Mabagos and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship)
[2019] AATA 216
•22 February 2019
Mabagos and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 216 (22 February 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2018/3752
Re:Gina Naval Mabagos
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:22 February 2019
Place:Sydney
The decision under review is affirmed.
...............................[sgd].........................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
CITIZENSHIP – refusal – whether applicant of good character – significant period of unlawfulness in Australia – consideration of applicant’s character – decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
CASES
Britos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1282
Bushell v Repatriation Commission [1992] HCA 47
Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 879
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] 4 ALD 198
Commonwealth v Twyman [1985] 8 ALD 554
Dinkha v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 3037
Do and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 390
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409
Fenn and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931
Godley v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] 83 ALD 411
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker [1997] 153 ALR 463
Rabino and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 999
Re KLGL and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2008] AATA 542
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31
Wendy Susan Baker v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] AATA 13
Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Dennis Pearce: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis, Butterworth, 4th edition, 2015)
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Citizenship Policy, 1 June 2016
REASONS FOR DECISION
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
22 February 2019
This is an application for the Tribunal to overturn a refusal by a Delegate of the Minister to grant citizenship by conferral to Mrs Gina Naval Mabagos (the Applicant).
NARRATIVE
The Applicant is a citizen of the Philippines, born in 1966, who first arrived in Australia in August 1996 holding a Temporary Visitor Visa (TR-676).
In November 1996 she made an application for a Protection Visa citing her concerns about the security situation in the Philippines related to the activities of the New People’s Army in the Masbate region. This application was refused by the Department on 25 January 1997 and this rejection was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 24 July 1997.
The Applicant’s bridging visa ceased on 28 August 1997 and as such she became an unlawful non-citizen. [1]
[1] Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions at [1]-[2].
On 9 April 2005 she married Kenn Mabagos, an Australian citizen.[2] On 2 September 2011 she lodged an application for a partner visa and was granted an associated bridging visa on 26 July 2012.
[2] Section 37 Tribunal Documents at [67].
On 5 February 2017 the Applicant applied for citizenship by conferral under section 21 of the Citizenship Act 2007 (the Act). This was formally refused by the Delegate of the Minister on 6 June 2018. The Applicant lodged her appeal against this decision on 5 July 2018.
This narrative of the Applicant’s visa reveals that despite the Applicant holding several different visas at different times, for the period between 28 August 1997 and 2 September 2011 (a period just over 14 years) she was an unlawful non-citizen.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Under the Act (section 21) a person is eligible to seek citizenship by conferral provided that they meet certain requirements which are specified in that section. These are enumerated in section 21(2) from (a) to (h). It is a requirement that all of the requirements be met. In the event that they are, then the applicant can be considered for citizenship. The Minister is obliged to make a decision to grant or to refuse a citizenship application (section 24(1)) but has discretion in reaching that decision. Finally, citizenship only becomes enlivened once the approved individual has taken the mandated pledge of commitment (section 26).
One of the section 21(2) requirements which must be met is that the person:
(h) is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.
This requires the Minister to be satisfied that the applicant is of good character at a specific time, namely when the decision on the application is made. The Minister’s authorised Delegate made that decision on 6 June 2018, believing that, at that date, Mrs Magabos was not a person of good character.
The basis for the Delegate coming to that decision was two-fold. In the first instance the Delegate considered that the Applicant’s period of 14 years as an unlawful non-citizen, during which time she had not sought to regularise her position, demonstrated a degree of disregard for the law such that she should be regarded as a person not of good character.
Secondly, the Delegate noted that although the Applicant had been sent a letter on 15 March 2018 notifying her that her citizenship application was being considered, but that the Department had concerns about it and so invited her to comment on those concerns, she had failed to reply to that letter.
This meant that the Delegate had no information before them as to the Applicant’s explanation for her unlawful status, her current circumstances, her employment history or her involvement in the community.
