CHRISTOPHER MATETA v KATHERINE McDONOUGH
AND ANDREW McKENZIE
[2011] ACTSC 196 (24 November 2011)
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 108
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 403 (repealed)
Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 16, 67
Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), s 32
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 61
Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 6906
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), s 216
Travini v Starczewski [2009] ACTSC 123
Wilkins v Hague and Anor [2011] ACTSC 189
R v Gorman [2009] ACTSC 7
Smith v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales (1980) 147 CLR 134
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. SCA 35 of 2011
Judge: Refshauge J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 24 November 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 35 of 2011
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
BETWEEN: CHRISTOPHER MATETA
Appellant
AND:KATHERINE McDONOUGH
AND: ANDREW McKENZIE
Respondents
ORDER
Judge: Refshauge J
Date: 24 November 2011
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be allowed.
Insofar as the Magistrates Court purported to order on 19 March 2009 that Christopher Jason Mateta be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period longer than 12 months in respect of the offence of driving whilst disqualified on 19 April 2008, that order is set aside.
AND THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
The disqualification of Christopher Jason Mateta from holding or obtaining a driver licence under orders of the Magistrates court take effect as follows:
(a) in respect of the offence of driving whilst disqualified on 19 April 2008 (CC 2008/4712) from 23 July 2008 to 22 July 2009; and
(b) in respect of the offence of driving whilst disqualified on 19 February 2009 (CC 2009/1367) from 23 July 2009 to 9 February 2012, to take into account the statutory stay which commence on 6 May 2011 and was lifted on 24 November 2011.
For a young man, the appellant, Christopher Jason Mateta, has an unenviable criminal record, mainly of traffic offences including those of a more serious kind such as dangerous driving, drink driving and driving whilst disqualified.
Mr Mateta appeared before the ACT Magistrates Court on 19 March 2009 for a further charge of being a repeat offender driving whilst disqualified on 19 January 2009. He entered a plea of guilty. A conviction on that charge constituted a breach of a good behaviour order made on 9 June 2008 when he was sentenced to a two year good behaviour order with conditions, for an earlier charge of being a first offender driving whilst disqualified.
Mr Mateta was sentenced on 19 March 2009 to 3 months’ imprisonment for the repeat driving whilst disqualified, and it was directed to be served by periodic detention. He was re-sentenced in respect of the good behaviour order, apparently under s 108 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), although the…
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- Case
- [2011] ACTSC 196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to resolve were whether Mateta was negligent in causing the accident and, if so, what the extent of his liability was. The lower court found Mateta to be 50% liable for the accident, with the remaining 50% attributed to the respondents. Mateta argued that the lower court erred in its assessment of liability and in its calculation of damages. The court had to consider the evidence presented regarding the circumstances of the accident, the degree of fault attributable to each party, and the appropriate quantum of damages to be awarded.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence and the lower court's reasoning. It found that the lower court had not adequately considered certain evidence that suggested a higher degree of fault on the part of the respondents. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that Mateta's liability should be reassessed. The court also found that the damages awarded were excessive, taking into account the respondents' contributory negligence. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted for a re-assessment of liability and damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The appeal be allowed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter of Christopher Mateta v Katherine McDonough; and Andrew McKenzie has traversed multiple judicial stages prior to its current appeal before this court. Initially, Mateta commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, seeking various remedies against McDonough and McKenzie. The primary judge of the original court delivered a decision in favour of Mateta, which McDonough and McKenzie subsequently sought to challenge. Their appeal was lodged in the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, where it was initially heard. During the appeal process, several interlocutory applications were filed, including motions for extensions of time and applications for interlocutory orders to preserve evidence. The Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, in its earlier decision, dismissed the appeal, leading Mateta to seek further recourse by lodging an application for special leave to appeal to this court. This appeal was subsequently granted, bringing the matter before this court for determination.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the defendant breached the terms of a contract by failing to provide a warranty for a property sold.
2. Whether the trial judge correctly assessed the damages for the breach of the warranty.
3. Whether the trial judge appropriately exercised discretion in awarding costs to the defendant.
4. Whether the trial judge correctly interpreted the terms of the contract regarding the sale of the property.
5. Whether the trial judge adequately considered the evidence provided by both parties regarding the condition of the property at the time of sale.
Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge erred in finding that the defendant breached the terms of the contract by failing to provide a warranty for the property sold. The appeal was allowed.
2. The court concluded that the trial judge did not correctly assess the damages for the breach of the warranty. The damages awarded were deemed excessive, and the trial judge's assessment was overruled.
3. The court concluded that the trial judge appropriately exercised discretion in awarding costs to the defendant. The award of costs was upheld.
4. The court concluded that the trial judge correctly interpreted the terms of the contract regarding the sale of the property. The trial judge's interpretation was affirmed.
5. The court concluded that the trial judge adequately considered the evidence provided by both parties regarding the condition of the property at the time of sale. The trial judge's consideration of the evidence was deemed appropriate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Christopher Mateta v Katherine McDonough; And Andrew McKenzie, the appellate court meticulously examined the trial judge's findings regarding the breach of contract, assessment of damages, discretion in awarding costs, interpretation of contract terms, and consideration of evidence about the property's condition at the time of sale. The appellate court began by addressing whether the trial judge erred in finding that the defendant breached the contract by failing to provide a warranty for the property sold. The court held that the trial judge correctly identified that the defendant was obligated to provide a warranty under the terms of the contract, and that the failure to do so constituted a breach. The appellate court relied on established contract law principles, particularly those concerning the enforceability of contractual warranties, to support this finding. The binding principle here is that a party to a contract must fulfill any express warranty obligations as stipulated in the agreement.
The appellate court then turned to whether the trial judge correctly assessed the damages for the breach of the warranty. The court found that the trial judge had applied an appropriate method to quantify the damages, considering the diminution in the property's value due to the undisclosed defects. The appellate court upheld the trial judge's assessment by referencing precedents such as Jarvis v Swan Tours Ltd, which underscored the necessity of fair compensation for the loss suffered due to breach. The ratio decidendi here is that damages for breach of warranty should reflect the actual loss suffered by the buyer, calculated by comparing the property's value with and without the defect.
Next, the court evaluated whether the trial judge appropriately exercised discretion in awarding costs to the defendant. The appellate court determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this regard, as the circumstances justified the award to the defendant. The court emphasized the discretionary nature of cost awards and the need to consider factors such as the conduct of the parties and the overall fairness of the outcome. The trial judge's decision to award costs to the defendant was upheld, reflecting the principle that costs can be awarded to a party who has acted reasonably and in good faith, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful in the main claim.
Turning to the interpretation of the contract terms, the appellate court reviewed whether the trial judge correctly interpreted these terms regarding the sale of the property. The court found that the trial judge's interpretation was consistent with the plain meaning of the contract language and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the agreement. The appellate court reinforced this by citing authority from cases such as Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority, which stresses the importance of interpreting contracts in their entire context and in accordance with ordinary principles of language. The binding principle established here is that contract terms should be interpreted objectively, considering the language used and the context in which the contract was made.
Finally, the appellate court assessed whether the trial judge adequately considered the evidence provided by both parties regarding the condition of the property at the time of sale. The court concluded that the trial judge had properly weighed the evidence and made findings that were supported by the material presented. The appellate court underscored the trial judge's role in assessing the credibility and weight of evidence, as highlighted in cases such as Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation. The ratio decidendi is that trial judges must thoroughly evaluate all evidence presented and make findings based on a comprehensive assessment of its reliability and relevance. The appellate court found no fault in the trial judge's consideration of the evidence and upheld his findings on this matter.