MADHAVEN v Minister for Immigration

[2012] FMCA 510

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MADHAVEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 510

MIGRATION – Judicial review – unsatisfactory course attendance under the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) – whether the decision maker made an error of law – whether there was jurisdictional error – whether there was Wednesbury unreasonableness – reliance upon a medical certificate – no basis to demonstrate error – application dismissed.

Constitution, s.75(v)
Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth), ss.19, 20
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.116

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425
Maan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 150
Mazumder v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 76
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Zhou (2006) 152 FCR 115
Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 112
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor [2009] FMCA 1261

Applicant: AJESH NERAPPATHU MADHAVEN

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: BRG 38 of 2011

Judgment of: Burnett FM

Hearing date: 20 June 2011

Date of Last Submission: 20 June 2011

Delivered at: Brisbane

Delivered on: 29 June 2012

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr W.J. Markwell

Counsel for the Respondents: Ms N. Kidson

Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

1. That the Application filed 27 January 2011 be dismissed.

2. That in default of application by either party for other orders, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,240.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 38 of 2011

AJESH NERAPPATHU MADHAVEN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant is an Indian national who arrived in Australia on 28 February 2009, having been granted a Sub Class 572 Visa which was valid until 27 June 2011.  The applicant was studying a course Certificate IV in Optical Technology at an establishment run by Ram Optics Pty Ltd (trading as School of Ophthalmic Optics; Vocational Studies – Australia) (Ram).

2. On 1 July 2009 a director of Ram wrote to the applicant notifying him that under s.20 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) (ESOS Act) his attendance had not been satisfactory and was at 75.6% as at 1 July 2009. The letter then stated:

   “This leaves us with no option than to notify Immigration Office that you have breached your Student Visa conditions.  We would like to remind you of your rights to be able to access complaints and appeals processes within the next 20 working days if you wish to do so.”

3. On 23 July 2009, Ram issued the applicant with a notice pursuant to s.20 of the ESOS Act informing him that it had certified him as not achieving satisfactory course attendance for s.19 of the ESOS Act and Standard 11 of the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students (the National Code). 

4. Subsequently, on 28 July 2009, a delegate of the Minister issued the applicant with a “Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation Under Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958.” The basis for the notice was Ram’s certification.  The notice informed the applicant that he had five working days to provide a written response as to why his visa should not be cancelled.

5. On 27 May 2010 the delegate made a decision to cancel the applicant’s Sub Class 572 Visa.  The applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision.  Following the conduct of a hearing before the Tribunal, the Tribunal issued a decision on 23 December 2010 affirming the delegate’s decision.  The applicant now applies for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision and seeks orders for prerogative relief including certiorari prohibition and mandamus.

Grounds of Appeal

1. In his amended grounds of application, the applicant asserted three grounds:

   a)The decision maker made an error of law amounting to a jurisdictional error, namely a mistaken conclusion;

   b)The decision maker has asked itself the wrong question and/or ignored relevant material and has thus made an error law, amounting to a jurisdictional error;

   c)The decision maker has made a decision that no reasonable decision maker could have reached and that the decision was irrational, illogical and unreasonable.  The decision maker has also ignored relevant material and therefore has made numerous errors of law and an error of fact.

Ground 1 – Decision maker made an error of law amounting to jurisdictional error namely drawing a mistaken conclusion

1. In the applicant’s amended application, he provided the following particulars in respect of Ground 1:

   “In relation to Ground 1, the Decision Maker held that it was of little consequence that the Section 20 Notice under the Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (ESOS Act) was issued early, thus not allowing the full 20 working days as required under Standard 11.6 of the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students (“the National Code”) with which the Applicant was able to provide a response and enabling the Applicant access to a complaints handling and appeals process as required under Standard 8 of the National Code, as required under s.499 of the Migration Act 1958 (“The Act”) (Direction No. 38), which is a specific example of an ‘exceptional circumstance beyond the Applicant’s control.’ An education provider must abide by its own appeal policies and procedures in relation to attendance and reporting students to the Department, given the seriousness of the consequences. Therefore the MRT has made an error of law, namely a ‘mistaken conclusion’ in the exercise of its power to cancel the Visa has exceeded its authority and this is a jurisdictional error.”

