Matson v United States of America

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Matson v United States of America [2018] FCAFC 57

Appeal from: Matson v United States of America [2016] FCA 1245
File numbers: QUD 569 of 2016
QUD 844 of 2016
QUD 51 of 2017
Judges: DOWSETT, WIGNEY AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 13 April 2018
Catchwords:

EXTRADITION – request by United States of America for extradition of appellant from Australia – appeal from dismissal of application for review of magistrate’s order that appellant be committed to prison under s 19(9) Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) to await surrender or release – whether primary judge erred in finding that extradition request met requirements of s 19(2)(b) Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and Article XI(3)(c) Treaty on Extradition between Australia and United States – adequacy of supporting documents – whether Article XI(3)(c) required affidavit setting forth reasonable grounds for believing that the person for whom the extradition was sought had committed an offence under United States law – appeal dismissed – application pursuant to s 39B Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – application for review of decision of Minister for Justice to issue notice pursuant to s 16 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Minister failed to consider delay of prosecution authorities in bringing extradition request – whether delay amounted to abuse of process or fraud on extradition power – whether Minister can consider delay at s 16 stage of extradition process – whether Minister had duty to inquire into delay – application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – rejection of tender of irrelevant documents – where evidence concerned matters not before Minister

Legislation:

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 12, 15, 15A, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Extradition (United States of America) Regulations 1988 (Cth) Schs 1, 2

Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United States of America. Opened for signature 14 May 1976. [1976] ATS 10 art XI(3)(c) (entered into force 8 May 1976)

Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United States of America of 14 May 1974. Opened for signature 4 September 1990. [1992] ATS 43 art 7 (entered into force 21 December 1992)

Title 18, United States Code, ss 2, 371, 1341, 1343, 1956

Cases cited:

Bou-Simon v Attorney-General (2000) 96 FCR 325; [2000] FCA 24

De Bruyn v Republic of South Africa (1999) 96 FCR 290

Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311

Forrest v Kelly (1992) 34 FCR 74

Foster v Attorney-General (1997) 97 A Crim R 560

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104

Griffiths v United States of America (2005) 143 FCR 182

Harris v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 386

Hermanowski v United States of America (2006) 149 FCR 93

Jacobi v United States of America [1996] FCA 962

McDade v United Kingdom [1999] FCA 1868

Ngo v United States of America (2009) 177 FCR 411

Papazoglou v Republic of the Philippines (1997) 74 FCR 108

Todhunter v United States…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Matson v United States of America involved an appeal by Mr Matson against the decision of a primary judge, who dismissed his application for review of a magistrate’s order that he be committed to prison to await surrender or release. The United States had requested Mr Matson’s extradition from Australia on charges of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The primary judge had found that the extradition request met the requirements of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United States. Mr Matson argued that the extradition request was not sufficiently supported by a description of the conduct constituting the offence and did not set forth reasonable grounds for believing that the extradition offences had been committed by him. He contended that the affidavit provided by the United States did not provide reasonable grounds for a belief that he committed the offences in the indictment.
The court needed to decide whether the primary judge erred in finding that the extradition request met the requirements of the Extradition Act and the Treaty, and whether the affidavit set forth reasonable grounds for believing that the extradition offences had been committed by Mr Matson. The court also needed to consider whether the Minister for Justice had failed to consider the delay of prosecution authorities in bringing the extradition request, and whether that delay amounted to abuse of process or fraud on the extradition power.
The court found that the primary judge was correct in finding that the extradition request met the requirements of the Extradition Act and the Treaty, and that the affidavit provided reasonable grounds for believing that the extradition offences had been committed by Mr Matson. The court held that the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish reasonable grounds for the belief, and that the delay of prosecution authorities in bringing the extradition request did not amount to abuse of process or fraud on the extradition power. The court also held that the Minister for Justice was not required to consider the delay at the s 16 stage of the extradition process, and that the Minister had no duty to inquire into the delay.
The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the application. The court found that the primary judge’s decision was correct, and that the extradition request met the requirements of the Extradition Act and the Treaty. The court also found that the affidavit provided reasonable grounds for believing that the extradition offences had been committed by Mr Matson, and that the delay of prosecution authorities in bringing the extradition request did not amount to abuse of process or fraud on the extradition power.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As has already been noted, Mr Matson contended, both before the primary judge and in support of his appeal, that the supporting documents that were before the magistrate were not capable of satisfying the requirement in paragraph (3)(c) of Article XI of the Treaty. The question of what is required by the expression “reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed” is considered later in the context of addressing Mr Matson’s appeal ground.BACKGROUND FACTS In the United States, a federal criminal prosecution is commenced when a grand jury files an indictment with the United States District Court. The clerk of the court, at the direction of a United States District Judge or Magistrate Judge, then normally issues a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. On 26 October 2005, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of Florida in the United States returned a fifteen-count indictment charging Mr Matson and others with various offences. Those offences were: one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, ss 371 and 2, carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment; five counts of mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, ss 1341 and 2, carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment; and nine counts of wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, ss 1343 and 2, carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment. A warrant for the arrest of Mr Matson was signed on 26 October 2005. On 21 December 2005, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment, which included, in addition to the fifteen counts in the original indictment, a sixteenth count. The sixteenth count was an offence of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, s 1956(h), carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment. A further warrant for the arrest of Mr Matson was signed on 21 December 2005. That warrant, however, included a “scrivener’s error”. New arrest warrants correcting that error were issued in November 2011. As will be seen, Mr Matson’s judicial review application relies on alleged delay, including the delay by the United States authorities between the return of the indictments and the initial warrants, and the issuing of the relevant warrants almost six years later in November 2011. The conduct the subject of the charges in the United States indictment and warrants occurred between 1997 and at least January 2001. It will be necessary to say something more in due course about the description of the conduct in the relevant supporting documents. It is sufficient for present purposes to set out the primary judge’s summary of the conduct (at [6] of the Judgment under appeal): The allegations made by the USA are to the effect that between 1997 and 2000, Mr Matson, his father, Roger Matson and Gordon Robert Grant made false promises and representations to induce investors to invest in fraudulent schemes related to gambling on horse and greyhound racing. The schemes are alleged to have initially involved investors paying money for computer hardware and software known as the Professional Race Organizer Program (“the PRO Program”), which would allow investors to “generate a consistent cash income” and “successfully back every runner in every race”. It is alleged that after receiving large amounts of money from the investors for the PRO Program, investors were invited by the conspirators to invest in a new program, a Managed Accounts Program, which would “increase their opportunity for return”. Under this program the investors’ funds were to be pooled and the conspirators were to manage the wagering process. In 2000, investors were presented with an opportunity to invest up to $75,000 each to be used for wagering on the Melbourne Cup. The USA alleges that the conspirators then “vanished along with substantially all of the investors’ money”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The conduct the subject of the charges in the United States indictment and warrants occurred between 1997 and at least January 2001. It will be necessary to say something more in due course about the description of the conduct in the relevant supporting documents. It is sufficient for present purposes to set out the primary judge’s summary of the conduct (at [6] of the Judgment under appeal): The allegations made by the USA are to the effect that between 1997 and 2000, Mr Matson, his father, Roger Matson and Gordon Robert Grant made false promises and representations to induce investors to invest in fraudulent schemes related to gambling on horse and greyhound racing. The schemes are alleged to have initially involved investors paying money for computer hardware and software known as the Professional Race Organizer Program (“the PRO Program”), which would allow investors to “generate a consistent cash income” and “successfully back every runner in every race”. It is alleged that after receiving large amounts of money from the investors for the PRO Program, investors were invited by the conspirators to invest in a new program, a Managed Accounts Program, which would “increase their opportunity for return”. Under this program the investors’ funds were to be pooled and the conspirators were to manage the wagering process. In 2000, investors were presented with an opportunity to invest up to $75,000 each to be used for wagering on the Melbourne Cup. The USA alleges that the conspirators then “vanished along with substantially all of the investors’ money”. On 21 May 2014, the United States requested Mr Matson’s extradition from Australia to the United States. That request was supported by an affidavit sworn by an Assistant United States Attorney, Mr Jay G. Trezevant. On 4 September 2015, the Minister signed a notice pursuant to s 16 of the Extradition Act stating that the extradition request had been received. On 17 September 2015, a magistrate issued an extradition arrest warrant under s 12(1) of the Extradition Act. Mr Matson was, in due course, arrested and brought before a magistrate on 26 October 2015. He was remanded in custody under s 15(2) of the Extradition Act. On 10 November 2015, the United States applied for proceedings to be conducted before a magistrate to determine whether Mr Matson was eligible for surrender pursuant to s 19 of the Extradition Act. Mr Matson advanced a number of arguments in support of his case that he was not eligible for surrender. Relevantly, he contended that the extradition request was not sufficiently supported by a description of the conduct constituting the offence and did not set forth reasonable grounds for believing that the extradition offences had been committed by Mr Matson. He argued that the facts set out in Mr Trezevant’s affidavit did not provide reasonable grounds for believing that Mr Matson acted with the required fraudulent design or intent. Rather, the facts were consistent with Mr Matson having acted as a mere “salesperson or promoter” without any intention of defrauding anybody. He submitted that the allegations in Mr Trezevant’s affidavit were too broad and unspecific to provide reasonable grounds for a belief that he committed the offences in the indictment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established