Matthew John Shaw v Danielle Leach
[2014] ACTSC 135
•22 April 2014
MATTHEW JOHN SHAW v DANIELLE LEACH
[2014] ACTSC 135 (22 April 2014)
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – In General and Right of Appeal – Appeal from Magistrates Court – Prescribed concentration of alcohol – Appeal upheld
TRAFFIC LAW – Offences – Sentencing – Disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver licence – Relevance of offender not driving prior to sentence – Relevant if proved – To be taken into account but not mathematically
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 63
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), ss 209, 214, Pt 3.10, Div 3.10
Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT), ss 15AA, 19, 35
Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), s 61B
Barac v Thexton [2008] ACTSC 137
Boeyen v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 482
Cooper v Corvisy (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 151
Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd v Gusmao (1993) 114 FLR 293
Gallo v Dawson (1990) ALJR 458
Hamilton v Spalding [2010] ACTSC 160
Hill v Wenham [2012] ACTSC 156
In the NSW Guideline Judgment application by the Attorney-General under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act for a Guideline Judgment concerning the offence of High Range Prescribed Concentration of alcohol under s 94 of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (No 3 of 2002) (2004) 61 NSWLR 305
Maher v Carpenter (2012) ACTLR 216
Mayen v Ryan [2013] ACTSC 172
Mateta v McDonough [2011] ACTSC 196
Meredith v Commonwealth (No 2) (2013) 280 FLR 385
Mwauluka v Turkich [2013] ACTSC 1
Newham v Cogle [2012] ACTSC 76
Piper v Hall [2013] ACTSC 207
R v Foster (1996) 187 LSJS 135
Scott v Wynants (2009) 4 ACTLR 13
Sheather v Bishop [2012] ACTSC 77
Shires v Edwards [2011] ACTSC 132
Travini v Starczewski [2010] ACTSC 100
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. SCA 24 of 2014
Judge: Refshauge ACJ
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 22 April 2014
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 24 of 2014
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
MATTHEW JOHN SHAW
AND
DANIELLE LEACH
ORDER
Judge: Refshauge ACJ
Date: 22 April 2014
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Matthew John Shaw be granted leave to appeal from the decision of the Magistrates Court on 14 August 2012.
Matthew John Shaw file and serve a notice of appeal in the form annexed as annexure A to his affidavit sworn on 1 April 2014 and that the same be issued without the requirement for a date for settling the appeal papers.
The appeal be upheld.
The conviction and fine entered and imposed in the Magistrates Court be confirmed.
The period of the disqualification imposed in the Magistrates Court be set aside and in lieu, Matthew John Shaw be disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence from 14 August 2012 to 12 July 2014.
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
As a result of s 35 of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT) the disqualification of Matthew John Shaw from holding or obtaining a licence under this order ceases on 14 April 2014.
On 15 April 2011, Matthew John Shaw was involved in an accident where the motorbike which he was riding and a kangaroo collided on the road to the Mount Ainslie Lookout. A friend, who was in a car following Mr Shaw, called the ambulance and police later attended. Mr Shaw was taken to The Canberra Hospital where later a doctor took a sample of his blood under s 15AA of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT) (the Alcohol and Drugs Act) which, when later analysed, showed it contained a prescribed concentration of alcohol at a Level 3, namely 0.154 percent of alcohol in his blood.
At some stage, not precisely identified in the material before me but agreed to be either 15 or 16 April 2011, Mr Shaw was issued with a notice under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT). As a result of the blood analysis, a summons was later sought by police, charging Mr Shaw with an offence against s 19(1) of the Alcohol and Drugs Act. Mr Shaw was served with the summons at some date in June or July 2012 for reasons that I will mention below. The summons was returnable on 14 August 2012 and on that day Mr Shaw, who represented himself, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a fine of $500 with court costs of $69, a criminal injuries compensation levy of $50 and a Victim Services levy of $10. He was also disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for the default disqualification period of three years.
Mr Shaw wishes to appeal against what he says was a manifestly excessive sentence in that the period during which he was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence is too long. Such an appeal, however, needs to be instituted within twenty-eight days from the imposition of the sentence; s 209 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT). Such a period may, by leave, be extended by this Court. Mr Shaw has now sought that leave to appeal out of time from the sentence imposed and to challenge that sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.
Leave to appeal
In Mayen v Ryan [2013] ACTSC 172, I considered a range of authorities which set out the principles that should be applied when considering an application to extend the time within which to be permitted to appeal a decision of a court. While it is very important to provide an explanation for the delay in seeking to appeal and that the longer the delay, the more detailed and perhaps persuasive the explanation must be, it is apparent that even a failure to provide an explanation is not necessarily fatal to such an application, though it is highly likely that it will be fatal.