The Tribunal must now make a decision as to the Applicant’s “good character” or otherwise, as of 11 February 2019, and do so on the basis of the material which it has before it. The decision is de novo and the facts are those most contemporary. The judicial authority for this proposition is as stated below.
MERITS REVIEW
The Tribunal is established as a merits-review body. Its responsibility is to review administrative decisions (made under legislation conferring such powers upon it) taking into account the merits of the case in question, the need to reach the correct and preferable decision in each individual case and to promote the objectives of good government.[3]
[3] Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] 24 ALR 307.
It is important to state the general principles upon which the Tribunal must proceed in its own independent decision making. These may be summarised as including:
“The Tribunal’s duty is to make the correct and preferable decision in each case on the material before it, and the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all, in fulfilling its statutory function.”[4]
“The question for the determination of the Tribunal is not whether the decision which the decision-maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him. The question for the determination of the Tribunal is whether the decision was the correct and preferable one on the material before the Tribunal.”[5]
“The decision under review, as distinct from the reasons for it, must be given no weight by the AAT. The decision is to be reviewed for the correct and preferable decision reached: the original decision itself cannot influence the AAT in reaching its conclusion.”[6]
“Davies J acknowledged that regard might be had to the decision of the primary decision-maker as part of the “material before the Tribunal”…….But ultimately, it was for the Tribunal to reach its own decision upon the relevant material, including any new, fresh, additional or different material that had been received by the Tribunal as relevant to its decision. In effect, this was no more than a consequence of the Tribunal’s obligation to conduct a true merits review.”[7]
“…. the A.A.T is an administrative decision-maker, under a duty arrive at the correct or preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it.”[8]
[4] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs(No.2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at [642].
[5] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 at [page 419].
[6] Dennis Pearce: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LexisNexis, Butterworth, 4th edition, 2015) at page 301 citing Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] 4 ALD 198; Commonwealth v Twyman [1985] 8 ALD 554 and Re KLGL and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2008] AATA 542.
[7] Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31 at [37] per Kirby J.
[8] Bushell v Repatriation Commission [1992] HCA 47 at [30] per Brennan J.
It is thus clear that although the original decision-maker has found Mrs Mabagos not to be a person of good character, it is now up to the Tribunal to make its own determination on that question.
In this respect the Tribunal must have regard to both the Policy which complements the Act and any judicial guidance on its interpretation. The Policy in question is the Citizenship Policy which came into effect on 1 June 2016.
THE DELEGATE’S TWO CONCERNS
As stated above, the Delegate made her adverse decision on the basis of the issue of the period of unlawful residence in Australia and the failure to respond to the Department’s letter of 15 March 2018.
In relation to the latter, the Applicant provided a statement to the Tribunal to the effect that, in response to the Departmental letter, her husband (Kenn) had prepared a Statutory Declaration but, due to pressures of work had forgotten to forward it. This claim was confirmed in Kenn Mabagos’ oral testimony to the Tribunal.
The personal narrative of the Applicant during her period of life in Australia from her first arrival until the date of her marriage is confusing, to say the least. Attempts to establish clearly where she had lived and what she had been doing in that time were made more difficult by problems faced with the use of a Tagalog interpreter providing her services by telephone. A mixture of English and Tagalog used by the Applicant herself and difficulties in the use of the interpreter’s services gave rise to a degree of uncertainty about some of the questions posed to the Applicant by both the Respondent and the Tribunal and her answers.
What follows is, therefore, the state of understanding of the Tribunal, as best it can be determined.
It appears that the Applicant first came to Australia when she was invited to accompany one of her relatives to visit for a holiday. Apparently at the end of that holiday the Applicant decided that living in Australia was far better than returning to the Philippines and so she decided to stay. According to her oral testimony she “had no idea about applications for visas” and so took no steps to either establish her right to remain in Australia or steps to remain on a lawful basis.
Her written submission suggests that at some stage a “family friend” gave her some papers to sign which she did, having no understanding of what they were. This eventually led to her being introduced to a migration agent by the name of Teddy Gonzales who assisted the Applicant. When she first met Teddy Gonzales is unclear.
