Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 22

Appeal from: Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1639
File number: NSD 2124 of 2018
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, KENNY, BESANKO, BROMWICH AND BANKS-SMITH JJ
Date of judgment: 28 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a single judge of this Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister, acting personally, to cancel the respondent’s visa under s 501(2) – whether the Minister can re-exercise the discretion conferred by s 501(2) to cancel a visa where the Tribunal has earlier set aside a delegate’s decision to cancel the visa under that same provision – whether the Minister can re-exercise the discretion relying on the very same facts to enliven the discretion in s 501(2) as the Tribunal did on review – appeal allowed for the reasons set out in Minister for Home Affairs v Brown [2020] FCAFC 21
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 33(1)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501(2), 501A

Cases cited:

Brown v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1722

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 373 ALR 196

Minister for Home Affairs v Brown [2020] FCAFC 21

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 185; 247 FCR 500

Date of hearing: 4 June 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Ahmad with Dr J Donnelly
Solicitor for the Appellant: Morning Star Legal and Migration Services Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Johnson with Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 2124 of 2018
BETWEEN:

LIKUMBO MAKASA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, KENNY, BESANKO, BROMWICH AND BANKS-SMITH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Court on 31 October 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof the Court orders:

a.the respondent’s decision of 18 October 2017 to cancel the applicant’s visa be quashed;

b.the applicant, Mr Likumbo Makasa, be released from immigration detention forthwith;

c.the respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

3.The costs of the appeal be dealt with at the time of publication of reasons.

4.Reasons to be published on a date to be fixed on or after 3 February 2020.

5.To the extent necessary and to the extent the Court has power, time for the filing and serving of any application for special leave to appeal be extended or enlarged to a date 21 days after reasons for judgment are published.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

NSD 2124 of 2018
BETWEEN:

LIKUMBO MAKASA

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, Mr Makasa, a citizen of Zambia, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary dispute centred on whether the Minister could re-exercise the discretionary power to cancel the visa after the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had previously set aside a delegate’s decision to cancel the visa under the same provision. The case was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which allowed the appeal against the earlier decision of a single judge dismissing the application for judicial review.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister could lawfully re-exercise the discretion to cancel Mr Makasa’s visa using the same facts that the Tribunal relied on in setting aside the delegate’s decision. The Court examined whether the Minister could rely on the very same facts to justify the cancellation of the visa, especially given that the Tribunal had already determined that the delegate’s decision should be set aside. The Court also considered whether the Minister’s reconsideration of the visa cancellation decision complied with the principles of legal certainty and procedural fairness.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Minister’s decision to re-exercise the discretion to cancel Mr Makasa’s visa was flawed. The Court held that the Minister could not rely on the same facts that the Tribunal had used to set aside the delegate’s decision. The reasoning of the Court was influenced by the principles outlined in Minister for Home Affairs v Brown, where it was established that the Minister must consider the matter afresh and not simply repeat the previous decision-making process. The Court emphasised that the Minister’s decision should be based on an independent assessment of the visa holder's conduct and circumstances at the time of the reconsideration, rather than merely repeating the earlier decision.

The orders of the Court mandated that the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the costs of the application before the primary judge as agreed or assessed. This directive was in line with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which governs the entry of orders in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and costs of the application before the primary judge as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 24 December 2019, orders were made by the Court, by majority, allowing the appeal. These are my reasons for dissenting from that decision.Background Mr Makasa, a citizen of Zambia, who is now 36 years old, arrived in Australia in 2001 when he was 18 years old. About four years later, in 2005, he was convicted of three counts of common assault against his then domestic partner, receiving a concurrent 18 month good behaviour bond for each. In 2007 he was convicted of negligent driving, drink driving and driving without a licence. The drink driving offence involved a high range prescribed concentration of alcohol in his blood (PCA). A further two years later, in 2009, Mr Makasa, along with two other men, was tried before a jury on sexual offences alleged to have taken place on the night of 30 August 2006, or in the early hours of 31 August 2006, and later in the morning of 31 August 2006. The trial ran for three months. In relation to the night of 30-31 August 2006, Mr Makasa was found guilty, but acquitted by majority on appeal, on one count of having sexual intercourse without consent, knowing there was no consent. The presence of the other two men was a charged circumstance of aggravation. He was acquitted by the jury on other counts arising from that night. In relation to the same complainant, concerning events that took place during the next day, 31 August 2006, Mr Makasa was found not guilty on five offences of sexual intercourse without consent in the circumstance of aggravation that the victim was above the age of 14, but under the age of 16 (she was 15). He was found guilty on three alternative counts of having sexual intercourse when he did not have an honest and reasonable belief that she was over 16. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of imprisonment of 2 years, with a single 12 month non-parole period. In 2011, a delegate of the Minister cancelled Mr Makasa’s visa under s 501(2). That decision was ultimately set aside by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2013 (a prior Tribunal decision affirming the delegate’s decision was set aside by a judge of this Court, and an appeal to the Full Court was dismissed). The 2013 Tribunal decided not to cancel Mr Makasa’s visa. On 24 January 2017, Mr Makasa was convicted of a summary offence of failing, apparently as a parolee, to report early enough his use of social media, which he said was to communicate with his daughter, and fined $300. On 3 May 2017, Mr Makasa was again convicted on a charge of drink driving, this time for a mid-range PCA. He was disqualified from driving for 12 months, and fined $1,200. These two 2017 convictions triggered a process of reconsideration of the cancellation of his visa. On 18 October 2017, the Minister personally cancelled his visa under s 501(2). He was in immigration detention from then until at least his appeal was allowed on 24 December 2019. The Minister’s reasons described the overall circumstances of the 2006 sexual offence allegations, the 2009 trial, convictions and sentences, and the 2010 appeal outcome. The reasons stated that the Minister made no findings as to the events of the night of 30-31 August 2006 and gave this no weight in considering the seriousness of Mr Makasa’s conduct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 2 should also have failed.Conclusion Contrary to the decision of the rest of this Court, I remain of the view that the appeal should have been dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established