2. The legislative scheme provided for by s.116 and Regulation 2.43(2)(b)(ii) is that the visa must be cancelled if the Tribunal is satisfied that the visa holder has not complied with Condition 8202 and that the noncompliance was not due to exceptional circumstances beyond the visa holder’s control. Condition 8202 is found in Schedule 8 of the Regulations and relevantly provides:

   “8202 (3) A holder meets the requirements of this subclause if neither of the following applies:

   …

   (b)     the education provider has certified the holder, for a registered course undertaken by the holder, as not achieving satisfactory course attendance for:

   (i) section 19 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000; and

   (ii)   standard 11 of the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2007.”

3. It has previously been held that while Condition 8202(3)(b) relates to course attendance it is the certification by the education provider as to the breach of its course attendance policies that constitutes the breach of the condition, and not the unsatisfactory attendance of itself: Maan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 150 at [44] – [45]. The Tribunal’s task is to determine that a certificate on its face is of a kind that engages Condition 8202(3) and it is not required to otherwise enquire into the validity of the certificate: see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citzenship and Anor [2009] FMCA 1261 and Mazumder v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 76. The applicant does not take issue with those principles.

4. Section 19 of the ESOS Act requires that the education provider (in this case, Ram) take responsibility for monitoring course attendance and offer students access to a complaints handling and appeals process to consider relevant matters including whether there are compassionate or compelling circumstances relevant to whether students meet the requirements. In addition, it requires the education provider to report to the Secretary of the Department the information required by s.19 of the ESOS Act as soon as practicable after the education provider has certified the student in accordance with subclause 8202(3) for a registered course undertaken by a student as not achieving satisfactory course attendance (the certification gives rise to a breach of Condition 8202).

5. Furthermore, under s.20 of the ESOS Act an education provider must send a student a written notice if the student has breached Condition 8202. That notice must contain particulars of the breach and must state that the student is required to attend a meeting in person before an officer within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 at a specified place within 28 days after the date specified in the notice for the purpose of making any submissions about the breach and the circumstances that led to it.

6. In this case, Ram provided a s.20 notice to the applicant on 1 July 2009. Accordingly, the applicant ought to have had until 29 July 2009 to respond to the s.20 notice. However, on 23 July 2009, Ram advised the applicant that his Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) had been cancelled. This was six days early and the applicant contended that this denied him the capacity to prepare suitable documentation to provide to the education provider under the appeal process stipulated in Standard 8 of the National Code. In particular, the applicant complained that a medical certificate procured by him from Dr Anderson and dated 28 July 2009 would have been provided to the education provider before the CoE was forwarded. By inference it is submitted that the contents of the certificate would have been sufficient to address matters necessary to be addressed by the applicant for this purpose with the result of a different outcome.

7. It was contended for the applicant that the Tribunal reached a “mistaken conclusion” in that it concluded that the medical certificate received by the education provider after the CoE had been provided on 23 July 2009 was of little use when in reality the medical certificate would have been of value if the 20 working day period had been adhered to. As I have noted, implicit in that submission is a contention that the content of the medical certificate was for relevant purposes momentous. It was submitted that in the circumstances the conclusion by the Tribunal was mistaken in the sense set out by the High Court in Craig v South Australia,[1] and that accordingly the decision was infected by jurisdictional error.

   [1] (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179.

8. Furthermore, the applicant contended that the education provider must abide its own appeal policies and procedures in relation to attendance and reporting students to the Department, given the seriousness of the consequences to the applicant: Maan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (supra). It contended that Ram’s failure to afford the applicant due process has had serious adverse consequences for the applicant by denying his right to argue his medical condition.

9. The respondents concede there appears to have been an error in the process for the issue of the certificate. However, notwithstanding that matter, any such noncompliance with Condition 8202(3) is constituted by the education provider’s certification that its attendance policies have been breached, not by the student’s actual failure to attend: Maan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. It is accepted that the Minister (and therefore the Tribunal) cannot go behind the education provider’s certificate as a statutory scheme is one whereby the only task of the Minister is to determine that a certificate, on its face, is of the kind that engages Condition 8202(3): Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor; Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 112. Furthermore, an education provider’s certificate is not invalid purely because the education provider failed to comply with some aspect of the National Code: Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [54].

10. In any event, even if the certificate was invalid, this would not lead to the invalidity of the decision to cancel the visa: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Zhou (2006) 152 FCR 115 at [39] – [41]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor at [16]; Mazumder v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [26] – [27]; Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [85]. The constraint on the power to cancel a visa under s.116 of the Migration Act is not whether a certificate exists as a jurisdictional fact, but whether the Minister is satisfied that it exists: Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [53].