It is also necessary for a court to consider whether the court must extend time in order to do justice between the parties. As McHugh J said in Gallo v Dawson (1990) ALJR 458 at 459:
This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time.
This is commonly described as requiring a proper explanation of why the applicant has not complied with the time limit provided in the statute and that there is a reasonably arguable case on appeal. The statement of McHugh J, however, shows that the considerations they generally encompass in such a description are somewhat more extensive than that. It must, for example, include a consideration of any prejudice to the respondent that the grant of leave may cause.
Delay
The delay in this matter is over nineteen months since the time limit for an appeal expired. Mr Shaw’s explanation was, in effect, that he was unrepresented and had no prior legal advice. He sought legal advice first on 24 March 2014 because of confusion about the date on which the disqualification of his driver licence expired. It was then that he was told for the first time that the sentence imposed on him may have been excessive because of the length of the disqualification period. The circumstances under which he came to seek that advice is also relevant. When Mr Shaw was convicted the learned Magistrate stated:
You are disqualified for the default period of three years, less that period that your licence has already been suspended, there being no significant and appropriate reasons not to impose the default period.
The reference to “less that period that your licence has already been suspended” was to the effect of the s 61B notice in the light of s 35 of the Alcohol and Drugs Act. Mr Shaw received two copies of the licence disqualification order. The first in time, dated 16 August 2012, set out the order as follows:
Matthew John Shaw ... be disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of three years, which period is reduced by the period that the defendant’s licence was suspended under s 61B Road Transport (General) Act 1999.
I note that the order refers to “drivers licence”, even though all the road transport legislation refers to “driver licence” which, though not the colloquial term (which is used in the order) is the correct and legislated term. This order, however, does not appear to have been sent to Mr Shaw directly; he says he obtained it from the Road Transport Authority much later. He did receive, however, a copy of the order dated 20 August 2012 which was different in that it omitted all the words after “three years”. He said that he received it sometime before he paid his fine, for when he did pay his fine he spoke to a court officer about the fact that it did not include the reduction for the period of suspension. He was told, he said, that he need not worry about that and it would be fixed up.
A letter from the Office of Regulatory Services was also in evidence. It was also dated 20 August 2012 and sent to Mr Shaw’s address in Cooma. It referred to the licence disqualification and it stated:
As a result of the court ordered disqualification, your right to drive or be issued with a driver licence in the ACT has been cancelled from 14/8/2012 to 13/8/2015 inclusive, in accordance with section 66 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT).
If you hold a driver licence issued by an interstate authority, details of your disqualification will be forwarded to the issuing authority of your driver licence who may impose additional penalties.
Mr Shaw did actually hold a licence issued by an interstate authority; his licence was a New South Wales licence. Mr Shaw said that this letter was probably actually received by him about the same time he paid his fine. He said he assumed that it was wrong, for the same reason as the order was wrong, and would be corrected as the court officer had told him. He said that he understood that he was not permitted to drive until the Court had dealt with the charge against him. I infer that this was because of the notice under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act. He said that he did not understand until he obtained legal advice that such a notice only suspends his right to drive for a maximum period of ninety days.
As a result he believed that he would be able to have his right to drive in this Territory restored on 14 April 2014. Accordingly, he made inquiries of the New South Wales Road Traffic Authority earlier this year, which informed him that it had no record of his disqualification. He then made inquiries of the Magistrates Court in Canberra. A computer printout of the Court outcome was provided to him. It showed that his licence had been “cancelled” from 15 April 2011 to 14 April 2014.
As a result of the legal advice, he was informed that he may be able to challenge the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. There are, however, some curious aspects of this explanation. As the respondent submitted, Mr Shaw had received a clear statement from the Office of Regulatory Services as to the period of suspension. While he had challenged earlier similar advice from the Magistrates Court, he appeared not to have followed that up to identify precisely when the period of disqualification would end.
The explanation may be in part that he felt that the correction would result in the taking into account of the whole of the period between 15 April 2011 and 14 August 2012 when he had not been driving, and left it at that. It is also not clear why he made further inquiry in early 2014. That is less curious because he had approached the New South Wales Road Traffic Authority who had, through one of those problems encountered with bureaucracies from time to time, not held a record of the disqualification.
Initially he made a telephone inquiry and was told that the disqualification had been made to end on 14 April 2014. This made him confused, so he sought legal advice. He then attended the Magistrates Court on about 24 March 2014, where he was told his file had been lost, but the computer printout to which I have already referred was made available to him. What is curious, having been given the information that corroborated what he understood to be the position, he still sought legal advice.