Tragically, in July 2001, Teddy Gonzales, together with his wife and daughter were brutally murdered by his own son Stef Gonzales who was eventually sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment for the crime.[9]
[9] Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions Attachment [R2].
The Applicant states that as a result of this incident she took no further steps to contact any other migration agent or form of assistance, partly out of fear and partly because she was advised (again, it is not clear, by whom) that she would be put in touch with someone else to assist her. She however took no active steps on her own behalf to advance the regularisation of her situation.
At no stage has the Applicant had her own home. Documents provided to the Department indicate that between March 1998 and the present she has lived at a variety of addresses, being the homes of her father-in-law or the aunt of her husband Kenn, until such time as she moved into Kenn’s house. She also had a period from January 2004 to April 2005 living with a friend of hers, Dr Vicky Gonzales Velasquez.[10]
[10] Ibid Attachment [R3].
The question of exactly where she was living, or with whom, is not central to the question of whether or not the Applicant is of good character. However there is some evidence from the Applicant’s own oral testimony that some of her husband’s relatives raised concerns about her unlawful residential status and that this may have contributed to her having to change her place of abode.
On the other hand, testimony given by Kenn Mabagos was to the effect that his relationship with his father, mother and several other members of his family was strained, if not to say overtly hostile.
Kenn Mabagos, who is a Registered Nurse and apparently manages a day-care facility, impressed the Tribunal as a forthright and credible witness. He told the Tribunal that he had left home at aged 15 and put himself through school and nursing training at the University of Western Sydney. Although he has contact with some members of his family he has only minimal contact with his parents. He said, and the Tribunal has no cause to doubt him, that many of his relatives did not really accept his wife or give her any degree of respect or support.
The Applicant and Kenn Mabagos were married on 9 April 2005 by marriage celebrant Conchita Soriano.[11] Apparently Ms Soriano also undertook some sort of activity as a migrant agent (whether registered or not is unclear) and she, after the wedding, suggested that she could assist with the Applicant’s immigration arrangements. Both the Applicant and Kenn Mabagos gave evidence to the effect that Ms Soriano took considerable sums of money from them allegedly to facilitate an application to regularise the Applicant’s legal status, but in fact did nothing (other than demand more money) before she too, passed away.
[11] Section 37 Tribunal Documents at [67].
The central point of the Applicant’s testimony is that she did not fully realise that she was an unlawful non-citizen or that she needed to regularise her immigration status until she married and her husband encouraged her to take positive steps in this direction. She told the Tribunal, “I had no idea I had overstayed”.
The Tribunal however is not persuaded that this is entirely plausible. There is evidence that people, be they friends or family members drew to the Applicant’s attention the fact that she needed to do something about her position. They gave her papers to sign or recommended that she see migration agents. She engaged with at least two in the persons of Teddy Gonzales and Conchita Soriano and after Teddy Gonzales’ death she fully expected to be referred to someone else.
The Tribunal accepts the Applicant had some difficulty with her English in the early years of her living in Australia and that it is, even now, far from proficient. (Although the Tribunal notes that it must be at sufficient level for the Applicant to have obtained a Certificate III qualification.)
It has no doubt that she has been induced or persuaded to sign documents about which she had little or no idea. For example, the claim made in the statement filed on behalf of the Applicant by her current migration agent (Robert Bock) contain a statement that, following the Gonzales murder:
“Eventually Mrs Mabagos married her now husband, and together they set up a home and out of sheer fear of getting involved with unknown elements, just kept to themselves.”[12]
[12] Letter to Tribunal from Aus-Pac Education and Migration Consultant, Robert Bock dated 1 August 2018, Applicant’s Submissions at [1].
Apart from the fact that the Gonzales murder was in 2001 and her marriage was in 2005, when this statement was put to her in cross-examination, it was clear that she had almost no comprehension of what it meant or what it was all about. It may well be that the same thing applies to statements about her apprehension of the activities of the New People’s Army.
