McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS & ANOR

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Layton)

22 July 2005

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - SOLICITOR AND CLIENT - RETAINER

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Appeal from decision of single Judge upholding decision of Master - Judge held that retainer agreement between solicitors and clients was not concluded in writing and therefore did not fall within the terms of section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) and did not bind the clients - appeal on grounds that Judge erred in holding that the retainer agreement did not constitute an agreement made in writing within the meaning of section 42(6).

Discussion of general principles regarding retainer agreements between solicitor and client - consideration of principles of statutory interpretation - legislative history of Legal Practitioners Act - discussion of fiduciary obligations owed by solicitors to their clients.

Appeal allowed - matter remitted to Master for further hearing and determination.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 42; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 95.15(b); Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 4; Legal Practitioners Act 1936-1972 (SA) s 21; Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 96; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 332; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 26; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB, referred to.
O'Young v Walter Reid & Co (1932) 47 CLR 497; Wong v Kelly (1999) 154 FLR 200; Heppingstone v Stewart (1910) 12 CLR 176; Re a Firm of Solicitors [1995] 3 All ER 482; Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1; Owen v South Australia (1996) 66 SASR 251; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449; Tyrell v Bank of London (1862) 10 HLC 26; 11 ER 934; Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; Haywood v Roadknight [1927] VLR 512; Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297; Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436; K & S Lake City Freighters Pty ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) CLR 309; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, considered.

MCNAMARA BUSINESS & PROPERTY LAW v KASMERIDIS & ANOR
[2005] SASC 269

Full Court        Gray, Sulan and Layton JJ

THE COURT

Introduction

  1. This appeal concerns the construction of section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) and addresses circumstances in which a solicitor may enter into an agreement with a client with respect to professional charges.

  2. The full terms of section 42 are as follows:

    (1)     On the application—

    (a)of a person claiming to be entitled to…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 269
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis, the dispute centred around a retainer agreement between the solicitors, McNamara Business & Property Law, and their clients, Harry and Vicky Kasmeridis. The case revolved around whether the retainer agreement had been concluded in writing, as required by section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), and whether this written agreement was binding on the clients. The case was heard initially by a Master, whose decision was subsequently appealed by the solicitors to a Judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The key legal issues before the court were the interpretation of section 42(6) of the Legal Practitioners Act and the principles of statutory interpretation relevant to the creation of a written retainer agreement between solicitors and their clients.

The court examined the nature of the retainer agreement provided by the solicitors to the clients. The solicitors had sent a letter enclosing their terms of engagement and schedule of fees, which together constituted the proposed retainer agreement. The letter indicated that these documents, along with the letter itself, formed a solicitor and client agreement under the Legal Practitioners Act. The Judge, however, held that the clients had not indicated by any form of writing their acceptance of the offer, thus concluding that the terms of section 42(6) had not been met. The Judge interpreted the statute to require not only that the terms of the agreement be in writing but also that the acceptance of the agreement be in written form. This interpretation meant that merely providing written terms did not constitute a written agreement unless there was also written acceptance from the clients.

