LYNDAWATI*SHIRAISHI and DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE - [2008] WASAT 99

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL

ACT: ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA)

CITATION: LYNDAWATISHIRAISHI and DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2008] WASAT 99

MEMBER: MR C RAYMOND (SENIOR MEMBER)

HEARD: 29 FEBRUARY 2008

DELIVERED : 13 MAY 2008

FILE NO/S: CC 1887 of 2007

BETWEEN: YOEN LYNDAWATISHIRAISHI
Applicant
AND
DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Application for variation of motor vehicle licence - Whether general power to vary licence - Whether requirement to apply for transfer of licence

Legislation:

Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 3(1), s 55
Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act 1973 (WA), s 28A
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 5, s 5(1), s 5(4), s 5A, s 15, s 17, s 20, s 23A, s 24, s 24B, s 25, s 27, s 29, Pt III

Result:

The decision under review is affirmed
The application for review is dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr C Cox (Acting as Agent)
Respondent: Mr N Fox (Acting as Agent)

Solicitors:

Applicant: N/A
Respondent: Department for Planning and Infrastructure

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612
Re Ralph Phillip Sloane v the Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

The applicant applied under s 25(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) for the review of a decision refusing an application for variation of a motor vehicle licence.
On the information before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had been the owner of the motor vehicle when it was first acquired by reason that her entitlement to immediate possession of it was paramount to her then husband's right to immediate possession of the vehicle. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's submissions that there was an implied power to "correct" the registration particulars to reflect the applicant as the owner in the face of the express provisions in the legislation governing variation of the name of the registered owner. Further, those express provisions did not enable an application for variation to be made after the applicant's former husband had ceased to be the owner of the licensed vehicle.
The Tribunal found that the Director General of the Department for Planning and Infrastructure was entitled to require the applicant to transfer the motor vehicle into her name once becoming aware that the applicant's former husband had ceased to be the owner as defined under the legislation. The decision under review was accordingly affirmed and the application dismissed.

The proceedings

The applicant applies under s 25(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RT Act) for the review of a decision made on behalf of the Director General of the Department for Planning and Infrastructure (Director General) refusing an application for variation of a motor vehicle licence in respect of a motor vehicle bearing registration number 9LA178 (the Motor Vehicle) to reflect the correct name of the owner (being that of the applicant) with effect from 9 June 2006, or some earlier date. An order is also sought that the respondent pay the applicant's costs in respect of the proceedings.
The parties have filed statements of issues, facts and contentions and bundles of the documents upon which they rely for the purposes the review. Although the State Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) made directions that signed witness statements be filed prior to the hearing date, neither party availed themselves of the opportunity to do so, so that the matter was argued solely on the documents filed with the Tribunal and served on the other party.
The Tribunal has considered the parties' respective statement of issues, facts and contentions, the written submissions incorporated therein and the oral submissions made on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

The issues for determination

The Tribunal considers that the issues raised within the parties' respective submissions are subsumed within the following issues, which will be determinative of the application.
1)Under the RT Act is the manner by which the applicant is required to become the licence holder of the Motor Vehicle to be effected by:
a)variation of the motor vehicle licence by changing the name of the nominated owner under s 24B of the RT Act;
b)variation of the motor vehicle licence by changing the name of the owner under an implied statutory power; or
c)by transfer under s 17 read with s 24 of the RT Act?