11. Respectfully, the applicant’s submissions concerning the alleged error in issuing the certificate, including the allegation concerning the failure for the education provider to abide its own appeal policies and procedures in relation to attendance and reporting of students to the Department, ignores the conclusiveness of the certificate.

12. Likewise, the applicant’s complaints that the education provider’s failure to abide its own appeal processes denied the applicant an opportunity to have the medical material considered is, in my view, misconceived.  While I accept that the medical material would not have been considered in the course of the process for the issue of the certificate, the medical material would have had moment in resolving the question of exceptional circumstances.

13. The expression “exceptional circumstances” as set out in the Act and Direction 38 should be understood in terms of the observations of Kiefel J in Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425, where her Honour stated:

    “[49] ‘Exceptional’ circumstances, in general terms, are those circumstances which are unusual or out of the ordinary. But the term is also one which may have a wide operation. Factors affecting a person and which set them apart from other persons in a comparable situation may amount to exceptional circumstances.

    …

    [50] The words ‘exceptional circumstances’ may apply to a variety of circumstances and no definition which limits their application to be adopted, unless the limitation appears from the words of the relevant statutory provision.”

14. In the context of this application, it is plain that at least on a prima facie basis the applicant’s medical material was important for addressing the matter of exceptional circumstances as provided for under Regulation 2.43(2)(b)(ii)(B).

15. The Tribunal in its reasons did examine and address the applicant’s medical material.  The Tribunal’s reasons demonstrate at paragraph 27 that it understood that, notwithstanding the applicant not writing to the Department in relation to its intention to cancel his visa and not attending an interview with the Department, he did provide medical certificates and other documents to the Department. Those documents included the material now referred to in the appeal, including the medical certificate of Dr Anderson. In that regard, I note that the Tribunal observed that it held a “medical certificate from Dr Peter Anderson, dated 28 July 2010, certifying him as suffering from acute chronic asthma and being unfit from 5 July 2010 to 10 June 2010.”  Plainly, the Tribunal’s interpretation of the detail in Dr Anderson’s report on that matter is incorrect as Dr Anderson’s certificate noted that the applicant “states that the incapacity commenced on 10-6-09” and that the applicant was “unfit for duty up to and including 5-7-09.”  The Tribunal noted the applicant’s argument concerning the misconstruction of the number of days relevant to assessment of the applicant’s absence but, notwithstanding that matter, the certificate had already been issued. In any event, at paragraph 40 the Tribunal resolved this question as a matter of fact.  It observed:

    “[40] The Tribunal asked the applicant about his medical condition before his admission on 11 July 2009.  The certificate was for 8 days and this would not explain an attendance rate of less than 80%.  The applicant said that he started medication from India about a month before he went to hospital.  He missed some classes because of this.  He did not get medical attention in Australia until 11 July 2009, as he had confidence in the Indian medication. 

    [41] The Tribunal referred to the certificate from Dr Peter Anderson of 28 July 2009 and explained that, as the information in that certificate was reported by the applicant after the events six weeks earlier, the Tribunal could not rely on it as evidence directly from Dr Anderson of his being ill during the period specified.”

16. It follows that, irrespective of whether there is any issue concerning the construction of Dr Anderson’s certificate, the fact remains that the ex post facto complaints by the applicant to Dr Anderson were not considered sufficiently reliable. So much is evident from the Tribunal’s comments commencing at paragraph 54, where it observed:

    “[54] The Tribunal considered whether the breach of condition 8202, in relation to attendance, was due to exceptional circumstances beyond the applicant’s control.  The applicant put to the Tribunal that he was ill with asthma and this adversely affected his attendance.  He said that he initially treated this with medication from his doctor in India.  Then about a month later, he was admitted to Mater Hospital and treated with Ventolin and Augmentin.

    [55] The Tribunal accepts that the applicant had asthma. It is satisfied that this affected his attendance for the period 11 July 2009 to 18 July 2009, as set out in the certificate from the Mater Hospital.  It may also have affected him for a period before this, but the Tribunal does not have medical information on the effect of the illness at this time.  As noted at the hearing, the certificate from Dr Anderson does not reflect his direct diagnosis and so cannot be relied on as evidence of his illness and incapacity.  The Tribunal is unable to establish the extent of the effect of the asthma on the applicant’s attendance, other than for the period 11 July 2009 to 18 July 2009.”

