McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mekonen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 309

Appeal from: Mekonen v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2715
File number: NSD 1959 of 2016
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 24 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application in that Court for judicial review of decision of former Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether the Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal engaged in an improper exercise of power – whether the Tribunal should have confined itself to the issue considered by the delegate
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 349

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.75

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 600.223, Sch 3 criterion 3004

Date of hearing: 24 February and 24 March 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 63
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person on 24 February 2017
The Appellant did not appear on 24 March 2017
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Hillary of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1959 of 2016
BETWEEN:

YENENEW SHUMALEM MEKONEN

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the cost of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 21 October 2016 that the application, as amended, to that Court be dismissed.

  2. The appellant is a male citizen of Ethiopia. He last arrived in Australia on 23 November 2011 as the holder of a Student subclass 574 visa, which ceased on 12 January 2014.

  3. On 10 February 2014, the appellant applied for a Visitor (Class FA) visa. That application was refused and it was the review by the then Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) of the refusal of that application which was the subject of the application for judicial review to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

  4. The application to that Court, as amended, was filed on 15 January 2015. As I have said, it sought judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal which, on 18 September 2014, affirmed the decision not to grant the visa applicant a Visitor (Class FA) visa.

  5. On 24 February 2017, the date on which the appeal to this Court was listed for hearing, the appellant sought and was granted an adjournment on the basis of what he said was his ill health which prevented him from conducting his appeal or limited his capacity to do so. The medical evidence…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The central dispute involved the appellant's application for a visa under the Migration Act 1958, which was denied by the Migration Review Tribunal. The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, arguing that it was procedurally unfair and that the Tribunal improperly exercised its power by considering factors outside the scope of the review. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and whether it correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutory provisions.

The legal issues before the court encompassed whether the Tribunal had breached principles of procedural fairness, whether it had misapplied the law, and whether it should have confined itself to the issues considered by the delegate. The court had to scrutinise the Tribunal's reasoning and findings, particularly regarding the appellant's claim that he was not the holder of a substantive visa due to factors beyond his control. This involved a detailed examination of the evidence presented to the Tribunal and the interpretation of specific criteria set out in the Migration Regulations.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation or application of the law. The Tribunal was exercising the powers and discretions of the primary decision-maker as provided for under the Migration Act. The court held that the Tribunal adequately addressed the appellant's submissions and correctly found that the factors claimed by the appellant did not meet the criteria for not being the holder of a substantive visa. The court rejected the appellant's claims of procedural unfairness and misdirection, concluding that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or assessed. This decision underscores the importance of correctly applying statutory criteria and ensuring that all relevant evidence is considered in the context of migration law and tribunal reviews.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the cost of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the circumstances I propose to make that order, but it is also appropriate to deal with the substance of the appeal. The Tribunal’s decision By s 349 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), for the purposes of the review the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the Migration Act on the person who made the decision. Clause 600.223 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) relevantly provided:600.223 (2)If the applicant was in Australia at the time of application, and did not hold a substantive visa:(a) …; and(b) the applicant satisfies Schedule 3 criteria 3001, 3003, 3004 and 3005. The Tribunal decided that, for the purposes of criterion 3004 in Sch 3 to the Migration Regulations, the appellant was not the holder of a substantive visa because of factors beyond his control. Criterion 3004 was, relevantly, as follows:3004 If the applicant: (a)ceased to hold a substantive or criminal justice visa on or after 1 September 1994; or(b)entered Australia unlawfully on or after 1 September 1994 and has not subsequently been granted a substantive visa; the Minister is satisfied that: (c)the applicant is not the holder of a substantive visa because of factors beyond the applicant’s control; and … The Tribunal said that the issue was whether cl 600.223 was met. This required the Tribunal to be satisfied that the appellant satisfied the relevant Sch 3 criteria. Under the provisions of cl 600.223(2), the appellant must satisfy Sch 3 criteria 3001, 3003, 3004 and 3005. The Tribunal found, at [16], that the appellant satisfied criterion 3001. The Tribunal then asked the appellant what factors beyond his control caused him to not have a substantive visa. The appellant referred to his enrolment for his PhD at the university being cancelled in August 2013 and his efforts to appeal or have that cancellation reviewed. The Tribunal said, at [21], it did not consider this to be a factor beyond the appellant’s control which would cause him not to be the holder of a substantive visa. The appellant told the Tribunal he had received confusing and contradictory advice from immigration lawyers. The Tribunal noted that the appellant’s PhD enrolment was suspended in August 2013 and the appeal against the suspension was finalised in October 2013. The Tribunal said, at [22], it did not consider the lack of immigration advice to be a factor beyond the appellant’s control which caused him not to be the holder of a substantive visa. The appellant said he had been hospitalised for two weeks in November 2013. There was no documentary evidence submitted at the hearing before the Tribunal of his hospitalisation. The appellant asked for, and was granted, time to make written submissions. The appellant, the Tribunal said at [23], subsequently submitted medical evidence concerning his psychiatric treatment. At [34], the Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been suffering from a mental illness which had had a severe impact on his education. It said the issue in the present application was whether the appellant was not the holder of a substantive visa because of factors beyond his control. The Tribunal said at [35] that the psychiatric evidence submitted did not indicate that the appellant was not able to lodge an application for a visa before his previous substantive visa expired. The Tribunal said, at [35], it was not satisfied that the medical evidence indicated the appellant was not able to lodge the claim for the visa. The Tribunal said, at [36], the appellant last had a substantive visa on 12 January 2014 which was several weeks after he was treated at the clinic. He was able to lodge the application for review on 6 March 2014. The medical evidence provided did not support a finding that the appellant’s medical condition was a factor beyond his control which caused him to not be the holder of a substantive visa at the time he applied for this visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to ground 7, the Minister submitted that at [144] of the primary judge’s decision, his Honour noted that the appellant was put on notice in each of the Minister’s sets of submissions that he would be seeking costs against the appellant. The Minister also noted that the appellant was in attendance when judgment was handed down and submitted that not only was the appellant given the opportunity to make submissions at that time, he also made written submissions which were taken into account by the Court.Consideration No error on the part of the primary judge has been made out. No jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal has been made out. The Tribunal was exercising the powers and discretions of the primary decision-maker: see s 349 of the Migration Act. The appellant was clearly on notice that criterion 3004 needed to be addressed if he succeeded, as he did, on criterion 3001. He put extensive submissions to the Tribunal in support of his contention that the Tribunal should be satisfied that the appellant was not the holder of a substantive visa because of factors beyond his control. There is no substance in the ground that there was a breach of procedural fairness by the Tribunal or, if put, by the primary judge. The ground that there was no evidence to support the finding was not developed and is of no substance. I am unable to perceive any basis for the ground that the Tribunal, or, if put, the primary judge, misconceived the meaning of “factors beyond [the applicant’s] control” under criterion 3004. The Tribunal addressed the factors claimed by the appellant and, in effect, found that those factors did not satisfy it that the appellant was not the holder of a substantive visa because of any of those factors. I reject the ground that the Tribunal did not take relevant critical material into consideration. I reject the claim that there was gross misdirection of fact which was said to raise a question of law. There is no substance to the ground that there was a failure to make a particular finding as a necessary step in support of the court order. The appellant did not identify either the particular finding or the necessary step. I reject the ground that the primary judge did not give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to argue and make submissions on the costs order. The appellant made written submissions in relation to costs which were taken into account by the primary judge.Conclusion and orders The appeal is dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent Minister, as agreed or as assessed.