Mamun v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MAMUN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2011] FMCA 620
MIGRATION – Migration Review Tribunal – student visa – secondary applicant – primary applicant having departed Australia – Tribunal assessing secondary applicant as if he were a primary applicant – applicant not meeting criteria.
Migration Act 1958, ss.66, 359A, 417
Migration Regulations 1994, sch. 2, cls. 573.223, 573.231, 573.322 and 573.326
SZOFE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 129
Applicant: ABDULLAH AL MAMUN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 229 of 2011
Judgment of: Riley FM
Hearing date: 22 July 2011
Date of Last Submission: 22 July 2011
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 22 July 2011

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: In person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Knowles
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 22 February 2011 is dismissed.

  2. That the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $6,240.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 229 of 2011

ABDULLAH AL MAMUN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

Background

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal.  The applicant came to Australia in 2003 from Bangladesh as the dependent spouse of his wife.  The wife had a subclass 572 vocational education and training sector visa. She did not pursue her studies. However, on 15 November 2004, she applied for a subclass 573 higher education sector visa. The present applicant was a secondary applicant for that visa.  On 17 December 2004, a delegate of the Minister refused the application by the applicant’s wife, and, consequently, the present applicant’s secondary application. Notification of the refusal was sent on 17 December 2004. 

  2. The wife and the present applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal found that the application was out of time and determined that it could not consider the application.  The wife and the present applicant made an application in respect of that determination to this court on 28 February 2005. The application was dismissed on 31 January 2006. 

  3. The present applicant and his wife then sought protection visas, which were refused. The present applicant and his wife then sought the exercise of the Minister’s discretion under s. 417 of the Migration Act 1958.  That was also refused. 

  4. The applicant’s wife departed Australia on 31 July 2008.  The applicant did not go with her. 

  5. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship on 9 December 2009 found the applicant to be living and working unlawfully in Australia.  The applicant at that point described himself as being single and divorced.  On 10 February 2010, the Minister sent the applicant a further notice of the decision of 17 December 2004. 

  6. On 9…

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Details
Case
[2011] FMCA 620
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mamun v Minister for Immigration, the applicant, a non-citizen, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant argued that she was not properly informed about where she could lodge an application for review of a decision made by a delegate, which decision was ultimately upheld by the Minister. The Full Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the Minister's notification to the applicant was sufficient under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The Court had to decide whether the Minister's failure to inform the applicant of all possible places to lodge an application for review constituted a jurisdictional error.

The Court examined the statutory requirements and considered the practical implications of the Minister's notification. The Court noted that the statutory provisions did not explicitly require notification of all possible places to lodge an application for review. The Court further held that the failure to inform the applicant of all possible places to lodge an application for review did not render the application a nullity, as the applicant was effectively notified of her rights and the decision did not have any adverse consequences for her. The Court held that the consequences of the alleged failure needed to be assessed in the context of the particular case and found that there was no jurisdictional error as the applicant was adequately informed and able to lodge an application within the required timeframe.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs, which were fixed at $6,240. This decision reinforces the principle that the failure to inform an applicant of all possible places to lodge an application for review does not necessarily constitute a jurisdictional error, provided that the applicant was effectively notified of her rights and the failure did not have any adverse consequences.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application filed on 22 February 2011 is dismissed.

2.

That the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $6,240.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, the Minister referred to the Full Federal Court’s decision in SZOFE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 129 at [28] to [30] and [64] to [67], which state as follows: 28 The only requirement of s 66(2)(d)(iv) is that a notification must state where an application can be made. That requirement was satisfied in the present case. The applicant had given the Minister an address in Harris Park where she resides. There was no suggestion that the applicant would not receive a letter sent by registered mail to that address. In those circumstances, there was nothing unfair or inconvenient in telling the applicant that she could lodge an application for review in Sydney or Melbourne. There has been no suggestion that the applicant suffered any injustice by reason of the failure on the part of the Minister to state that an application for a review of the Delegate’s Decision could have been made at a registry of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Perth, Brisbane or Adelaide. 29 In the present case, the Minister notified the applicant of the Delegate’s Decision in a manner that was calculated to inform her fully of everything she needed to know in order to make a decision as to whether to apply to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision. She decided to do so and made an application that complied with s 412(1). It was made in the approved form and it was given to the Tribunal within the period of 28 days after the applicant was taken to have been notified of the Delegate’s Decision. 30 In any event, even if the provision were to be properly construed as requiring a statement of every place where an application for review could be made, the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that any failure, in the present case, to comply strictly with the procedural requirements of the Act and the Regulations was not of a nature that would render the application lodged by the Applicant on 2 June 2009 a nullity. It is not possible to glean, from the language of the provisions in question, an intention on the part of the Parliament to invalidate a process simply because an applicant was not told that an application for review could be lodged at a place which was of no relevance or significance, so far as that particular applicant was concerned. While the Parliament may be taken to have intended that compliance with the requirements of s 66(2) would discharge the Minister’s obligation with respect to the giving of timely and effective notice of a decision, it does not follow that it was the intention that any departure from those steps would result in invalidity, without consideration of the extent and consequences of the departure (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO(2009) 238 CLR 627 at [35]). (emphasis added)…64 We find ourselves in disagreement with North J in Hasan insofar as his Honour stated a general rule about the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(iv). The present case is an example of the necessity to test the question whether jurisdictional error has resulted from an alleged failure to comply with a statutory requirement by reference to the particular circumstances of the case in question. It is not necessary to decide in the present case whether the failure to draw to the attention of a potential applicant for review the facility of lodging an application at a registry of the AAT in Brisbane, Adelaide or Perth would constitute a jurisdictional error in some circumstances. It does not do so in the present case. (emphasis added)65 There is no doubt in the present case that there was a notification of the decision made by the delegate which was, in every practical sense, effective to put the applicant on notice of her rights of review as contemplated by s 66 of the Act. As a result of the notification, the applicant applied to the RRT in Sydney, at the address provided in the letter to her. Sydney is where she lived. Any failure to notify the applicant of the possibility that she might file an application for review at the AAT in Brisbane, Adelaide or Perth (as well as at the RRT in Sydney or Melbourne) had no adverse consequences for the applicant. The applicant’s argument can only succeed if the procedural direction in s 66(2)(d)(iv) is first interpreted as requiring notification of all possible places of lodgement (whether with the RRT directly or through the AAT) to all potential applicants for review regardless of where they reside. Furthermore, the argument can only succeed if such a requirement is seen as fundamental to the exercise of any jurisdiction by the RRT even if a potential applicant is effectively notified of a decision and, in response, files an application for review in the required manner and within the required time. Neither premise should be accepted. The reasons why neither premise should be accepted are interconnected.66 In the case of an administrative tribunal, it is frequently necessary to consider the consequences of a departure from a statutory (or other) requirement before concluding that jurisdictional error has been committed (Craig v The State of South Australia(1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179-180; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627 at [35-36] (SZIZO)). The exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal must be, in some way, "affected" by the error or failure alleged. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the principle had no application in the present case because the failure of which the applicant complained did not arise during the process set in train by her application to the RRT but, rather, prevented that process from being commenced. The failure to specify all places at which her application might be made was said to be fatal to any application by her even though there were no adverse consequences, procedural or otherwise, from the alleged failure. (emphasis added)67 However, in our view there cannot be an adequate assessment of whether the requirements of s 66 of the Act have been breached, or of whether the jurisdiction of the RRT was not engaged, without some examination of the consequences of the alleged non-compliance. The judgment of the High Court in SZIZO has expressly drawn attention to the need to evaluate the practical consequences of failure to comply with procedural obligations under the Act. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to speak of "imperative obligations" under the Act without specific attention to the purposes they are intended to serve. If the asserted failure to comply with s 66 is tested in that manner then the proposition that in all cases potential applicants for review must be advised of all places at which an application might be lodged, or to which it might be sent, cannot be sustained. The consequences of an alleged lack of information need to be assessed in a particular case. (emphasis added)