McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1640

File number(s): MLG 591 of 2025
Judgment of: JUDGE O'SULLIVAN
Date of judgment: 8 October 2025
Catchwords: FAIR WORK – costs application – application under s 570(2)(b) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether unreasonable act or omission – no order as to costs
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 570(1), 570(2)
Cases cited:

Australian Securities and InvestmentCommission v Mitchell (No 4) [2021] FCA 1387

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2008) 170 FCR 574

McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1481

Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia (No 2) (2011) 211 IR 119

Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8

Stratton Finance Pty Ltd v Webb [2014] FCAFC 110

Torrens University Australia Limited v Fair Work Ombudsman (No 2) [2025] FCA 1120

Tuckerv Victoria (No 2) [2021] VSCA 182

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 18
Date of last submission/s: 23 September 2025
Date of hearing: On the papers
Place: Melbourne
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maddocks Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondent: Marks Pritchard

ORDERS

MLG 591 of 2025

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ROBYN MCGREGOR

Applicant

AND:

ADMOSIS MEDIA GROUP PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE O'SULLIVAN

DATE OF ORDER:

8 OCTOBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.There be no orders as to costs of the application in a proceeding filed 24 July 2025.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE O’SULLIVAN

  1. On 23 January 2025, Robyn McGregor, (the applicant) commenced proceedings against Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd (the respondent) in this Court under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). 

  2. On 10 September 2025, and for the reasons set out in McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1481 (the transfer decision) the Court made the following orders:

    1.Pursuant to section 153 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), these proceedings be transferred to the Melbourne Registry of the Federal Court of Australia to be listed on a date to be advised.

    2.The respondent file and serve submissions of no more than 4 pages within 7 days in support of any application for costs of the application in a proceeding filed 24 July 2025.

    3.The applicant file and serve submissions in reply of no more than 4 pages, 7 days thereafter.

    4.The respondent’s application for costs be determined on the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1640
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the matter of McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd (No 2) involves a costs application following a transfer of proceedings from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The primary issue before the Court was whether the applicant, McGregor, had acted unreasonably in opposition to the transfer application, thereby justifying an award of costs to the respondent, Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd, under section 570(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The Court had to determine if the respondent had satisfied the statutory threshold for an award of costs, considering the discretionary nature of the transfer power and the policy behind the Act's access to justice provisions.

The Court considered the statutory framework, particularly the provisions of section 570 of the FW Act, which sets out limited and specific circumstances under which costs may be awarded. The Court was also guided by previous case law, which emphasised the need for caution in exercising the discretion to award costs and the importance of ensuring that the threat of costs does not deter individuals with genuine grievances from pursuing their claims. The Court had to weigh the respondent's arguments that the applicant's opposition to the transfer was unreasonable against the principles of fairness and the potential chilling effect on access to justice.

The Court concluded that the respondent had not satisfied the Court that the applicant's opposition to the transfer was unreasonable. The opposition was not deemed incompetent or hopeless, and the Court found that the discretionary nature of the transfer power and the need for the respondent to demonstrate that the transfer was warranted, regardless of the applicant's stance, were significant considerations. The Court found no evidence of an unreasonable act or omission by the applicant that would justify an award of costs under section 570(2)(b). Consequently, the respondent's application for costs was dismissed.