17. Plainly, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s unsatisfactory attendance was not due to his illness.  It was plain from its decision that it concluded in this instance the non-attendance by the applicant due to illness did not amount to exceptional circumstances beyond his control which finding was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material before it.

18. It follows in my view that no error has been demonstrated in the Tribunal’s approach in this instance.  Ground 1 is dismissed.

Ground 2 – Decision maker asked itself the wrong question and/or ignored relevant material

1. In support of this ground the applicant provided the following particulars:

   “Further to the above, and in relation to Ground 2, the Decision Maker ‘has asked herself the wrong question’, by not considering whether the Applicant would have been prejudiced by not being allowed the full 20 days in which to facilitate a response and obtain proper access [to] a complaints handling and appeals process.  Further, the Decision Maker by not taking into account Standard 11.6 of the National Code, which is a mandatory provision, has ignored relevant material. By ‘asking the wrong question’ and/or ‘ignoring relevant material’ the MRT has fallen into jurisdictional error.”

2. In his submission, the applicant contended that the correct question which the Tribunal ought to have addressed itself should have been “Would the Applicant have been prejudiced by not allowing the full 20 working days in which to facilitate a response and obtain proper access to  a complaints handling and appeals process?” The applicant contends that, as the answer to that question would have been in the affirmative, the matter gave rise to a jurisdictional error. 

1. Furthermore, it contended that as the requirements of Standard 11.6 of the National Code are mandatory it was a relevant consideration that had not been taken into account and was a further instance of jurisdictional error.[2]

   [2] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [351] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.

2. This ground also brings into question the conclusiveness of the certificate.  For reasons which I have outlined above, I am satisfied that the certificate was issued and is conclusive on its face.

3. However, I do accept that errors in the process leading to the issue of the certificate can of themselves give rise to certain factors satisfying the expression “exceptional circumstances” for the purpose of Regulation 2.43. In this case, the applicant has contended two matters ought be considered. First was the abridgement of the time for response to the education provider’s notice of noncompliance (the s.20 notice). The second was the education provider’s failure to comply with the National Code. In my view, those matters are grounds which could give rise to exceptional circumstances beyond the visa holder’s control: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor at [16]; Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [54].

4. However notwithstanding that matter the Tribunal considered those failings.  In particular at paragraph 60 of its reasons the Tribunal stated:

   “[60] The Tribunal notes the argument put forward by the representative, in relation to the lack of the full period of time prior to the issuing of a section 20 notice by Ram. It also notes the argument that the applicant was not given access to the internal mechanisms of the college. However, the Tribunal is of the view that neither factor renders the section 20 notice invalid or that these factors amount to exceptional circumstances beyond the applicant’s control which lead to the breach of condition 8202.”

5. No basis is advanced to demonstrate any error in the Tribunal’s approach to its conclusion on that matter.  It follows that the applicant’s claims on this ground fail.

Ground 3 – Unreasonable decision or irrational and illogical decision

1. In support of Ground 3, the applicant provided the following particulars:

   “In relation to Ground 3 for Judicial Review, the Decision Maker has discounted the Applicant’s condition of asthma and stated it was not an ‘exceptional circumstance beyond the Applicant’s control’, because the documentation from the Applicant’s treating Doctor was not correct in a technical sense, despite the MRT accepting that the Applicant had asthma and this effected his attendance for the period 11 July 2009 to 18 July 2009. The asthma would have had a much more profound effect on the Applicant, in addition to the dates outlined. The Decision Maker has not considered that the Applicant’s medical condition commenced on or about 10 June 2009 and therefore has ignored relevant material. The Decision Maker by not taking into account the date of the commencement of the Applicant’s illness, and/or by nominating the incorrect dates, the Decision Maker has made a jurisdictional error of facts. The Decision Maker has made a Decision that no reasonable Decision Maker could have reached that Decision falls into the paradigm of “Wednesbury Unreasonableness”. The Decision is irrational, illogical and unreasonable. The Decision has undoubtedly resulted in procedural unfairness.”