It is clear that The Applicant gave no priority to taking steps to regularise her position and that she was prepared to wait for indefinite periods of time while other people were allegedly “helping” her, without active pursuit following-up on their activities.
It is also clear from his evidence that while Kenn Mabagos was aware of the situation and attempted to move things forward on the immigration front he was much more concerned with issues of his wife’s physical and mental health. He told the Tribunal that he proffered advice to her because he could tell (with his training as an RN) that she was suffering from depression, perhaps Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and that she had issues with her hormonal balance. Despite his entreaties, it appears that his wife was resistant to seeing a general practitioner or following his advice. This in turn gave rise to some tensions but at the very least had the effect of relegating his concerns about her immigration status into a far lower level of priority.
ENGAGING IN (PROHIBITED) EMPLOYMENT
It is also relevant to note that the Applicant told the Tribunal that during the period of her unlawful residence she had not worked in any paid employment, although she did provide various forms of domestic support and assistance to the people with whom she was residing. She said she was not paid for these services, instead receiving assistance by way of food, shelter, clothing and occasional allowances, although she mainly depended on occasional financial support from her sister in the Philippines.
The Respondent drew attention to the provisions of section 235(3) of the Migration Act 1958 which provides that:
“An unlawful non-citizen who performs work in Australia whether for reward or otherwise commits an offence against this subsection.”
The subsection in question prohibits unlawful non-citizens from working in Australia. It is not the intention of the Tribunal to enter into the fraught determination of whether undertaking unremunerated minor domestic chores or assisting around the home constitutes “work” for the purposes of this application, but even assuming that it does, the Tribunal takes comfort from the assurance of the Respondent that it is in the hands of the Tribunal as to what weight it assigns to that finding.
It is apparent that since about November 2017, the Applicant has been engaged in employment, working in the healthcare/disability sector. The Statutory Declaration of Dr Valasquez states:
“Gina is now a Disability Support Worker who utilises her skills to care for people in need. I am very happy that Gina is working in the health industry as it shows that she is a person with the character to care for the people and place trust in her.”[13]
[13] Statutory Declaration of Dr Vicky Velasquez (dated 5 May 2018), Applicant’s Submission at Tab [2].
Another supporting reference merely states that:
“I have seen that Gina is deeply engaged with her work and is very passionate about what she does. I highly commend Gina with the service she provides as I comprehend that the work she is engaged in is difficult and challenging.”[14]
[14] Statutory Declaration of Marilene Jaingue (dated 5 May 2018), Applicant’s Submission at Tab [2].
Another goes into greater detail:
“Gina Mabagos is an employee of Sunnyday Carers and is a Disability Support Worker which she holds a Certificate III in Disability and to which (sic) she has been employed since November 2017. …. Since beginning as a volunteer and now to an employee (sic), I have observed and note that Gina Mabagos is of good character and a person to which (sic) I will continually employee.”[15]
[15] Statutory Declaration of Komeil Kordorstami (dated 28 April 2018), Applicant’s Submission at Tab [2].
Details of this employment are confirmed by another Statutory Declaration by the Sunnyday Carers’ Human Resources Manager.[16]
[16] Statutory Declaration of Nasim Shrivani (dated 28 April), Applicant’s Submission at Tab [2].
These references make it clear that some time after her period of non-lawful residence, the Applicant took steps to obtain a qualification in disability service provision and used that to gain meaningful and productive employment.
REFERENCES
The Applicant provided a number of Statutory Declarations (other than those already quoted) which went to the question of her good character and highlighted both her helpful and caring nature and her willingness to help other people.
The Tribunal is aware of the caution issued in the Citizenship Policy document of 1 June 2016 which provides guidance for decision-makers when deciding on what weight to give references in their deliberations. It notes that where references do not acknowledge the offence or incident crucial in decision-making very little weight should be accorded.[17]
[17] Citizenship Policy at [155].
