MCL v The Queen - [2000] HCATrans 108

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M95 of 1999

B e t w e e n -
R H McL
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 21 MARCH 2000, AT 10.17 AM

MR P.F. TEHAN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.B. BOYCE, for the appellant in this matter. (instructed by Leanne Warren & Associates)

MR W.H. MORGAN‑PAYLER, QC: And if it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.J. RYAN, on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Tehan.

MR TEHAN: Your Honours, we adopt the outline of submissions filed with the Court. There are some amendments to that outline, the first of which is on page 1 and, of course, we are at 21 March, not 21 May. The second amendment is on page 2 where in paragraph 3 the sentences are set out and we should have said after “counts 8 and 9 be served concurrently” there should be added these words “that the sentences on counts 10 and 11 be served concurrently”. Then on page 14 in paragraph 28 at about line 7 we state “Lovelock and Craig were decided post the 1967 amendments when the legislation could more clearly be taken not to refer to general sentences.” That is clearly wrong and I would ask the Court to simply delete that from our outline.

KIRBY J: Where is that?

MR TEHAN: It is an error.

KIRBY J: No, where is that?

MR TEHAN: It is at page 14, paragraph 28, line 7 commencing with the words “Lovelock and Craig” and ending with the words “general sentences”.

MR TEHAN: We have also sought by way of notice of motion to amend our grounds of appeal by adding an additional ground of appeal and I seek leave of the Court to rely upon that additional ground. The notice of motion appears at page 151 of the appeal book and the additional ground that we seek to rely upon is the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria erred in law in failing to accord procedural fairness to the appellant.

GLEESON CJ: Is that opposed, Mr Morgan‑Payler?

MR MORGAN-PAYLER: No, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ: Yes, you have that leave.

MR TEHAN: If the Court pleases. To turn now to our argument, this case concerns the operation of a provision of the Victorian Crimes Act. Such provision appears in other legislations in all States and Territories in the Commonwealth and in so far as relevant, it provides as follows:

If it appears to the Court of Appeal that an appellant, though not properly convicted on some count or part of the indictment…..has been properly convicted on some other count…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading MCL v The Queen

Details

AGLC: MCL v The Queen [2000] HCATrans 108
Case: [2000] HCATrans 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by MCL against a conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically statements made by him to police and a DNA sample. The appellant argued that these items of evidence should have been excluded from his trial on the grounds that they were obtained in contravention of his legal rights.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence obtained from MCL was improperly admitted at his trial. This involved determining whether the police had acted unlawfully in obtaining the statements and the DNA sample, and if so, whether the trial judge had erred in exercising their discretion to admit that evidence despite the impropriety. The Court also considered the application of the exclusionary rule in Australian criminal law, particularly in circumstances where evidence is obtained in breach of a suspect's rights.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles governing the admission of evidence obtained in contravention of legal rights. The Court reiterated that while evidence obtained in breach of a suspect's rights may be excluded, the ultimate decision rests on the exercise of a judicial discretion. This discretion requires a balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the unfairness to the accused that its admission might occasion, and the seriousness of the breach of the law. In this instance, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

Orders