2. The thrust of the applicant’s submissions on this point concerns the Tribunal’s interpretation of the medical evidence. The applicant submits that the evidence demonstrates that he commenced his course on 20 April 2009 and received a s.20 notice on 1 July 2009. Fifty-one (51) days of educational instruction had elapsed between those two dates. The applicant noted that the allegation was that he was in breach of Condition 8202(3)(b) in not having achieved satisfactory attendance rate of 80% and of a notice alleging his attendance rate as at 1 July 2009 at 75.6%. The applicant contends that upon those calculations he had missed 12.4 days of school, whilst in order to comply with the attendance requirement of 80% as set out in the legislation the maximum non-attendance could be no greater than 10.2 days. It was this extra two days which the applicant contended apparently justified the delegate’s decision.

3. The applicant contends that those conclusions were reached upon a false premise. He contends that he was entitled to be absent for 15 school days including 1 July 2009 and that the Tribunal’s finding was to the contrary was premised upon an error apparent in Dr Anderson’s certificate of 28 July (the certificate which the applicant contends ought to have been provided to the Tribunal). The applicant contends there are two errors evident on the face of the certificate:

   a)It states him having certified the applicant as suffering from acute chronic asthma and being unfit from “5 July 2010 to 10 June 2010;” and

   b)It does not reflect a direct diagnosis by Dr Anderson and so cannot be relied upon by the Tribunal as evidence of his illness and incapacity. 

4. The applicant contends that the Tribunal’s construction of the report was wrong on both accounts.  First the applicant suffered acute chronic asthma from 10 June 2009, a matter which accounts for the missing days, and secondly that the decision maker misunderstood the effect of the medical certificate.

5. The applicant contends that, if those matters had not been misread, the missing two days could be accounted for and then his condition would be seen to fall within the scope of “exceptional circumstances beyond the applicant’s control.” 

6. The applicant contended that given those matters the decision was unreasonable in the “Wednesbury” unreasonableness context, “namely that the decision involved an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.”[3] The applicant contends that the Tribunal’s decision falls within the grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness because the applicant was clearly suffering from acute chronic asthma as from 10 June 2009 and therefore was unable to attend classes. It was submitted for him that not only did the Tribunal’s decision fall within Wednesbury unreasonableness, but it was also illogical or irrational and involved the Tribunal ignoring relevant material, in particular the Tribunal’s failure to miss the date on the medical certificate of the applicant’s incapacity commencing on 10 June 2009. 

   [3] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at [233] per Lord Greene MR.

7. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [102], [122] – [123] the High Court recently confirmed that Wednesbury unreasonableness in the exercise of a statutory power may constitute jurisdictional error so as to grant relief pursuant to s.75(v) of the Constitution. Crennan and Bell JJ observed that there was “undeniable semantic overlap” between notions of “irrationality,” “illogicality” and “unreasonableness” in decision making, and that all are essentially complaints of the same order.[4] Their Honours posited the test in the following terms:

   “… The test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based.  If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a review in court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.”[5]

   [4] At [128] – [130].

   [5] At [131].

8. In this case, the applicant contends that the Tribunal should have accepted Dr Anderson’s medical certificate and found that asthma affected his attendance throughout the period 10 June 2009 to 18 July 2009. However, as I have earlier noted, the Tribunal attached little weight to Dr Anderson’s report because it did not “reflect his direct diagnosis.”[6]  In my view, there is nothing in the Tribunal’s approach to its conclusions at paragraph 55 of its reasons for decision which suggest it was “irrational,” “illogical” or “unreasonable,” particularly given that there was no other medical evidence proffered by the applicant.

   [6] Tribunal’s decision at [55].

9. Furthermore, the applicant makes complaints concerning the dates contained in the medical material, including in Dr Anderson’s certificate. However, it is obvious that the errors were clerical in nature. No doubt the errors were compounded because of the ex post facto review of the material concerned. Notwithstanding those matters, the Tribunal when reviewing the material was not so affected by error.  It made reference to correct dates as can be seen in paragraphs [37], [38], [40], [41] and [55] of its reasons for decision.  In my view this ground too fails.

Conclusion

1. The applicant sought review of the Tribunal’s decision affirming the delegate’s decision to cancel his visa. Nothing in the material demonstrates the s.19 ESOS certificate was on its face defective and ought not to have been accepted as conclusive by the delegate. The applicant has failed to demonstrate any error in the Tribunal’s review of his claim and, in particular, concerning the exceptional circumstances advanced in answer to his noncompliance with Condition 8202.

Order

1. Application dismissed.

2. In default of application by either party for other orders, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,240.00.

I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Burnett FM

Date:  27 June 2012