JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: MANDURAH ENTERPRISES PTY LTD & ORS -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2007] WASC 43
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 26 JULY & 9 AUGUST 2006
DELIVERED : 23 FEBRUARY 2007
FILE NO/S: CIV 1037 of 2006
BETWEEN: MANDURAH ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 008 722 638)
First Plaintiff
NEIL ROBERT GRAHAM
VALMAI EVELYN GRAHAM
Second PlaintiffsAND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Defendant
Catchwords:
Administrative law - Town planning - Validity of Taking Order - Whether compulsory acquisition "for the purposes of" a town planning scheme - Whether compulsory acquisition "for the purposes of" a railway - Whether doctrines of election, approbation and reprobation apply
Legislation:
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 37
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA), s 151, s 170, s 171, s 172, s 173, s 174, s 175, s 177, s 184, s 202, s 211, s 248
Public Works Act 1902 (WA), s 2, s 17, s 17A, s 96, s 102
Railway (Northern and Southern Urban Extensions) Act 1999 (WA), Sch 2, s 4
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA), s 6, s 13
Town Planning and Development Act Amendment Act 1957 (WA)
Western Australian Planning Commission Act 1985 (WA), s 18, s 37F
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : Mr R I Viner QC
Second Plaintiffs : Mr R I Viner QC
Defendant: Mr R M Mitchell
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : Deacons
Second Plaintiffs : Deacons
Defendant: State Solicitor
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Attorney‑General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394
Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1320
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93
Mounsdon v Weymouth & Melcombe Regis Corporation (1960) 1 All ER 538
News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 215 CLR 563
Swallow & Pearson v Middlesex County Council [1953] 1 All ER 580
Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 221 CLR 30
LE MIERE J: These proceedings relate to the acquisition of four parcels of land which the defendant compulsorily took from the plaintiffs on 7 August 2003. The four parcels of land which I will collectively refer to as "the Plaintiffs' Land" are described as Lots 7, 8, 30 and 49.
Lot 7 is contiguous with and to the west of the TAFE Peel Regional Campus. Lot 8 is contiguous with and to the west of Lot 7. Lot 30 is contiguous with and to the west of Lot 8. Lot 49 adjoins the northwest corner of the campus.
Prior to the Plaintiffs' Land being taken the second named plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs Graham, were the registered proprietors of Lots 8 and 30 and the plaintiff company, Mandurah Enterprises, was the registered proprietor of Lot 7 and Lot 49. Mr Graham is the principal shareholder and director of Mandurah Enterprises.
In these proceedings…
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- Case
- [2007] WASC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the compulsory acquisition was for the purposes of a railway, not a town planning scheme. The court considered the principles of the doctrine of election, approbation and reprobation, and held that the public authority could not be estopped from denying a fact or status that it had represented if to do so would give the authority powers which it did not in law possess. The court held that the principles of approbation and reprobation did not apply to this case as the public authority had not represented that the acquisition was for the purposes of a town planning scheme.
The court found that the compulsory acquisition of the land was for the purposes of a railway, and that the doctrines of election, approbation and reprobation did not apply. The appeal was dismissed.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the respondents be entitled to their costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A similar issue arose in Mounsdon v Weymouth & Melcombe Regis Corporation (1960) 1 All ER 538. In that case, planning permission to use land as a caravan site was granted to Mounsdon in April 1952, on a condition that only three caravans should be sited on the land. By July 1958, 26 caravans were on the site. The local planning authority served on Mounsdon an enforcement notice alleging that there had been development within four years preceding the date of the notice and that the development consisted of a material change of use by using the land as a site for caravans exceeding three in number. The notice alleged that the condition of the planning permission to develop land had not been complied with as the land was used as a site for more than three caravans. Mounsdon appealed under s 23(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 (UK) seeking, by complaint, that the enforcement notice should be quashed. On his complaint being dismissed he appealed. On appeal the enforcement notice was quashed. The council contended that, having obtained planning permission, the appellant could not now argue that it was unnecessary and it was suggested that Swallow & Pearson (supra), was distinguishable on the ground that planning permission was not obtained in that case whereas in this case it was. The Queen's Bench Division did not think that the distinction affects the principle applied in Swallow & Pearson and held that the appellants were not precluded from raising the issue as to development by reason of the grant of planning permission in 1952. The defendant has cited a number of cases in which the principle of approbation and reprobation has been applied. The defendant further submits that to the extent that it is necessary to show that the defendant would suffer a detriment if the plaintiffs were permitted to depart from the assumption on which the payment of compensation to them was based, the defendant has satisfied that requirement. The defendant has lost the opportunity to correct any invalidity, or remove any doubt as to validity, of the Taking Order by issuing a notice of intention to take or a new Taking Order before entry onto the plaintiffs' land was effected. Persons other than the defendant have relied on the validity of the Taking Order by entering into contracts for the construction of part of the Perth‑Mandurah Railway on the Plaintiffs' Land, entering the land and undertaking construction activity on the land. The defendant and others would suffer a detriment which is not confined to the payment of compensation to the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs were now permitted to depart from the assumption. The authors of Wade and Forsyth "Administrative Law" 9th ed, say at p 236 that legal rules about estoppel and waiver are applicable to public authorities as well as to other persons. The authors cite a number of English authorities where a public authority was estopped from denying a fact or status that it had represented. The authors go on to state (at p 237), that in public law the most obvious limitation on the doctrine of estoppel is that it cannot be evoked so as to give an authority powers which it does not in law possess. In other words, no estoppel can legitimate action which is ultra vires. At p 238 the learned authors say that it has often been said that no amount of waiver or consent can extend the public authority's powers or validate action which is ultra vires.