The court's reasoning and outcome were pivotal in establishing the requirements for a valid written retainer agreement under the Act. The Judge's interpretation of section 42(6) clarified that a written agreement required both the terms and the acceptance to be in writing. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Master's decision that the retainer agreement did not meet the statutory requirement of being in writing. The final orders upheld the decision of the Master, and the appeal by the solicitors was unsuccessful.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This approach is of considerable appeal. However, it is necessary to address the arguments that were put to the court in their entirety before reaching a final view.The Facts In early 2004, Harry and Vicky Kasmeridis, the clients and respondents, engaged the appellant, McNamara Business & Property Law, a firm of solicitors, to act on their behalf in an application to set aside a default judgment entered in proceedings in the Magistrates Court. On 5 February 2004 the solicitors wrote to the clients enclosing a copy of the solicitors’ terms of engagement and schedule of fees, which together comprised their proposed retainer agreement. The stated purpose of the letter was to set out the terms upon which the solicitors would act for the clients. It read:Thank you for instructing us to act on your behalf. The purpose of this letter is to set out the terms on which we will act for you.Enclosed are our Terms of Engagement and Schedule of Fees which together with this letter, set out the relevant terms and conditions on which we will act for you. Please note that our Terms of Engagement, Schedule of Fees and this letter constitute a solicitor and client agreement between you and this firm for the purposes of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981.Please also note that these terms and conditions will apply to all matters in respect of which we accept instructions from you or act on your behalf unless mutually agreed to the contrary in writing. This will include any matter in which we act for a related body corporate of you, or for any person, corporation, trust or other party on whose behalf you instruct us.Please contact us to discuss any aspect of this letter and the Terms of Engagement if you have any queries. Included in the proposed retainer agreement were the following clauses:Each solicitor/staff member is assigned an hourly rate determined by seniority, experience, and expertise, and is required to keep detailed records of all time spent on the matter. The present hourly rates are quoted in the attached schedule. Services charged include interviews, preparing or reading documents, correspondence, negotiations, telephone calls, meetings, attending in Court, research of other matters and other relevant work.…The client agrees and expressly authorises the solicitors to assign solicitors, staff members or counsel to work on the matter as and when required; to engage and obtain any reports from experts; to engage barrister/s and incur any unusual disbursement/s the solicitors consider necessary for the proper conduct of the matter.The client is aware and has been advised that the fixed amount charged or rate payable may exceed the rates set by the relevant Court or other scale and may care to seek independent legal advice concerning this aspect or any part of this agreement.The client agrees to pay the solicitors’ accounts including interim accounts received within 14 days of presentation. The client agrees to pay or reimburse the solicitors for any GST payable in respect of the fees and disbursements. Interest at the rate of 10% per annum is payable on all accounts unpaid for 14 days or more after presentation.The client agrees to pay monies for anticipated legal services or disbursements into the solicitors’ Trust Account as and when requested.…The client is aware and has been advised that any costs received from other parties in a litigious matter (called “party/party costs”) may not cover all of the solicitors’ costs and disbursements incurred (called “solicitor/client costs”) and the client will have to meet the difference in these costs from the client’s own pocket if this occurs.…The client is personally liable for the solicitors’ costs and disbursements even if the matter involves the solicitors acting for other person/s and/or organisations.…Any special conditions on the Retainer Agreement will comprise part of these terms.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 July 2004 the clients filed a notice of dispute in relation to the amounts claimed in the bill of costs. They submitted that the Master should refuse to tax the bill of costs that had been lodged, and should instead direct the filing of a bill of costs prepared in accordance with the appropriate scale pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules. It was said that no written fee agreement had been concluded between the parties in accordance with section 42(6). The Master ordered:Fresh bill to be served and filed based on the usual scale of costs. I note that the present bill is a time cost one and as presently advised I am not satisfied that an agreement in writing has been achieved by the solicitors. It is for that reason that I am directing a fresh bill.Decision under Appeal The solicitors brought an appeal against the decision of the Master to a Judge of this Court.[1] The learned Judge summarised the complaints brought by the solicitors under three heads:-the Master should have found that an agreement in writing had been made between the solicitors and the clients;-the Master denied the appellant procedural fairness in allowing the argument as to the existence of an agreement in writing to take place, and requiring it to be completed, at a time when counsel appearing for the solicitors was unprepared for that argument;-the Master’s reasons were inadequate.[1] McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2004) 90 SASR 151. The Judge dismissed the appeal. In relation to the first complaint, the Judge found that in the circumstances, a written agreement between the parties within the meaning of section 42(6) had not been made. The clients had not indicated by any form of writing their acceptance of the offer. As such, the Judge reasoned that the terms of section 42(6) had not been met:[2]...s 42(6) is to be understood as though it read “the practitioner may make, in writing, an agreement with the client”. In this way effect is given to all words in s 42(6), and in particular to the requirements for the making of the agreement which it contains. Where two parties agree orally that the terms of their agreement are those contained in a specified document, they do not, in my opinion, make an agreement in writing. Rather, they make an oral agreement with a term of that oral agreement being that the written terms contained in the specified document form part of their agreement. One can say, sensibly, that they have an agreement in writing but not that they have made an agreement in writing.…One can say, as did Evatt J in O’Young v Walter Reid & Co that when a signed offer is accepted orally, the writing constitutes a written agreement, but that falls short of a conclusion that the parties have made an agreement in writing. That which the parties have agreed upon may be in writing without the parties having made an agreement in writing.In dismissing the appeal, the Judge interpreted the terms of section 42(6) as requiring not only that the terms of the agreement be in writing but that acceptance of the agreement also be in written form.[2] (2004) 90 SASR 151 at [23]-[24].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established