That suggests that perhaps he was not as clear in his own mind about the actual length of the disqualification. I accept, however, that this inquiry to the New South Wales Road Traffic Authority must have caused him some uncertainty; thus, the explanation for the delay is principally that Mr Shaw was not represented by a lawyer and was confused by the effect of the suspension of his right to drive, which confusion was not clarified by any official agency, the learned Magistrate, the court officials or the Office of Regulatory Services.
The confusion about the exact period of disqualification is very unfortunate. Nevertheless, unlike in Piper v Hall [2013] ACTSC 207, the matter of the suspension under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act was at least raised. This seems to me to be important and impose an obligation upon police and prosecution authorities to bring the matter to the attention of the court. It may be desirable in fact for the courts to make a declaration as to the exact period of disqualification of a licence where there is a requirement for some concurrency with a suspension under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act.
It may not need to be as formal as the declaration I made in Mateta v McDonough [2011] ACTSC 196 where, at [20]-[23], I explained why in some cases that may be necessary, but at the very least the period for which the court ordered automatic disqualification is reduced under s 35 of the Alcohol and Drugs Act should be specified. That may go some way to address the obvious confusion that existed here, particularly where Mr Shaw was unrepresented, and existed both within the Magistrates Court and in the Office of Regulatory Services.
I appreciate that the delay has lasted for a considerable period. A significant part of that was caused by the perception, wrong, but not corrected by anyone, that the effect of the disqualification with the statutory reduction would cease on 14 April 2014. While that has lasted for a long time, it seems to me that, once Mr Shaw took that view, there was nothing that would have caused him to doubt it and so until he started to inquire about reinstating his right to drive shortly before the period he thought the disqualification was to end, he remained of that belief.
I pointed out in Meredith v Commonwealth (No 2) (2013) 280 FLR 385 at 435; [426] that there is no reason to suppose that a false understanding only has a limited temporal effect; unless there is an identifiable occasion where the person with the false understanding is disabused of the falsity, one would ordinarily expect it to continue. So far as any occasion when he should have been disabused is concerned, there is nothing in the material to suggest when that should have arisen. The notice under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act was never produced so I cannot tell whether that could or should have played any part.
Neither the prosecution nor the learned Magistrate said anything that was contrary to Mr Shaw’s understanding. The precise terms of the letter from the Office of Regulatory Services did explicitly set out the period of the disqualification, but it is agreed that this period was wrong and was wrong for the reason that had been the basis of Mr Shaw’s belief, though he must have misunderstood the actual effect of the error. Further, a similar error had been made by the Magistrates Court, which Mr Shaw was told would be rectified and which I accept he could have reasonably concluded would correct the error made by the Office of Regulatory Services.
While this explanation may not quite meet the “exceptional circumstances or some untoward vicissitudes of life” to which Lander J referred in R v Foster (1996) 187 LSJS 135 at 139-40, it seems to me that there is a reasonable explanation as to why Mr Shaw would not be considering whether the disqualification period was manifestly excessive until he found that his understanding, from which no one had disabused him was, in fact, wrong. While not of itself justifying such a substantial extension of time, it does seem to me that Mr Shaw has provided an explanation which justifies further consideration. Indeed, as Martin CJ said in Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd v Gusmao (1993) 114 FLR 293 at 294, even where there is “no explanation whatever” it is appropriate for the court to consider the matters to which McHugh J referred in Gallo v Dawson.
Prospects of success on the appeal
The only question to be answered on the appeal was whether the imposition of the default period of the disqualification was manifestly excessive. This, however, had two aspects, namely:
(a) whether for the circumstances of Mr Shaw’s offending there was a good reason for reducing the period of suspension; and
(b) whether in particular the period when Mr Shaw voluntarily did not drive, though at law entitled to do so, should somehow have been taken into account. It is convenient to consider each of these issues in turn, and first to consider the second one.
As the grant of leave to appeal is in this case so heavily dependent on whether there is a sufficient prospect of success on the appeal, it was agreed that both the application for leave and the appeal should be heard together. So far as the appeal itself is concerned, the court’s power to determine such appeals is set out in Pt 3.10 of the Magistrates Court Act. Division 3.10.2 regulates appeals in criminal matters, such as this appeal.
I have described, in Cooper v Corvisy (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 151, the principles to be applied in appeals against a sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court; I apply them in this case. Such sentences are not to be set aside simply because I, on hearing the appeal, conclude that I might have imposed a different sentence. I may uphold the appeal and substitute a sentence for the original sentence if I am satisfied that the exercise of the sentencing discretion in the Magistrates Court was affected by a specific error but only if I, in re-exercising the sentencing discretion, consider that a different sentence is appropriate and that I am not merely tinkering.
