Mazzeo v Caleandro Guastalegname & Co - [2000] VSCA 230

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No.5340 of 1999

RITA MAZZEO
	Appellant
v.
CALEANDRO GUASTALEGNAME & CO.	Respondent

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JUDGES:	WINNEKE, P., TADGELL and CHERNOV, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	25 October 2000
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	12 December 2000
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2000] VSCA 230

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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Negligence - Personal injuries – Section 5(1A) Limitations of Actions Act 1958 – Whether plaintiff has to know that causative “act or omission of some person” was wrongful or negligent.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	Mr. R.J. Stanley, Q.C. and Mr. A.D.B. Ingram	Holding Redlich
For the Respondent	Mr. R.P. Gorton, Q.C. and Mr. N.G. Ross	Phillips Fox

WINNEKE, P.:

I agree with Chernov, J.A. that this appeal should be allowed on the ground that s.5(1A) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (“the Act”) does not operate to permit such cause of action as the appellant had against her former employer to survive. In my view those words of the section which provide that:

“… the cause of action shall be taken to have accrued on the date on which the person first knows –
(a) that he has suffered those personal injuries and
(b)that those personal injuries were caused by the act or omission of some person.”

were, contrary to the view taken by the trial judge, satisfied more than 6 years before July 1993. Subject to any extension being granted by the Court pursuant to s.23A of the Act, the appellant’s cause of action was statute barred by operation of s.5(1)(a). In my opinion, the evidence which she gave clearly demonstrated that, by the end of 1984, she knew that she had suffered injury to her wrist and arm; and that those injuries were “caused”, in the relevant sense, by the acts or omissions of the employer Costas’ Builders Mart Pty. Ltd.

The trial judge found that s.5(1A) applied, on the facts of this case, to enable the appellant’s cause of action against her former employer to survive. He did so reluctantly because, as he said, he was constrained to so find by reason of authority binding upon him. He said:

“As I am constrained to find to the contrary, it is idle for me to express attraction to the … views of Hedigan, J. [in Hickey v. Womens & Childrens Health Care Network, unreported Supreme Court 11 June 1998] with respect to the interpretation of the expressions ‘disease’ and ‘disorder’ as set out in s.5(1A). It is equally idle to indicate that, free from authority, I would have taken the words ‘act or omission of some person’ at face value, and not considered the words so used involved that the requisite knowledge was of a wrongful or negligent act or omission of some person.” (my emphasis)

It seems to me that, against the background of these remarks of the judge, when regarded in the context of the submissions made to him, there is no substance in the contention made by…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] VSCA 230
Decision Date: 12 December 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mazzeo v Caleandro Guastalegname & Co involved a plaintiff, Mazzeo, who sought compensation for personal injuries sustained due to alleged negligence. The defendant, Caleandro Guastalegname & Co, was a company that employed the person responsible for the injuries. The dispute centred around whether the plaintiff's cause of action had been barred by the limitations period under the Limitations of Actions Act 1958. Specifically, the issue was whether the plaintiff needed to be aware that the causative act or omission was wrongful or negligent for the limitation period to commence. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The court was tasked with interpreting section 5(1A) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958, which states that the limitation period starts when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the “act or omission of some person” that caused the injury. The central question was whether the plaintiff needed to know that the act or omission was wrongful or negligent, or if mere knowledge of the injury and the act or omission was sufficient. This interpretation was critical to determine whether Mazzeo's claim was time-barred.

The court examined the statutory language and considered relevant precedent. It held that the statutory language did not require the plaintiff to know that the act or omission was wrongful or negligent. Instead, the plaintiff needed to be aware of the injury and the act or omission. The court concluded that the limitation period began when Mazzeo knew or ought to have known about the injury and the act or omission, regardless of whether Mazzeo was aware that the act or omission was wrongful or negligent. The court found that Mazzeo's knowledge of the injury and the causative act or omission was sufficient to start the limitation period.

As a result of the court's reasoning, Mazzeo's claim was not time-barred. The court determined that Mazzeo had sufficient knowledge to commence the limitation period under section 5(1A) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958. The decision underscored the importance of the plaintiff's awareness of the injury and the causative act or omission, rather than the plaintiff's knowledge of the wrongful or negligent nature of the act or omission.

Orders