McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS & ANOR

[2007] SASC 90

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice David)

16 March 2007

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - SOLICITOR AND CLIENT - RETAINER

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - JURISDICTION AND GENERALLY

Appeal from the decision of a Master rescinding a solicitor-client costs agreement on the grounds that the terms of the costs agreement were not fair or reasonable - duty of a solicitor to explain to a prospective client the meaning and practical effect of the costs agreement - content of a solicitor's duty to inform a client about costs under the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2003 - discusson of history of the Court's power over costs agreements.

Held: appeal dismissed.

Legal Practitioners Conduct Act 1981 (SA) s 13(2)(d), s 42, s 42(6), s 42(7); Attorneys' and Solicitors' Act 1870 (UK) s 9; Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2003 r 41, referred to.
McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law [2006] SASC 200; Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; Athanasiou v Ward Keller Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22; Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369; In Re Stuart [1893] 2 QB 201; Brown v Talbot & Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70; Law Society of NSW v Foreman (1994) 34 NSWLR 408; Re Morris Fletcher and Cross' Bill of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228; New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116; Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171; United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1; Renton Resources Pty Ltd v Johnson Winter & Slattery [2005] SASC 231, considered.

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS & ANOR
[2007] SASC 90

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Gray and David JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ. Mr and Mrs Kasmeridis (“the Kasmeridis”) applied for a taxation of costs to determine their liability to pay costs to their former solicitor, McNamara Business & Property Law (“McNamara”). McNamara lodged a bill of costs for taxation in accordance with a costs agreement (“the agreement”) between the parties. The Kasmeridis objected that the agreement relied on was not “an agreement in writing” for the purposes of s 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (“the Act”). The Master decided that point in their favour, but on appeal the Full Court held that the agreement was in writing for the purposes of the Act: McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis [2005] SASC 269; (2005) 92 SASR 382. When the matter returned to the Master the Kasmeridis claimed an order rescinding the agreement under s 42(7) of the Act on the grounds that terms of the agreement were “not fair and reasonable”.

  2. The Master…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 90
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis is an appeal against a Master's decision to rescind a solicitor-client costs agreement, arguing that the terms of the agreement were not fair or reasonable. The primary parties involved are McNamara Business & Property Law, acting as the solicitor, and Mr. Kasmeridis, the client. The dispute arose from a costs agreement executed in February 2004, where McNamara was engaged to act for Mr. Kasmeridis in relation to a default judgment and subsequent proceedings. Mr. Kasmeridis later sought to have the costs agreement rescinded on the grounds that the terms were not fair or reasonable.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the terms of the costs agreement were fair and reasonable and whether the solicitor had adequately explained the meaning and practical effect of the agreement to the client. The court was required to consider the content of a solicitor's duty to inform a client about costs under the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2003, specifically Rule 41, which mandates that a practitioner must give a client an estimate of the costs to be incurred unless it is unreasonable or inappropriate to do so. Furthermore, the court needed to evaluate the historical context of the Court's power over costs agreements and whether the solicitor fulfilled their duty to explain the agreement to the client.

The court found that while Mr. Kasmeridis had some experience in business and legal matters, there was no evidence to suggest that the solicitor, Mr. Viscariello, provided any explanation or advice regarding the costs agreement. The urgency of the situation, coupled with the solicitor's heavy workload, did not absolve them of their duty to ensure that the client understood the agreement. Given that the solicitor failed to provide an estimate of the costs to be incurred, a requirement under Rule 41, the court upheld the Master's decision to rescind the costs agreement. The court also noted that since no submissions were made regarding this specific rule, it did not comment further on the matter.

The final orders of the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Master's decision to rescind the costs agreement. The court agreed with the reasoning provided by Doyle CJ, concluding that the solicitor's failure to explain the agreement adequately and provide a cost estimate warranted the rscission of the agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The separate disposition of the point now raised by the Kasmeridis cannot result in conflicting judgments. The issues now raised are different from those raised before, although there is a common factual basis. For those brief reasons the two issues are not so closely connected that it is unreasonable to have them disposed of separately.Facts In November 2003 a company obtained a default judgment against the Kasmeridis in the Magistrates Court, for an amount of $39,175. In early February 2004 Mr Kasmeridis spoke to Mr Viscariello, an employee of McNamara. The situation had become urgent. The judgment creditor had a warrant for the sale of the Kasmeridis’ home, and the Sheriff was threatening to execute the warrant. Mr Kasmeridis was referred to Mr Viscariello through another person, who helped the Kasmeridis in connection with a number of premises at which they conducted a picture framing business. On 5 February Mr Viscariello sent to the Kasmeridis a letter setting out the terms on which McNamara would act for them, accompanied by “Terms of Engagement” and a “Schedule of Fees”. These together constitute the agreement. I set out below the relevant provisions of the “Terms of Engagement” and of the “Schedule of Fees”: TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT On 9 February Mr Viscariello spoke by telephone with Mr Kasmeridis. Mr Kasmeridis acknowledged receiving the agreement, told Mr Viscariello to “go ahead” and told him to do whatever it takes to save the house. The Master was unable to resolve the question of whether, as Mr Kasmeridis claimed, he told Mr Viscariello that he had not read or understood the costs agreement. Mr Viscariello claimed in his affidavit that Mr Kasmeridis said he had read and accepted the costs agreement. In any event, there is no suggestion that Mr Viscariello gave any advice to Mr Kasmeridis about the agreement, or explained any aspect of its operation. In fairness to Mr Viscariello it needs to be acknowledged that the situation was one of some urgency. Previous solicitors had apparently failed to prevent the warrant being issued, and Mr Viscariello had to act urgently. He says in his affidavit that he had to work over weekends and after hours. A further difficulty was that Mr Viscariello was unable to obtain the file from the Kasmeridis’ former solicitor, because they had not paid that solicitor’s account. By 24 February 2004 an order had been obtained setting aside the default judgment. McNamara then rendered to the Kasmeridis an account for $20,613, including counsel fees and disbursements. The Kasmeridis then terminated the instructions of McNamara and retained other solicitors. There was affidavit material before the Master to the effect that the Kasmeridis conducted a picture framing business from a number of premises. There was also evidence that between 1991 and early 2004 Mr Kasmeridis had been a party to some 35 actions in the Magistrates Court. In his affidavit Mr Viscariello asserts that the Kasmeridis were “experienced business people and experienced in legal matters including in dealing with solicitors and court processes”. The Master made no finding to that effect, and on the limited material available it was not open to him to make such a finding. It was open to him to find that the Kasmeridis conducted a picture framing business, and that Mr Kasmeridis had been a party to about 30 actions in the Magistrates Court. One could infer from that, that he had some knowledge of business matters and some knowledge of court processes. But there was no basis for going any further than that.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ GRAY J (dissent) DAVID J (dissent)
No submissions were put to the Court relating to r 41 of the Law Society’s “Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice” (2003). This rule states in some detail the duty of a practitioner to inform a client about costs. Rule 41.2(a) requires a practitioner, unless it is “unreasonable or inappropriate” to do so, to give a client an estimate of the costs to be increased. That was not done here. But as no submissions were addressed to this point, I make no comment on that aspect.Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal. I would dismiss this appeal. I agree with the reasons of Doyle CJ. I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by the Chief Justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ,