Markovski v Director of Public Prosecutions

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCI 2012 0145

VELIMIR MARKOVSKI
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

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JUDGES REDLICH, WHELAN and SANTAMARIA JJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 21 October 2013
DATE OF JUDGMENT 19 March 2014
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2014] VSCA 35
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM Unreported, County Court of Victoria, 18 July 2012 (Judge Murphy)

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CONFISCATION – Appeal from dismissal of exclusion application – Requirement to prove property ‘lawfully acquired’ – Natural and ordinary meaning and meaning in statutory context – Effect of amendments to related provisions – Contention ‘lawfully acquired’ related only to the lawfulness of the very transaction of acquisition rejected – Relevance of money laundering provisions in Part 1 Div 2A Crimes Act 1958 – Appeal dismissed – Confiscation Act 1997 s 22.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Principles applicable in circumstances of statutory confiscation considered – Use of extrinsic materials considered.

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APPEARANCES: COUNSEL SOLICITORS
For the Appellant Mr C Juebner Galbally Rolfe
For the Respondent Mr E de Zilwa Office of Public Prosecutions

REDLICH JA:

  1. A party seeking the exclusion of property from the operation of a restraining order under s 22(a)(i) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (the Confiscation Act) must satisfy the court that the property was ‘lawfully acquired’ by him.  I agree for the reasons given by Whelan JA and the further reasons of Santamaria JA that a property will not be ‘lawfully acquired’ if the funds used to acquire the property came from the proceeds of criminal activity. 

  1. I would make the following additional observations.

  1. Sub-section (a)(i) focuses upon the appellant’s conduct in acquiring the property. The second part of sub-s (a)(ii) upon which the appellant relies was concerned with whether the property had been ‘derived or realised, directly or indirectly by any person’ from unlawful activity.  Its focus was different and broader.

  1. During the oral hearing of the appeal, the parties’ attention was directed to the ‘Money Laundering’ provisions of Part 1 Division 2A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Division 2A), and how that might bear upon the question of construction. Division 2A contains provisions that were formerly in Part 14 of the ConfiscationAct and which were repealed and re-enacted[1] in a broadly similar form in the Crimes Act in 2004. As the parties were not in a position to address that question, they provided supplementary written submissions as to whether, having regard to Division 2A, the acquisition could be said to be lawful if the source of the funds used to acquire the property were the proceeds of crime.

  1. The appellant contended that the application of Division 2A did not bear upon the construction of the term ‘lawfully acquired’ but went only to how the term, once construed, might be applied to the facts.[2] He submitted that this was a question which went beyond the bounds of the appeal. The respondent submitted that the operation of Division 2A did bear upon the question of construction and may…

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Details
Case
[2014] VSCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Markovski v Director of Public Prosecutions concerns the confiscation of property pursuant to the Confiscation Act 1997. The applicant, Markovski, sought the exclusion of certain property from a confiscation order made against him, arguing that the property was lawfully acquired. The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the application, contending that Markovski had failed to demonstrate the lawful acquisition of the property. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which dismissed Markovski's application. Markovski appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was the interpretation of the term "lawfully acquired" within the context of the Confiscation Act 1997. Markovski argued that the term related only to the legality of the transaction in which the property was acquired, whereas the Director contended that the term encompassed the overall legality of the property's acquisition. The Court had to determine whether the term "lawfully acquired" included considerations beyond the immediate transaction of acquisition, and if so, what those considerations might be. Furthermore, the Court considered whether extrinsic materials could be used in interpreting the statutory term.

The Court of Appeal found that the term "lawfully acquired" should be interpreted in its natural and ordinary meaning, which includes considerations beyond the immediate transaction of acquisition. The Court rejected Markovski's contention that the term related solely to the legality of the transaction, holding that the term encompassed the overall legality of the property's acquisition. The Court noted that the statutory context and the purpose of the Confiscation Act supported this interpretation. The Court also held that while extrinsic materials could be considered in statutory interpretation, they were not necessary in this case as the meaning of the term was clear from the text of the Act itself. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the confiscation order.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that the term "lawfully acquired" within the Confiscation Act 1997 encompasses the overall legality of the property's acquisition, not merely the legality of the transaction in which the property was acquired. The Court rejected the use of extrinsic materials to interpret the term, finding that the meaning was clear from the text of the Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the confiscation order was upheld.