Consequently, in this context these references cannot be accorded any significant weight as none of them touch upon the question of the Applicant’s previous period of non-lawful residency which is central to the Tribunal’s assessment of the question of good character.
THE APPLICANT’S POSITION
In essence the Applicant asserts the following:
1)She had no intent to mislead Australian immigration authorities by overstaying and only did so because she was unaware of the obligations related to residency and the necessity to hold a valid visa at all times;
2)She took initiatives to regularise her status but was dependent upon, and let down by others, including members of her (husband’s) family and various migration agents;
3)She is remorseful for her actions to the extent that she now understands her obligations and responsibilities;
4)She is a person of “good character” who is now engaged actively in working in the community in support of people with disability and special needs; and
5)The Department failed to indicate any concerns about her status when she was granted her permanent residency.
THE RESPONDENT’S POSITION
The Minister asserts:
(1)There is no doubt that the Applicant was an unlawful non-citizen in Australia for a period of some 14 years;
(2)The Applicant and the people with whom she was in contact clearly recognised that the Applicant was an unlawful non-citizen and were aware that steps should be taken by her to regularise her position;
(3)The Applicant took no genuine and meaningful steps to regularise her position and when she did engage with migration agents and others to this end she merely left matters in their hands and took no active role in pursing the representations they were supposed to be making on her behalf;
(4)One of the tests of good character, for the purposes of the Act, is that what a person actually does, or is seen to do, may be taken as representative of and indicative of, their attitude towards fulfilling their obligations of citizenship, which includes obedience to the laws of Australia;[18]
(5)The Applicant’s explanations of her reliance upon other people in no way vitiates her personal obligations to act in accordance with the law or to be active in her own right in relation to matters of her immigration status;
(6)Denial of a grant of citizenship at this stage does not prejudice the right of the Applicant to make a further application at a later stage when she has had the opportunity to demonstrate a greater understanding and acceptance of the obligations of Australian citizenship, nor does it deprive the Applicant of the enjoyment of any currently held rights.[19]
[18] Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304 at [120].
[19] Fenn and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931 at [8].
CONSIDERATIONS
The fundamental issue before the Tribunal is whether the evidence which suggests that the Applicant is a person who is making genuine attempts to become a productive and contributing member of the Australian community is of sufficient weight and significance as to overbear the consideration that she was an illegal non-citizen who remained in Australia for a period of 14 years without taking adequate steps to regularise her position and cease breaking the law.
In Godley[20], the Federal Court stated:
“[51] The words “of good character” mean enduring moral qualities reflected in soundness and reliability in moral judgement in the performance of day-to-day activities and in dealing with fellow citizens. It is not simply a matter of repute, fame or standing in the community but of continuing performance according to moral principle. A person of ill repute or past criminal conduct may nonetheless, on objective examination at a later stage in life, be shown to be a person reformed and now of good character.”
[52] A finding that a person is “not of good character” requires the minister to make a supervening determination after having regard to the matters set out in s 501(6)(c). The consideration of past and present criminal conduct and/or past and present general conduct provide indicia as to the presence or absence of good character but do not in themselves answer the question. The minister must look at the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the person before him is distinguishable from others as a person not of good character, a question not to be confused with characterisation by conduct alone: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker (1997) 73 FCR 187 at 197; 153 ALR 463 at 472; 45 ALD 136 at 143–4.
[20] Godley v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] 83 ALD 411.
Similarly, this Tribunal in Baker stated:
“…. To prescribe that bad character will be forever assumed in the event of one conviction carrying a sentence of 12 months or more, no matter when the conviction took place is quite unreasonable. It is necessary in assessing character to look at all relevant circumstances including the age of convictions.”[21]
[21] Wendy Susan Baker v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] AATA 13 at [43] .Quoted with approval by the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker [1997] 153 ALR 463 at [468].
