROU and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	7 November 2016
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	28 November 2016
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2016] VSCA 296
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	[2015] VCC 1894

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Rape, incest, indecent act with child under 16 – Complainant was younger sister of accused – Whether verdicts unreasonable – Whether jury bound to have doubt about complainant’s credibility – Complainant contacted witnesses before trial – Dispute between complainant and accused over mother’s will – Whether complainant financially motivated – Inconsistencies in complaint evidence – Whether complainant’s behaviour inconsistent with allegations – Appeal allowed – Convictions quashed – Verdicts of acquittal entered – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 276(1)(a).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr D A Dann QC with Mr B W Johnston	Reichman & Co
For the Respondent	Ms D Piekusis	Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

MAXWELL P:

Summary

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment of Kyrou and Kaye JJA. Their Honours’ comprehensive account of the evidence, and of the course of the trial, makes it unnecessary for me to repeat any of those matters. I have, however, come to a different conclusion on the disposition of the appeal. For reasons which follow, I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.

Having read the trial transcript in its entirety, I am not persuaded that this is a case where the jury must have had a doubt about the guilt of the accused.[2] Clearly enough, there were matters which might have raised a doubt in the mind of a reasonable juror. But, in my view, none of the matters relied on by the applicant — taken either singly or collectively — precluded the jury from being satisfied of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[2]Klamo v The Queen (2008) 18 VR 644, 654 [39].

As will appear, all of the matters relied on by the applicant concern the complainant’s credit. The jury were perfectly capable, in my view, of resolving those credit issues for themselves. The defence attack on her credit was spelt out at length, and repeatedly, throughout the cross-examination and in the final address. Its themes were clearly delineated: she is a liar; she is motivated by money; she makes false allegations; she tries to get others to give false evidence’; and so on.

These were quintessential jury questions. The various strands of the attack were readily comprehensible. The questions raised went to matters of ordinary human experience. And the jury were clearly told by the prosecutor and by the judge that they could only convict…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Mejia v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Mejia v The Queen [2016] VSCA 296
Case: [2016] VSCA 296
Decision Date: 28 November 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mejia v The Queen involved an appeal by the accused against convictions for rape, incest, and an indecent act with a child under 16 years. The complainant, the accused’s younger sister, had alleged that the accused had committed these acts against her. The appeal was heard in the High Court of Australia. The primary issues before the Court were whether the verdicts were unreasonable, whether the jury was bound to have doubt about the complainant’s credibility, and whether there were inconsistencies in her evidence that should have led to acquittal.

The Court considered the credibility of the complainant, particularly in light of her contacting witnesses before the trial and the existence of a dispute between her and the accused over their mother’s will. The Court also examined the complainant’s behaviour post-incident to determine if it was consistent with her allegations. The Court found that the inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her behaviour after the alleged events were significant enough to create a reasonable doubt about her credibility. The Court held that the jury should have had doubts about her credibility, and therefore the convictions were unreasonable.

The High Court allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions. The Court entered verdicts of acquittal for the accused. This decision was based on the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 276(1)(a), which provides the Court with the authority to allow an appeal and quash convictions if it finds that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

Orders