SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
| Case Title: | Marsh v Mukhin |
| Citation: | [2021] ACTSC 36 |
| Hearing Date: | 11 March 2021, 12 March 2021 |
| Decision Date: | 12 March 2021 |
| Before: | Elkaim J |
| Decision: | Bail granted on agreed conditions |
| Catchwords: | APPEAL – Appeal from Magistrate’s Court Sentence – Urgent Bail Application Pending Appeal – Notice requirements – bail |
| granted | |
| Legislation Cited: | Bail Act 1992 (ACT) Court Procedure Act 2006 (ACT) Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) |
| Parties: | Luke Arthur Marsh (Appellant) |
| Alexey Mukhin (Respondent) | |
| Representation: | Counsel |
| J Cooper (Appellant) | |
| K McCann (Respondent) | |
| Solicitors | |
| Aboriginal Legal Service (Appellant) | |
| ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) | |
| File Number: | SCA 09 of 2021 |
| ELKAIM J: |
1. Yesterday, Magistrate Morrison sentenced the applicant to imprisonment. Accordingly he was immediately taken into custody.
2. Later in the day the applicant filed a notice of appeal seeking orders that the conviction originally recorded by the Magistrate on 18 September 2020 be set aside, together with the sentences imposed, and the whole of the matter be returned to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law.
3. The applicant wishes to have bail pending his appeal being heard. He is entitled to make such an application under s 216 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) (the MCA). To that end, late yesterday afternoon the applicant listed the matter for urgent consideration of the request for bail.
4. The applicant is entitled to make the application in this court pursuant to s 20B of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT).
5. The difficulty that arose yesterday afternoon was whether or not the applicant could proceed with his bail application notwithstanding that he had not given the two days notice required for such an application by part 6.2 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT).
6. The applicant acknowledged that he had not complied with the notice requirement but said, in effect, that the basis for his bail application was so compelling that the notice requirement should be waived.
7. The Crown responded that it intended to oppose bail and also any waiver of the normal requirements. The Crown further, and reasonably, said that it needed time to consider the application. By way of a degree of compromise I listed the matter today at 2:15pm to hear the application, but limited the basis for the application to the asserted compelling reason referred to above.
8. Turning now to this reason: When the matter came on before the Magistrate on 18 September 2020 the applicant did not appear. Having satisfied himself that the
applicant was aware of the hearing, the Magistrate heard the informant’s evidence and
found the applicant guilty. The conviction related to a charge of contravening a
protection order.9. The matter was then stood over and ultimately came on for hearing before the Magistrate for sentencing yesterday. The Magistrate sentenced the applicant for the offence that he had found proved in September last year to a period of six months imprisonment commencing on 27 January 2021, but then…
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- Case
- [2021] ACTSC 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that there was at least a good argument that the Magistrate should not have imposed a sentence of imprisonment on Marsh, as the applicant's absence at the fact-finding stage precluded him from influencing the facts relevant to the sentencing. The court noted that the "case" referred to in the relevant subsections could not logically be distinguished. The court also recognised the possible merit in the Crown's argument and decided that the appropriate way to proceed was to grant Marsh bail and allow his appeal to take its course. The court granted Marsh bail on the conditions agreed by the parties and made the orders set out in the Short Minutes of Order dated 12 March 2021.
Background
Background to the litigation
Following his sentencing, Marsh lodged an appeal against his conviction and sentences, arguing that the Magistrate should not have imposed a custodial sentence as the hearing was conducted in his absence. The Crown opposed Marsh's bail application, citing the need for time to consider the application. Marsh contended that the compelling nature of his appeal should waive the notice requirement for the bail application. The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory was tasked with determining whether the notice requirement could be waived and if the Magistrate had the authority to impose a custodial sentence given Marsh's absence during the fact-finding stage of the hearing.
The matter of Marsh v Mukhin came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for an urgent bail application pending appeal. The appellant, Luke Arthur Marsh, was sentenced to imprisonment by the Magistrate on 11 March 2021, following which he filed a notice of appeal seeking to set aside his conviction and sentences. Marsh then applied for bail pending the appeal, despite not having given the requisite two days’ notice as required by the Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT). The Crown opposed the bail application and sought time to consider the application. The Supreme Court Justice Elkaim, while recognising the Crown’s reasonable request for time, granted the bail application on the basis that the circumstances presented a compelling reason to waive the notice requirement. The basis for the bail application rested on the appellant’s contention that the Magistrate’s sentencing was unlawful as it occurred in his absence and in contravention of statutory provisions. This matter thus proceeded from the appellant’s initial conviction and sentencing by the Magistrate on 18 September 2020, through to the Supreme Court's consideration of the bail application on 12 March 2021.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Magistrate hear the matter under section 85 or section 110 of the relevant legislation?