Specific errors may be errors of law, errors of fact, taking account of irrelevant or extraneous considerations, or failing to take account of relevant or material considerations. If I find specific error but the original sentence nevertheless appears to be appropriate, I should dismiss the appeal rather than allow the appeal and reimpose the same sentence. Even if I cannot identify a specific error, I may uphold the appeal and substitute another sentence for the original sentence if I find the sentence to be manifestly excessive, unreasonable or plainly unjust or plainly wrong.
The period when Mr Shaw did not drive
To understand this issue, it is necessary to recite some further facts; these were admitted as further evidence by consent: s 214 of the Magistrates Court Act. Mr Shaw was, at the time of the collision, a student and had arranged to travel overseas to Taiwan and China, on what he described as a one-year student exchange. He left Australia in late June or early July 2011. By that time, for reasons that were not explained, the summons for the offence with which he was ultimately charged and to which he pleaded guilty had not been issued. It was issued on 27 July 2011.
When served at Mr Shaw’s Canberra address, he was informed about it by an email from his housemate. He telephoned the respondent, Constable Danielle Leach, and explained that he was overseas and would not be returning until mid 2012. He also had email communication with her and it was arranged that when he returned he would attend at Civic police station to be served with the summons. In the meantime, he had not driven a motor vehicle; he had not driven in Canberra since 15 April 2011 and did not drive while overseas.
In the hearing before me, he was asked some questions about the circumstances of him not driving overseas. I am not certain that this was especially relevant, but I note the position anyway. He said that his fellow students did drive while overseas, mostly by motor scooter in Taiwan; there was some need for transport because public transport was problematic and he had to travel some distance and had to rely on other students to some extent. In Beijing, the public transport was adequate and he was not significantly disadvantaged. When he returned to Canberra he did present himself at Civic police station and, although he was not initially served with the summons he did receive it shortly after, went to court on 14 August 2012 and pleaded guilty.
The question then was whether this period should have been taken into account in the setting by the learned magistrate of the period of disqualification. Mr M Reardon, who appeared to make helpful submissions on behalf of the respondent, very properly accepted that it was proper to do so; I agree. The tenor of s 35 of the Alcohol and Drugs Act is that pre-sentence licence suspension, as pre-sentence custody under s 63 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, should be taken into account. Of course the fact that Mr Shaw did not drive, though generated by his incorrect belief that the notice under s 61B of the Road Transport (General) Act required it, was actually voluntary and there was no statutory requirement to take into account.
The Court must be satisfied in any sentencing proceedings that a defendant who asserts in those proceedings that he or she has not driven should be accepted as reliably stating it. That will be an issue on each sentencing occasion. Nevertheless, in this case, Mr Shaw was extensively cross-examined and his assertion that he did not drive was not seriously challenged; I am satisfied that he did not, in fact, drive between 15 April 2011 and August 2012. It was also put to him that this caused him little disadvantage or inconvenience, especially in Beijing. He frankly conceded that while in Beijing he did manage reasonably well.
It is not entirely clear to me that this is particularly relevant. Clearly, where a disqualification imposes a particular or especially severe hardship on a defendant, there is a reason for reducing the period. Thus family circumstances (Barac v Thexton [2008] ACTSC 137 at [49]) and employment circumstances (Shires v Edwards [2011] ACTSC 132 at [82], Hill v Wenham [2012] ACTSC 156 at [16]), have been accepted as reasons for reducing a period of driver licence disqualification. Nevertheless, it is proper for pre-sentence non-driving to be taken into account if the court is satisfied that there has been such a period when a defendant did not drive. See Mwauluka v Turkich [2013] ACTSC 1 at [49].
The converse, however, is not the case; because a defendant will be less inconvenienced than another, absent the particular circumstance I have referred to, is not a reason for refusing to reduce the period of disqualification from the default disqualification. Accordingly, it seems to me that, had her Honour been told of Mr Shaw’s voluntary restraint from driving, it would have been proper to take that into account. That Mr Shaw was unrepresented makes it unsurprising that he did not mention the matter himself; he thought it had been dealt with by the reference to the immediate suspension.
