[2014] AATA 658
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number
2013/3955
Re
Margaret Armstrong
APPLICANT
And
Comcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal RM Creyke Senior Member
Dr P. Wilkins, MemberDate 10 September 2014 Place Canberra The decision under review is affirmed.
......................[sgd]..................................................
RM Creyke Senior Member
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – Commonwealth employee – accepted aggravation of injury – wether applicant suffers a permanent impairment as a result of accepted condition – whether the impairment exceeds 10 percent whole person threshold
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (Act), the salient provisions being section 4(1), 5A, 5B, 24, 27.
Cases
Re Carson and Comcare [2003] AATA 112
Re Milenkovic and Comcare [1993] AATA 17
Re Rees and Comcare [1996] AATA 104
Re Nelson and Comcare [2009] AATA 874.
Re Brice and Comcare (2007) 96 ALD 171Secondary Materials
American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th edn, 2001)
Comcare, Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of PermanentImpairment (edn 2.1)
DW Black et al ‘The Iowa follow-up of chemically sensitive persons’ (933 Ann. NY Acad Sc, 2001) 48-56.
Macquarie Dictionary (6th rev’n, 2013)REASONS FOR DECISION
RM Creyke Senior Member
Dr P. Wilkins, Member
Ms Margaret Armstrong, born 1952, has an accepted condition of ‘aggravation of allergic rhinitis, cause unspecified’, described in the reviewable decision as ‘aggravation of multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS)’, with a deemed date of injury of 28 October 2011.
On 17 April 2013, Ms Armstrong sought compensation for permanent impairment and non-economic loss under sections 24 and 27 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (Act) for her accepted condition.
On 6 June 2013, the claim was rejected, a decision upheld on review on 2 August 2013.
Ms Armstrong sought further review by the Tribunal on 12 August 2013. The matter was heard in Canberra and by telephone to Orange, NSW, on 8 August 2014.
Background
Ms Armstrong was formerly employed by the Department of Human Services (agency), Orange, NSW as a Customer Services Adviser. She was invalidity retired from 30 April 2013.
Ms Armstrong attributed her condition to ‘constant exposure to perfumes/oils and chemicals’, a condition she first noticed in about 1995. The condition worsened slightly in the years between the mid-1990s and 2006, but markedly in late 2011 to early 2012.
The significant sensitivity increase occurred after the agency moved into a new air-conditioned and sealed building in late 2011, when Ms Armstrong was exposed to residual smells of new carpet, fittings, paint and glue, as well as perfumes. Formerly the agency had been housed in an older style building in which groups of staff had separate rooms, windows could be opened, and Ms Armstrong’s group had agreed not to wear perfumes. The new building was largely open-plan and there was no general agreement not to wear perfumes. Ms Armstrong says that it is exposure to perfumes which is the principal trigger for her condition.
Ms Armstrong lodged six incident reports between 24…
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- AGLC
- Margaret Armstrong and Comcare [2014] AATA 658
- Case
- [2014] AATA 658
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory definitions of "impairment" and "permanent," as well as the principle that compensation is only payable for a permanent impairment resulting from a compensable injury. Comcare had accepted that Ms Armstrong's pre-existing sensitivity was aggravated by her employment, leading to the condition of multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS). The court concluded that the concession of liability was correctly made and focused on whether Ms Armstrong's impairment was permanent and resulted from her employment. Given the nature of MCS and the evidence provided by medical practitioners, the court found that Ms Armstrong's condition was likely to continue indefinitely, fulfilling the definition of a permanent impairment. However, the court determined that the degree of impairment did not exceed the 10 percent threshold required for compensation.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory definitions and the principle that only impairments resulting from the compensable injury could be compensated. Despite acknowledging the severity of Ms Armstrong's condition, the court found that the degree of impairment did not meet the statutory threshold for compensation. Consequently, the court dismissed Ms Armstrong's application for further review.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The issues are:· Whether Ms Armstrong suffers a permanent impairment as a result of her accepted ‘injury’ within the meaning of the Act;· If so, whether her impairment meets or exceeds the 10 per cent whole person threshold contained in section 24(7) of the Act; and· What, if any, is Ms Armstrong’s entitlement to compensation under section 24 and 27 of the Act in respect of ‘aggravation of MCS’? Consideration Ms Armstrong claims she is permanently impaired due to her accepted condition, ‘aggravation of multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome’. The Act defines relevant terms as follows:· ‘”impairment” means the loss, the loss of the use, or the damage or malfunction, of any part of the body or of any bodily system or function or part of such system or function’;[2] · ‘”non-economic loss”, in relation to an employee who has suffered an injury resulting in a permanent impairment, means loss or damage of a non-economic kind suffered by the employee (including pain and suffering, a loss of expectation of life or a loss of the amenities or enjoyment of life) as a result of that injury or impairmentand of which the employee is aware;[3]·‘”permanent” means likely to continue indefinitely’.[4]Whether Ms Armstrong suffers a permanent impairment as a result of her accepted ‘injury’ within the meaning of the Act[2] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 4(1) – definition of ‘impairment’.[3] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s4(1) – definition of ‘non-economic loss’.[4] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 4(1) – definition of ‘permanent’. On 5 April 2012, Comcare accepted that Ms Armstrong suffered from a compensable condition in accordance with section 14 of the Act. The condition was then described as ‘aggravation of allergic rhinitis, cause unspecified’, but this was changed later to MCS. The acceptance of liability was because Ms Armstrong’s pre-existing sensitivity was aggravated by employment. Her exposure to volatile chemicals, particularly perfume, in the work environment was apparently the trigger for the worsening of the condition. This followed the move to the new agency building. The Tribunal is satisfied that this concession is correctly made, and notes that the initial determination of liability is not in issue. Section 24(1) of the Act states that compensation is only payable in respect of a permanent impairment which ‘results from’ a compensable injury. Hence, the applicant is only entitled to be compensated for any permanent impairment resulting from MCS and even then, non-work factors contributing to the impairment must be taken into account. The expression ‘results from’ is defined in section 7(6). If, but for an injury, a person's impairment would not have occurred, would have been significantly less, or would have occurred at a later time, the impairment ‘results from’ the injury.[5][5] Re Carson and Comcare [2003] AATA 112. Impairment