The Court's decision reflects the careful balance required when considering costs applications in the context of the Fair Work Act, recognising the importance of encouraging access to justice while ensuring proceedings are conducted fairly and efficiently. The Court’s refusal to award costs highlights the need for parties to approach such applications with due regard to the legislative policy and the potential implications for future litigants.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 10 September 2025, and for the reasons set out in McGregor v Admosis Media Group Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1481 (the transfer decision) the Court made the following orders:1.Pursuant to section 153 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), these proceedings be transferred to the Melbourne Registry of the Federal Court of Australia to be listed on a date to be advised.2.The respondent file and serve submissions of no more than 4 pages within 7 days in support of any application for costs of the application in a proceeding filed 24 July 2025.3.The applicant file and serve submissions in reply of no more than 4 pages, 7 days thereafter.4.The respondent’s application for costs be determined on the papers unless required otherwise in submissions. As contemplated by those orders, each of the parties filed written submissions (though the respondent didn’t adhere to the page limit) addressing the respondent’s application for its costs of the transfer application, which the applicant opposed. As there was no indication otherwise, that application has been considered on the papers. These reasons (which should be read in conjunction with the transfer decision) concern why there will be no order as to costs. Statutory provisions and principles The respondent’s costs application falls to be determined by reference to the provisions of s 570 of the FW Act, which relevantly provides: (1)A party to proceedings (including an appeal) in a court (including a court of a State or Territory) exercising jurisdiction under this Act may be ordered by the court to pay costs incurred by another party to the proceedings only in accordance with subsection (2) or s.569 or 569A.(2)The party may be ordered to pay the costs only if:(a)the court is satisfied that the party instituted the proceedings vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or(b)the court is satisfied that the party's unreasonable act or omission caused the other party to incur the costs; or… Section 570(1) of the FW Act provides that a party to a proceeding in a court arising under the FW Act may only be ordered to pay costs incurred by another party in limited and specified circumstances. In Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8, Justice Mortimer (as Her Honour then was) considered an application for costs arising from proceedings under the FW Act. In relation to the provisions in s 570 of the FW Act, her Honour observed: 64.I accept the general import of the authorities relied on by the applicant and Mr McDonald in their written submissions about the significance of the threshold set by s570(2) of the Fair Work Act. Although some of the authorities relied on dealt with the predecessor provisions to s570, there is no difference in substance in the way the threshold is expressed. The discretion conferred by the confined terms of s570(2)should be exercised cautiously, and the case for its exercise should be clear: see Saxena v PPF Asset Management Ltd[2011] FCA 395 at [6] per Bromberg J. The reason for caution is the potential for discouraging parties’ pursuit in a complete and robust way of the claims for contravention which they seek to make under the Fair Work Act, or the defence of such claims. The policy behind s570 is to ensure that the spectre of costs being awarded if a claim is unsuccessful does not loom so large in the mind of potential applicants (in particular, in my opinion) that those with genuine grievances and an arguable evidentiary and legal basis for them are put off commencing or continuing proceedings. It is an access to justice provision. Insofar as it operates to the benefit of respondents, it is designed to ensure respondents feel free to pursue arguable legal and factual responses to the claims made against them. There is an almost identical provision in s611 of the Fair Work Act, giving the Fair Work Commission a similar costs power, conditioned by similarly-worded considerations. The predecessor provisions, and the conscious broadening of the statutory terms used in s570, are traced by the Full Court in Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia (No 2)(2012) 203 FCR 430; [2012] FCAFC 103 at [3]- [4] per Jessup and Tracey JJ. 65.None of those propositions deny the Court’s ability to find that one or both of the two preconditions expressed in ss570(2)(a) and (b) exist where the factual circumstances warrant it. The legislative policy behind a provision such as s570(1) is not inconsistent with the requirements for proceedings to be conducted reasonably, fairly and efficiently. As an access to justice provision, it contemplates parties and their legal representatives will access the Court responsibly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant, in submissions filed 23 September 2025 opposing the respondent’s costs application noted inter alia, that the respondent’s costs application was “misconceived” as:(a)the opposition to the transfer application was not incompetent or hopeless;(b)the power to order a transfer is discretionary in nature and the Court is required to have regard to certain mandatory considerations including the wishes of the parties;(c)the Court is not bound to exercise its discretion in the same way as in other cases;(d)the correspondence the respondent relied on did not amount to an offer of compromise;(e)it was not apparent what costs the applicant caused the respondent to incur as an order for transfer could not be made by consent of the parties; and(f)the respondent was required to satisfy the Court that the transfer was warranted, regardless of the applicant’s position.[2] [2] See para 8-16 of submissions filed 23 September 2025. Consideration For the purposes of the respondent’s costs application, the relevant part of the particular statutory provisions is s 570(2)(b) and whether I am satisfied that the respondent incurred costs as a result of any unreasonable act or omission of the applicant. The onus is squarely on the respondent to satisfy the Court that the applicant acted unreasonably. Unreasonableness is a question of impression and degree, to be assessed by reference to the particular circumstances of a given case.[3] Although a failure to accept a reasonable offer of compromise may constitute an unreasonable act for the purposes of s 570(2), much turns on the form and content of the offer and the conduct of the parties. [3] Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2008) 170 FCR 574, 582 [28] (Tamberlin, Gyles and Gilmour JJ). The determination of whether the applicant’s rejection is an unreasonable act requires consideration of numerous factors (see for e.g. Australian Securities and InvestmentCommission v Mitchell (No 4) [2021] FCA 1387 per Beach J at [33]). These factors include, among other things, the nature of the claim, the nature of the response, the evidence and documents filed in the proceeding and the information available to the parties at the time the offer is made, a realistic assessment of the parties’ cases, the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was made, the window for its consideration and acceptance, the financial position of the parties and the extent of the compromise and the consequences of non-acceptance. To those matters, I would add the statutory framework within which the Court will ultimately hear and determine the application, including the presumption against awarding costs. Section 570(2)(b) has been found not to have been enlivened in circumstances where a jurisdictional matter that was contested, but was ultimately unsuccessful, raised novel and difficult questions and where there was a refusal to engage in mediation or accept settlement offers.[4] [4] Tucker v Victoria (No 2) [2021] VSCA 182 at [34].