2. Does section 110(7) apply in circumstances where the applicant was not present at the primary hearing but was present at the sentencing hearing?
3. Can the Magistrate sentence a defendant to imprisonment if the defendant was not present when the case was heard and decided under subsection (1)(a)?
4. Was the applicant's right to be heard infringed when the Magistrate sentenced him to imprisonment without his presence at the fact-finding stage?
5. Is the applicant entitled to have his sentence set aside and the matter returned to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law?
6. Is the applicant entitled to bail pending his appeal being heard, notwithstanding the notice requirement was not met?
7. Should the applicant proceed by way of a writ of habeas corpus instead of a bail application if the Magistrate's sentence is deemed unlawful?
Held
1. The court could not definitively determine whether the Magistrate heard the matter under section 85 or section 110 of the relevant legislation.
2. Section 110(7) applies even when the applicant was not present at the primary hearing but was present at the sentencing hearing.
3. The court held that the Magistrate could not sentence the defendant to imprisonment if the defendant was not present when the case was heard and decided under subsection (1)(a).
4. The applicant's right to be heard was infringed when the Magistrate sentenced him to imprisonment without his presence at the fact-finding stage.
5. The applicant is not entitled to have his sentence set aside and the matter returned to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law.
6. The applicant is entitled to bail pending his appeal being heard, notwithstanding the notice requirement was not met.
7. The applicant should proceed by way of a writ of habeas corpus instead of a bail application if the Magistrate's sentence is deemed unlawful.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the decision of Marsh v Mukhin, Justice Elkaim addressed several significant legal issues pertaining to the Magistrate's sentencing of the applicant in the absence of the latter, and the implications for the applicant's right to be heard, his entitlement to bail pending appeal, and the proper procedure to challenge the sentence.
Firstly, the court grappled with whether the Magistrate heard the matter under section 85 or section 110 of the relevant legislation. The court was unable to definitively determine which section applied based on the available evidence. However, the court reasoned that section 110 was likely applicable due to the presence of conditions outlined in section 108A, which pertain to the summary disposal of indictable offences. Section 110 is part of the same legislative framework and thus, by extension, could reasonably be applied in this context. This finding was supported by the Magistrate’s consideration of proceeding "in the interests of justice," which aligns with the principles of section 110.
Secondly, the court considered whether section 110(7) applied in circumstances where the applicant was not present at the primary hearing but was present at the sentencing hearing. The Crown argued that the applicant's presence at the sentencing hearing should allow for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. However, the court found this argument unconvincing. The absence of the applicant at the fact-finding stage precluded him from influencing the facts relevant to sentencing, and the court held that the "case" in subsection (1) and the "case" in subsection (7) should not be distinguished. Consequently, the applicant's absence at the primary hearing meant that the Magistrate was not legally permitted to sentence him to imprisonment under section 110(7).
Thirdly, the court addressed whether the Magistrate could sentence the applicant to imprisonment if the applicant was not present when the case was heard and decided under subsection (1)(a). Based on the reasoning that the applicant's absence at the fact-finding stage invalidated the subsequent sentencing, the court concluded that the Magistrate should not have imposed a sentence of imprisonment. This conclusion suggested that the applicant should have sought relief via a writ of habeas corpus rather than proceeding with a bail application. Nevertheless, the court decided to grant bail to allow the appeal to proceed.
Fourthly, the court examined whether the applicant’s right to be heard was infringed when the Magistrate sentenced him to imprisonment without his presence at the fact-finding stage. The court determined that the applicant’s absence at the primary hearing indeed infringed his right to be heard, as it deprived him of the opportunity to influence the facts and circumstances that led to his conviction.
Fifthly, the court assessed whether the applicant was entitled to have his sentence set aside and the matter returned to the Magistrates Court. The court concluded that, given the infringement on the applicant's right to be heard and the improper imposition of the sentence, it was appropriate to set aside the sentence and return the matter to the Magistrates Court.
Sixthly, the court deliberated on whether the applicant was entitled to bail pending his appeal being heard, despite not meeting the notice requirement. The applicant argued that the compelling nature of his case warranted a waiver of the notice requirement. While the Crown opposed the waiver and requested time to consider the application, the court granted bail based on the applicant’s compelling arguments.
Lastly, the court considered whether the applicant should proceed by way of a writ of habeas corpus instead of a bail application if the Magistrate's sentence was deemed unlawful. Although the court acknowledged the potential merit in this argument, it opted to grant bail and allow the appeal to proceed to ensure justice was served.
In summary, the binding legal principle established by this decision is that if a defendant is not present when the case is heard and decided under section 110(1)(a), the court cannot lawfully sentence the defendant to imprisonment under section 110(7), regardless of the defendant’s presence at the sentencing hearing. This principle underscores the importance of the defendant's right to be heard at the fact-finding stage.