There is also the more generic issue of the extent to which individuals should be given a “second chance” when they have offended against Australia’s laws. Neither the Australian community, nor this Tribunal, is unsympathetic to the idea of giving people a second chance.
In an analogous context to the case now before it, this Tribunal stated:
Neither the Australian community, nor this Tribunal, is averse to giving people a second chance. However, those second chances are not automatically available; they have to be earned. Persistent disregard of warnings about the need for compliance with mandated programmes and wilful failure to take rehabilitative opportunities offered must be regarded as fatal to applications such as this. Persistent refusals to accept life-lines when offered cannot be ignored.[22]
[22] Dinkha v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 3037 at [113].
In a direct reference to citizenship considerations, the Tribunal notes Deputy President Forgie’s comments in Rabino and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection that “the Principles are directed to whether the Australian community is prepared to give the person another opportunity to remain in Australia”.[23]
[23]Rabino and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 999 at [68].
Deputy President McCabe in Do and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection reflected on the question of second chances when he said that:
A decision-maker is, to some extent, required to guess at the community’s expectations … As I begin my deliberations, I assume the Australian community would be fair-minded and mature … The community would certainly not be vengeful … after all: we are a nation built on second chances.[24]
[24]Do and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 390 at [23].
Set against this is the strong disapproval evidenced in decisions of this Tribunal when it comes to the matter of deliberate overstaying of visas.
In Britos, Deputy President Constance said:
“Mr Britos’ failure to obey Australian law by remaining in this country for many years as an unlawful non-citizen is a serious matter. He was aware of his unlawful status when he failed to return from shore leave and during those times he did not hold a valid visa. I am satisfied he was prepared to break Australian law because he wanted to live in Australia and because he believed is prospects of employment in this country were better than in his home country.”[25]
[25] Britos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1282 at [26].
Similarly, in Choi, Senior Member Poljak said:
“I am satisfied that the applicant was aware of his unlawful status since his visa expired in 2003. The applicant’s failure to obey Australian law by remaining on this country as an unlawful non-citizen is a serious matter. Given that the applicant’s period of unlawfulness was for approximately nine years, the seriousness of his conduct is magnified.”[26]
[26] Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 879 at [15].
The key elements identified in these two quite recent Tribunal decisions are present in relation to this Applicant: she knew she was unlawfully in the country and was so for a considerable period of time and she had decided to stay originally because of the prospects of a better life in Australia than the Philippines.
It is easy to feel sympathetic for the Applicant’s position given her personal history and her general lack of support until her marriage to Kenn, but, during those years she was not totally devoid of support, nor did she at least recognise her situation, as is evidenced by her dealings with Teddy Gonzales. Nevertheless she simply failed to take active steps to regularise her position and to bring herself into conformity with the laws of Australia. Doing so is a hallmark of what is expected of, and required of, good citizenship.
An unlawful non-citizen cannot expect that they can, as it were, just outlast the system and in due course hope that their involvement in the life of the Australian community will cause their past breaches of the law to somehow vanish, or at the very least, be ignored.
The Tribunal acknowledges the efforts made by the Applicant to become a valuable member of the Australian community and it commends her for those efforts.
However they are not enough, nor have they been on foot long enough, to overbear the weight which must be given to her deliberate flouting of Australia’s immigration laws and her decision to remain for some 14 years as an unlawful non-citizen while taking inadequate steps to regularise her position.
In denying this claim for citizenship by conferral through affirmation of the decision under review, the Tribunal urges the Applicant to consider some reapplication at a later stage when more time has passed and when there will be stronger evidence of the claim that, by her own actions, she can be judged to be a person of good character.
DECISION
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 68 (sixty- eight) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
...............................[sgd].........................................
Associate
Dated: 22 February 2019
Date(s) of hearing: 11 February 2019 Advocate for the Applicant: Mr Robert B D Bock, Aus-Pac Education and Migration Consultant Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Karwin Eskerie, Sparke Helmore
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