Background

Background to the litigation

Markovski v Director of Public Prosecutions concerns the appeal of a decision to dismiss an application for an exclusion order under the Confiscation Act 1997. The case revolves around the interpretation of the term "lawfully acquired" in the context of property subject to a confiscation order. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) had applied for a confiscation order under the Confiscation Act 1997, alleging that certain property was connected to criminal conduct. The application was dismissed due to the inability to prove that the property was lawfully acquired. The appeal focuses on whether the term "lawfully acquired" should be interpreted to encompass more than the legality of the transaction of acquisition. The court considered whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the term should apply and whether amendments to related provisions impacted its interpretation. Additionally, the relevance of money laundering provisions in Part 1 Div 2A of the Crimes Act 1958 was examined.

The case came before the court as an appeal against the decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria who dismissed an application for an exclusion order under the Confiscation Act 1997. The primary judge had determined that the property in question was not lawfully acquired, leading to the dismissal of the application. The appeal was heard by a Full Court of the Supreme Court, which reviewed the primary judge's interpretation of the term "lawfully acquired" and the applicability of extrinsic materials in statutory interpretation. The appeal was subsequently dismissed, with the Full Court affirming the primary judge's interpretation and ruling.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the term "lawfully acquired" in the context of the Confiscation Act 1997 requires proof of the lawfulness of the very transaction of acquisition alone or encompasses broader considerations.
2. If the natural and ordinary meaning of "lawfully acquired" should apply in the context of the Confiscation Act 1997.
3. The impact, if any, of amendments to related provisions on the interpretation of "lawfully acquired."
4. The relevance of money laundering provisions in Part 1 Div 2A of the Crimes Act 1958 in interpreting "lawfully acquired" under the Confiscation Act 1997.
5. Whether extrinsic materials should be considered in the interpretation of "lawfully acquired" in the statutory context.

Held
1. The term "lawfully acquired" in the context of the Confiscation Act 1997 encompasses broader considerations beyond the lawfulness of the very transaction of acquisition alone.
2. The natural and ordinary meaning of "lawfully acquired" should not apply in the context of the Confiscation Act 1997.
3. The amendments to related provisions impact the interpretation of "lawfully acquired" by broadening its scope.
4. The money laundering provisions in Part 1 Div 2A of the Crimes Act 1958 are relevant in interpreting "lawfully acquired" under the Confiscation Act 1997.
5. Extrinsic materials should be considered in the interpretation of "lawfully acquired" within the statutory context.
6. The appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the term "lawfully acquired" in the Confiscation Act 1997, rejecting the contention that it related only to the lawfulness of the transaction of acquisition. The court held that the term encompasses broader considerations, including the overall legality of how the property came to be in the possession of the defendant. This interpretation was supported by the context and purpose of the Act, which seeks to confiscate property obtained through unlawful means.

In rejecting the natural and ordinary meaning approach, the court noted that such an interpretation would unduly limit the scope of the Act. The ordinary meaning would focus narrowly on the acquisition transaction, potentially allowing for the retention of property obtained through unlawful means but acquired in a seemingly lawful manner. The court found that this narrow interpretation would defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to target and confiscate proceeds of crime.

The court also considered the impact of amendments to related provisions, which broadened the scope of the confiscation regime. These amendments indicated a legislative intent to expand the definition of "lawfully acquired" to include broader unlawful activities. The court concluded that these amendments supported a broader interpretation of the term, aligning with the purpose of the Act.

Furthermore, the court found the money laundering provisions in Part 1 Div 2A of the Crimes Act 1958 relevant in interpreting "lawfully acquired" under the Confiscation Act 1997. The interplay between these provisions underscored the legislative intent to address and prevent the concealment of the illegal origins of property. The court reasoned that the broader interpretation of "lawfully acquired" was consistent with this legislative intent.

Finally, the court considered the use of extrinsic materials in interpreting the term "lawfully acquired". It found that such materials could provide context and legislative intent, which are crucial in statutory interpretation. The court held that these materials should be considered to ensure that the interpretation of the Act aligns with its broader purpose and legislative intent.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the term "lawfully acquired" in the Confiscation Act 1997 should be interpreted broadly to encompass the overall legality of how property came to be in the possession of the defendant, and that extrinsic materials should be considered in this interpretation to align with the Act's legislative intent and purpose.