Shinn v Commonwealth of Australia

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 5504 of 2000

JOHN LESLIE ROBERT SHINN Plaintiff
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Defendant
- and -

No. 8711 of 1994

PAUL MICHAEL QUINN Plaintiff
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Defendant
- and -
No. 7911 of 1996
JOHN ROBERT CAVENETT Plaintiff
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Defendant
- and -
No. 6531 of 1996
GRAHAM JAMES HART Plaintiff
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Defendant
- and -
No. 6663 of 1999
JAMES ALEXANDER BATE Plaintiff
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Defendant

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JUDGE:

KAYE J.

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

15 to 18 June 2004

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

28 June 2004

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Shinn and ors v Commonwealth of Australia

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2004] VSC 221

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PROCEDURE - Supreme Court procedure – Application to amend pleading – Admission that s.5(1A) of Limitation of Actions Act 1958 applies to post‑traumatic stress disorder – Withdrawal of admission – Question of prejudice to plaintiff – Estoppel – Futility.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiffs Mr J.B. Richards S.C. with
Mr C.B. Thomson
Hollows Lawyers
For the Defendant Mr M.R. Titshall Q.C. with
Mr A.J. McG. Moulds
Australian Government Solcitior

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Legal Principles.................................................................................................................................. 5

Prejudice Alleged by Plaintiffs....................................................................................................... 9

Background....................................................................................................................................... 12

The Evidence of Mr Forster............................................................................................................ 15

Shinn v Commonwealth of Australia.......................................................................................... 23

Cavenett v Commonwealth of Australia..................................................................................... 31

Hart v Commonwealth of Australia............................................................................................. 33

Quinn v Commonwealth of Australia......................................................................................... 35

Bate v Commonwealth of Australia............................................................................................. 41

Estoppel.............................................................................................................................................. 44

Futility................................................................................................................................................ 44

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 44

HIS HONOUR:

  1. These are applications by the Commonwealth of Australia, as defendant in five proceedings, to amend its defence in each proceeding.  The five plaintiffs are each former members of the Royal Australian Navy.  They are John Leslie Robert Shinn (“Shinn”), James Alexander Bate (“Bate”), Graham James Hart (“Hart”), Paul Michael Quinn (“Quinn”), and John Robert Cavenett (“Cavenett”). 

  1. In those proceedings the plaintiffs claim damages for injuries suffered by them, as members of the Royal Australian Navy, on 10 February 1964, when HMAS Voyager collided with HMAS Melbourne approximately 20 miles south-east of Jervis Bay.  Shinn, Bate, Hart and Cavenett were each members of the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.  Quinn initially pleaded, and swore an affidavit, that he was a member of the destroyer HMAS Voyager.  The Commonwealth delivered a defence admitting that fact.  Later the Commonwealth amended its defence to plead that Quinn was in fact on HMAS Melbourne on the date of the collision.  Subsequently, Quinn amended his statement of claim to also plead that on the date of the collision he was on the HMAS Melbourne.  In each proceeding the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that as a result of the collision he had suffered injury including post traumatic stress disorder, or alternatively, symptoms consistent with that disorder. 

  1. In its defence in each proceeding the Commonwealth pleaded that the plaintiff’s cause of action was statute barred by virtue of s.5(1)(a) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1958 (Vic).  In order to…

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Details
Case
[2004] VSC 221
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Shinn v Commonwealth of Australia involves a dispute where the plaintiff, Shinn, sought to amend his pleadings to include claims for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The Commonwealth opposed this amendment, arguing that the proposed claims were time-barred under section 5(1A) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958. Initially, the Commonwealth admitted that this section applied, but later withdrew that admission, contending that allowing the amendment would be prejudicial to them. The case was heard in the Supreme Court, which had to determine whether the plaintiff's attempt to amend his pleadings should be allowed, despite the withdrawal of the earlier admission.

The court needed to decide whether the withdrawal of the admission by the Commonwealth regarding the applicability of section 5(1A) to PTSD claims would prejudice them to the extent that the amendment should not be allowed. Additionally, the court had to consider whether estoppel or futility principles should prevent the Commonwealth from retracting its earlier admission. The key issues were whether the court should permit the amendment despite the withdrawal of the admission and, if so, under what conditions.

In its judgment, the court held that the withdrawal of the admission by the Commonwealth did not necessarily bar the plaintiff from amending his pleadings. The court examined whether allowing the amendment would prejudice the Commonwealth and found that, in this instance, it would not. The court also considered whether estoppel or futility applied to prevent the withdrawal of the admission but concluded that neither principle was engaged in this case. Ultimately, the court determined that permitting the amendment would not be futile and would not cause significant prejudice to the Commonwealth. Therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to amend his pleadings to include the PTSD claims.

The final orders of the court permitted the plaintiff to amend his pleadings to include claims for post-traumatic stress disorder, despite the Commonwealth's withdrawal of its earlier admission. The court's decision balanced the need for the plaintiff to have his claims heard against the potential prejudice to the Commonwealth, ultimately concluding that the amendment should be allowed.