was brought was not stated, but when the appl~cat~on
was tlled there were
supporting affidavits including one from Mr George Kekatos of 5 November 1993 and
one from the trustee ot 17 December 1993.
There are two sections which could have been relevant; one is S 120(1) of the
1966 (Cth), which provides that a settlement of property not being a
settlement made in favour of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valid consideration is, if the settler becomes a bankrupt and the settlement comes into operation after or withrn two years before the commencement of the bankruptcy, void as agarnst the trustee in bankruptcy.
Another possrbilrty is S 121 ot the Bankruotcv Act which provides that a
disposition of property made with intent to defraud creditors not being a disposition for
valuable consideration in favour of a person who acted in good faith is, if the person making the disposition subsequently becomes a bankrupt, void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy.
The application did not refer specifically to either oi those sections, nor d ~ d
the
affidavits in support. Section 121 however, makes an allegation of fraud. The usual rule is that an allegation of fraud should be made clearly and explicitly and particulars should
be given. l refer for example to & v Pollard and Morris [l9301 1 KB 628 where, at
636. Lord Justice Greer said:
"
11 19 absolutely essential lhal where a charge o f fraud is made hy o n e of the parties to
Iltlgat~on
agalnsl the other 11 should be ralsed w ~ l h
parucularily"
In the same case, at 641, Lord Justice Slesser sald:
"Fraudulent conduct must hc di\tinctlv alleged and
dirtinctly proved. and it 1s not
allowable to leave fraud lo he inferred from the facls
A charge of fraud or
marcprc\enlatllon must he plcaded with the utmost particularity "
Thts is only one of very many cases whlch have applted the prlnclple which is descr~bed
in the pract~ce books.
See eg.. R~tchie's Supreme Court Procedure NSW, paras
15.13.6 and 16.2.1
It is a well known and very important principle. Even though t h ~ s
case d ~ d
not proceed by way ot pleadings, the basic prlnc~ple
nevertheless applies. It is
not necessary that the matter be raised in the form ot applicat~on
lodged w~th
the Court,
but Rule 103(1) of the Bankruptcy Rules specittcally provides that:-
"The grounds on which the Court will hc asked to make the ordcr specified in an appliutlon, and the facts on which the applicant proposes to rely in rupport of the appllcatlon for that order, shall he slated in the affidavit hled in \upport of the apphcauon "
In my view, that rule would require in bankruptcy proceedings that allegations ot fraud
should be clearly ra~sed in either the application Itself or in the supporting aftidav~t and
that particulars should be given.
In the present case only two matters were raised. The first matter appeared in the affidavit of Mr Kekatos who said that, in or about July 1992, he received instructions from Mr Burton to transfer hts two shares in Brtindown Pty Llmited, that his instructions
included the preparation of a share transfer for the two shares and that he was Instructed
to backdate it to 1989.
In paragraph 13 ot hr\ att~d;lvit, Mr Krkatos deposed that the "request ot Leslie Koss Burton in July 1992 for me to hackd;itr the Br;tndown Pty Limited share transfer was an attempt by him to defeat creditors." 1 would add that those part~cular words have not been received as evidence in the proceedings but, nevertheless, they put the respondents upon notice that instructions had been given to backdate the transfer and
it was alleged that those instructions were given with a vlew to defraud~ng
creditors.
The second matter is that, in paragraph 15 ot Mr Wily's affidavit, ev~dence
was
given that the shares transferred were valuable and worth much more than the $2 which was the cons~deration expressed for them. But that, of course, was a matter that could
readily go to the issues arlsing under s 120(1), namely, matters of good fa~th
and valuable
consideration.
In my opinion, there was no general allegation that there had been a d~spos~tion
hy Mr Burton w~th
Intent to defraud cred~tors. The matter was set down tor hear~ng
some time ago and it has now proceeded for a number of days.
I t would be wrong to
allow the trustee to raise a general allegat~on that the transfer was made to defraud creditors. That matter was not raised expressly or with particulars in the application or
in the affidavit supporting it.
Counsel for the trustee has wrltten out some part~culars
wh~ch
he would wish to
put. As I read those part~culars,
they go no further than the matter raised in Mr
Kekatos' aftidav~t. The p,u
. .L~~lars
say that Mr Burton lnstr ucLLu .... ..skates to prGljd1~
a transter of his shares "and to backdate the transter to 1989 tor the purpose that those shares would not be available to his crediton In the event that he was made bankrupt"
I would read those partlculars as relatlng the traud to the matter of the backdating that
was raised in Mr Kekatos' att~davit.
That 1s not the polnt whlch counsel tor the trustee now wlshes to raise, and I a m
intormed that I have mlsread the particulars or the Intent ot them.
Counsel tor the
trustee w~shes
to ralse a general allegation that the transter of shares to NJW Contractors
from Mr Burton was a transfer with Intent to deteat creditors.
In my vlew, as that
allegat~on
was made expressly and with partlculars at a n early stage In the proceedings,
it ought not now to be allowed.
I ccrllfy that Ihlc and the 4 preceding pages
are a true copy of the
judgmenl hcrcln of
the Honourable Mr
Dare
21 October 1994
Counsel for the applicant,
Sollcltors for the applicant
Altkcn & Magney
Counsel for the 2nd
respondent:
J S Wheelhouse,
Mr P M Blsroc QC and Mr B Evans
Sol~c~lors
for the 2nd
recpondent
Ferr~er
and Ascor~ates
and
Boylc and Assoc~ates
Counsel for the I t 1 & 3rd respundcnls
Mr J T Gleeson
Sol~cllors
fur the 1st & 3rd rerpondenls
Ddlc of hearlnp
21 Ortoher 1994
Dale (11 judgment
21 Octohcr 1994
Details
AGLC
McDonald v R [1994] FCA 956
Case
[1994] FCA 956
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of McDonald v R involves an application for a declaration that a transfer of shares in Brandown Pty Limited was void against the trustee of Leslie Ross Burton's estate. The application was brought by Hugh Jenner Wily, on behalf of Brandown Pty Limited, against the trustee of Burton's estate. The case raised issues under Sections 120(1) and 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which deal with the voidness of property transfers made within two years before bankruptcy and with intent to defraud creditors, respectively. The application did not explicitly reference these sections, nor did the supporting affidavits.
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the transfer of shares was void against the trustee in bankruptcy, based on the lack of explicit and particularised allegations of fraud. The court considered whether the trustee's application adequately raised the allegation of fraud in compliance with established legal principles, which require clear and explicit allegations of fraud with particulars. The court noted that the application and supporting affidavits did not provide the necessary particulars, and the trustee's attempt to introduce new particulars at a later stage was deemed inappropriate.
The court held that the trustee's application failed to raise the allegation of fraud with the required particularity. It emphasized the importance of the principle that allegations of fraud must be explicitly stated and supported by specific details. The court ruled that the trustee was not allowed to introduce a general allegation of fraud without the necessary particulars, particularly since it was raised at a late stage in the proceedings. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for lack of sufficient evidence and particulars to support the claim of fraud.
The final orders of the court were that the application by Hugh Jenner Wily was dismissed, and no declaration was made regarding the validity of the transfer of shares in Brandown Pty Limited. The trustee was not allowed to proceed with the allegation of fraud without the required particulars, and the application was thus rejected.