FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rivas v The Republic of Chile [2020] FCA 737
File number: NSD 751 of 2019 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 29 May 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory application – Application for copy of the applicant’s extradition file – Where interlocutory application is taken to be an application for discovery – Applicant seeking production of all departmental submissions made to the Attorney-General or any Minister administering the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth)(Extradition Act) regarding the exercise of powers under the Extradition Act in relation to the Applicant between 2006 to June 2018 – Where the Second Respondent, the Attorney General for Australia, has produced, by agreement between the parties, a copy of the departmental submission to the applicant’s solicitors – Where the applicant has not established that there is a basis to order discovery in the terms sought – Application dismissed, with costs , Legislation: Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 5, 11, 12, 12(1), 15, 16, 19, 22, 22(2), 22(3)(e), 22(3)(f), 50
Extradition (Republic of Chile) Regulations 1995 (Cth) reg 4
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 26.01, Div 20.2
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) ss 16, 16(3)
Treaty on extradition between Australia and the Republic of Chile [1996] ATS 7; [1996] UNTSer 413 Arts V, IX, X, X(2), XV, XVI
Cases cited: Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 1044
Barton v Commonwealth [1974] HCA 20; (1974) 131 CLR 477
Bollag v Attorney-General [1997] FCA 1146; (1997) 79 FCR 198
Carmody v MacKellar [1996] FCA 791; (1996) 68 FCR 265
Commonwealth Minister for Justice v Adamas [2013] HCA 59; (2013) 253 CLR 43
Director of Public Prosecutions of the Commonwealth v Kainhofer [1995] HCA 35; (1995) 185 CLR 528
Federal Republic of Germany v Parker (1998) 166 ALR 522; (1998) 84 FCR 323
Foster v Attorney General (1998) 158 ALR 394; (1997) 97 A Crim R 560
Harris v Attorney-General (Commonwealth) [1994] FCA 621; (1994) 52 FCR 386
Hempel v Attorney-General (Cth) (1987) 29 A Crim R 133; (1987) 77 ALR 641
Jilani v Wilhelm [2005] FCAFC 269; (2005) 148 FCR 255
Liem v Republic of Indonesia [2018] FCAFC 135; (2018) 265 FCR 251
Matson (Roger) v Keenan [2016] FCA 1549
Matson v United States of America [2018] FCAFC 57; [2018] 260 FCR 187
Minister for Home Affairs v Zentai [2012] HCA 28; (2012) 246 CLR 213
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273
Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) [2001] FCA 84; (2001) 181 ALR 559
Oates v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2002] FCAFC 80; (2002) 118 FCR 544
Rivas v Republic of Chile [2019] FCA 1940
Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1518
Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Ltd (No 4) [1995] FCA…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 737
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles established in previous cases such as Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd and Carmody v MacKellar, which highlight that the court has a discretionary power to order discovery in judicial review proceedings but will not do so if the proceeding or claims within it are essentially speculative. The court found that the applicant had not established that there was a basis to order discovery in the terms sought, as no decision had been made to refuse any earlier request because no ministerial decision had been made under the Extradition Act in respect of any such request. The application was considered to be fishing in nature and therefore the applicant had not met the onus of satisfying the court that the documents sought were necessary.
Consequently, the application for discovery was dismissed with costs. The court held that the applicant's submissions were flawed and did not establish the necessary grounds for discovery. The order dismissing the application was final and no further appeal was possible on the interlocutory matter. The court ordered that the applicant pay the second respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the stringent requirements for obtaining discovery in judicial review proceedings and reinforces the principles that guide the court's discretion in such matters.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 11 December 2019 and filed on 13 December 2019, be dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the second respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Surrendering a person pursuant to s 22 of the Extradition Act gives effect to Australia’s treaty obligations: United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60; (2001) 209 CLR 165 at [58] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ.Consideration This is an interlocutory application for discovery in relation to an application for judicial review. The principles relevant to the consideration of such an application are well established. The Court will not order discovery as a matter of course unless discovery is necessary for the determination of issues in the proceeding, and an applicant for an order for discovery bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the documents sought are necessary: Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 1044 at [33] per Mansfield J citing Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Ltd (No 4) [1995] FCA 1418; (1995) 58 FCR 426 at 436 per Lindgren J. The principles that are relevant to an order for discovery in an application for judicial review are as summarised in Carmody v MacKellar [1996] FCA 791; (1996) 68 FCR 265 (Carmody) at 280 per Merkel J, as follows:The following principles may now be taken to be well established by the decisions of the Court in Melbourne Home of Ford v Trade Practices Commission [1979] FCA 15; (1979) 36 FLR 450, W.A. Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman [1980] FCA 79; (1980) 41 FLR 175 and Australian Securities Commission v Somerville (1994) 51 FCR 38: 1.the Court has a discretionary power to order discovery in proceedings for the review of an administrative decision; 2.the proper exercise of the power depends upon the nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which discovery is sought; 3.if a proceeding or claims in it are essentially speculative in nature the Court will not order discovery in order to assist the applicant in a fishing exercise; 4.the evidence or material which will be required to establish that the proceeding or particular claims in it are not essentially speculative will vary with the nature and circumstances of the particular case; 5.if there is not the slightest evidence or there is no other material to support the bare allegations made in the proceeding, then as a general rule, an order for discovery ought not to be made. These principles were accepted by the Full Court (Dowsett, Jacobson and Greenwood JJ) in Jilani v Wilhelm [2005] FCAFC 269; (2005) 148 FCR 255 at [108]. Against that background I turn to the application. The applicant submitted that one basis for her challenge in the judicial review proceedings is that the extradition request was made in breach of the “Treaty and the Extradition (Republic of Chile) Regulations dated 12 December 1995 that commenced 13 January 1996”. The applicant relies on Article XVI of the Treaty on extradition between Australia and the Republic of Chile [1996] ATS 7; [1996] UNTSer 413 (the Treaty) which is in the following terms: XVINon bis in idemOnce the extradition request has been ultimately refused, a new request may not be submitted for the same offence.