It is no doubt difficult for magistrates in busy courts with long lists to provide what may turn out to be the necessary assistance to unrepresented litigants. While some degree of inquisitorial inquiry will be appropriate to ensure that the unrepresented litigants are not disadvantaged, as I set out in Maher v Carpenter (2012) ACTLR 216, it is however difficult to identify precisely the extent to such assistance. In my view, the failure to have this taken into account in this case amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
Reduction of the default period of disqualification
Mr R Davies, who appeared helpfully for Mr Shaw, submitted that in any event the default period of three years was manifestly excessive. It was held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Boeyen v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 482 at 484-5 that disqualification of a licence has a punitive element as well as a protective element. It seems to me that, so far as the punitive element is concerned, the usual considerations under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act should apply.
Mr Davies referred to the following matters: the early plea of guilty, the low reading, at the bottom of the range for Level 3; the co-operation of Mr Shaw in the prosecution, by making contact while he was overseas and then attending at the Civic police station; the fact that he has no prior offences, the fact that by riding a motorcycle he was not putting any passengers at danger; that he suffered extra-curial punishment in the injuries he sustained as a result of the collision; that he had a self-imposed absence from driving and that he would suffer some hardship in the employment on which he was about to embark.
Mr Reardon submitted that the default disqualification is to be imposed unless there is a “good reason” to reduce it. See Scott v Wynants (2009) 4 ACTLR 13 at 18; [32]. That approach is regularly applied in this court. See Travini v Starczewski [2010] ACTSC 100, Hamilton v Spalding [2010] ACTSC 160 and Mwauluka v Turkich. In New South Wales, In the NSW Guideline Judgment application by the Attorney-General under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act for a Guideline Judgment concerning the offence of High Range Prescribed Concentration of alcohol under s 94 of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (No 3 of 2002) (2004) 61 NSWLR 305 at 336; [127] (the Guideline Judgment) uses the phrase “sufficient and appropriate reason”.
It is important to recognise that neither of these phrases amounts to requiring “special or exceptional circumstances” and such a gloss should not be read into the statute. Further, I do not consider that the reasons must be in some way outside the circumstances of the offence itself; thus, for example, the reading of the prescribed concentration of alcohol may be or may be part of the sufficient reason. A low reading may justify or help justify a reduction of the disqualification period while a high reading justify or help justify the default period.
I do not consider, however, that the fact Mr Shaw has no prior drink driving offences is directly relevant; the penalty he is facing was for a first offender in respect of such offences. That, however, he had no other driving or indeed other offences is relevant. That Mr Shaw was riding a motorcycle did not seem to me to be relevant. Mr Davies seemed to suggest that this meant he was not putting any passengers in danger, a relevant factor. It seems to me, however, that there are often passengers carried on motorcycles and that there are often cars where there are no passengers. The Guideline Judgment does refer to “the number of persons actually put at risk by the driving” but this is an aggravating factor; that few or none are put at risk does not mitigate.
That an approach such as I have identified may mean that the default disqualification is often reduced seems to me not only likely but contemplated by the legislation, as interpreted by the Guideline Judgment and by Scott v Wynants; indeed in the latter, Higgins CJ noted, at 18; [33], without disapproval that “it has clearly enough been common for the default period to be reduced”. I have set out in Newham v Cogle [2012] ACTSC 76 at [45]-[46] and Sheather v Bishop [2012] ACTSC 77 at [46]-[49] the approach to setting the disqualification period. Penfold J, in Mwauluka v Turkich, suggested this involved a two-stage process, which her Honour queried but at [49] applied herself.
Insofar as my approach appears inconsistent with the need to sentence by arriving at the sentence through instinctive synthesis, as required by the High Court in cases such as Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 611; [25], I did not mean to depart from that mandated approach and am content that it is no more a two-stage process than that applied in the decision by her Honour. It seems to me that, in this case, there were good, sufficient and appropriate reasons for the reduction of the period of disqualification from the default period.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the period of disqualification in this case was manifestly excessive and that there has been, now that the full facts have been put before a court, a miscarriage of justice. No prejudice has been identified to suggest that leave should not be granted in those circumstances. While I am not convinced that the correct approach is to add up the various periods of non driving and apply that mathematically in every case, I do not consider that in this case there is any reason why I should not accept that Mr Shaw did suffer the penalty of not driving for the whole of the period from 15 April 2011 to 14 August 2012.
While I would have reduced the default disqualification period modestly, it seems to me that this would be somewhat offset by the fact that, for at least the six months Mr Shaw was in Beijing, his need for a licence was very limited. In the circumstances, it seems to me that justice is served by a disqualification period that ends on 14 April 2014.
I shall order accordingly.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Acting Chief Justice Refshauge.
Associate:
Date: 22 August 2014
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Davies
Solicitor for the Appellant: Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Reardon
Solicitor for the Respondent: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
Date of hearing: 22 April 2014
Date of judgment: 22 April 2014
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