Relevant background information

The respondent has issued an invoice to the applicant in respect of transfer fees and stamp duties. It is understood that enforcement proceedings have not been taken pending the resolution of this matter.
The applicant contends that the respondent cannot require her to pay the above transfer fees and stamp duty, that s 24 of the RT Act is not applicable because she is not a "new owner" as referred to therein, that she has at all times been the owner and that the respondent's records should be amended to reflect the true situation.
The motor vehicle was purchased in 1997 and a motor vehicle licence was issued in the name of Tatsaya [sic] Shiraishi, which was intended to be a reference to the applicant's then husband, Tatsuya Shiraishi.
In January 2005, in circumstances which resulted in a failed prosecution being commenced against the applicant on a charge of wilfully misleading a person to effect a change in registration of a vehicle, the name of the licence holder was changed to Tatsuyoshi Shiraishi, which is the name of the applicant's son. Subsequently, the respondent's records were amended to change the licence holder's name to Tatsuya Shiraishi, that is, in the name of the applicant's then husband, correctly spelled.
On 9 June 2006, the Family Court of Western Australia made a consent order resolving the financial relations between the applicant and her then husband, and which included a specific order that any interest of the husband in a number of stated assets vest in the applicant absolutely, including the Motor Vehicle and that the husband arrange for the Motor Vehicle to be transferred to the wife's sole name.
It appears that little was done to effect transfer of the Motor Vehicle into the applicant's sole name. It was not until 31 August 2007 that the applicant wrote to the respondent. In that letter she advised that she was the sole owner of the Motor Vehicle, that she had been an owner of the Motor Vehicle since it was purchased in 1997, that previously it had been jointly owned with Tatsuya Shiraishi but that as a result of the above court order, he had ceased to be an owner with effect from 9 June 2006. The applicant requested that the licence be varied by changing the name of the person to whom the licence is granted to her name under s 24B(3)(c) of the RT Act.
In support of the application to this Tribunal, the applicant has provided copies of affidavits filed by her then husband in the Family Court proceedings as well as a transcript of the prosecution proceedings commenced against her in the Magistrates' Court, in which her husband gave evidence.
The affidavit evidence of the husband, which was directed at obtaining a division of the matrimonial assets, referred to the Motor Vehicle as his wife's motor vehicle as opposed to the vehicle which the husband was using which he referred to as "my motor vehicle". There was no factual basis deposed to explaining why the Motor Vehicle was described in this manner.
Some additional detail can be gleaned from the husband's evidence given in the Magistrates' Court.
Under examination from the prosecutor, the following evidence was given:
"... So you purchased that vehicle [a reference to the Motor Vehicle] in 1997? - - -
Did you purchase it on your own? - - - Yes, on my - under my name.
As registered under your name and your name solely? - - - Yes.
No other names at all? - - - Yes.
In relation to that vehicle, who paid the registration from 1997 every single year that it was due? - - - I bought that car for my new job.
Yes? - - - Used to be working at (indistinct) Australia.
Yes? - - - So I paid and - - -
You paid the registration of the vehicle? - - - Yes." (T:17)
Under crossexamination from counsel for the applicant, the following evidence was given:
"I think that when you went before the Family Court to settle property, this particular car was never in dispute? - - - No.
You agreed although it was in your name, it would be transferred to her? The - this is different from the Australian family, but in Asian custom - - -
I just want the - - - ? - - - No, I'm just saying that the car belongs to the family, not the husband.
Yes? - - - And the family chief usually pay [sic] everything, so I'm paying my (indistinct) I pay my scooter. I pay my - both cars, all the things."
The prosecution called a senior compliance officer, employed by the respondent, Mr Terrence Burbidge, who amongst other things testified as to an interview he conducted with the applicant. The notes of the interview were read and tendered as an exhibit (which was not before the Tribunal). The notes of interview reflect, according to the transcript, that the applicant stated that she had paid the purchase price for the motor vehicle; it was her money from an inheritance from her mother. That it was not joint matrimonial money, the price paid had been approximately $11,000. It is to be noted that the applicant's statement of the issues, facts and contentions (the statement) do not refer to the applicant having provided the purchase price for the motor vehicle. All that is stated is that in 1997, the applicant and her husband Tatsuya Shiraishi purchased the vehicle (par 24).
It is also noted that the applicant states at par 52 of the statement that at the time when the vehicle was purchased, the applicant and her husband owned another motor vehicle. It is stated that the reason the Motor Vehicle was purchased was that Tatsuya Shiraishi commenced employment and this resulted in the family needing two cars.
Consequently, the applicant contends that she has been the person who had virtually exclusive possession of the vehicle since it was purchased in 1997 and that she is the person who has been, and still is, entitled to the immediate possession of it since it was purchased and therefore she is the owner of the vehicle in accordance with the definition of "owner" contained in s 5(1) of the RT Act.

The relevant legislative provisions

Unless expressly stated otherwise, all references made below to a section or subsection of an Act is a reference to the corresponding section or subsection of the RT Act.
The definition of "owner" (s 5) is:
"(a)the person who is entitled to the immediate possession of the vehicle; or
(b)if there are several persons entitled to its immediate possession, the person whose entitlement is paramount,
but if one of 2 or more persons fitting that description has been nominated for the purposes of section 5(4), it means only the person nominated;"
Subsection 5(4) provides:
"Where a vehicle is owned by more than one person and one of those persons is nominated by all such persons, by notice in writing given to the Director General, the nominated person shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle."
Section 5A prescribes who is the person responsible for a vehicle for the purposes of the RT Act. In summary, if the vehicle is licensed, the responsible person is the licence holder - unless notice has been given under s 24 that the licence holder has ceased to be the owner, in which event, the new owner, as specified in the notice is responsible. If the vehicle is not licensed, but was previously licensed, the person who previously was the licence holder is responsible, unless it can be shown that the person did not agree to becoming an owner of the vehicle and has given notice accordingly. In all other cases, the party entitled to immediate possession, or if there are several persons entitled to immediate possession, the person whose entitlement is paramount, is responsible for the vehicle. For the purposes of the section the licence holder is the person in whose name the vehicle is licensed.
Section 15 provides that a vehicle licence is required for vehicles prescribed in the regulations. The use of a vehicle, for which there is not a valid vehicle licence, on any road, constitutes an offence, subject to certain qualifications.
Section 17 provides relevantly as follows:
"17. Applications for grant, renewal and transfer of vehicle licences
(1)An owner of a vehicle may apply for the grant, renewal or transfer of a licence for a vehicle by -
(a)submitting an application in a form approved by the Director General; and
(b)paying the amount of -
(i)any fee or charge that would be required by section 19; and
(ii)the stamp duty, and any penalty tax, payable under the Stamp Act 1921 on the grant or transfer of the licence.
...
(3)A vehicle cannot be licensed in the name of more than one person at a particular time.
(4)Any one of 2 or more owners may apply for the grant or transfer of a licence and the application is to be signed by each of them.
(5)An application under subsection (4) is to be regarded as notice of the nomination of the applicant for the purposes of section 5(4).
..."
Section 20 contains provisions to the effect that where the fees or charges for the grant or renewal of a vehicle licence are paid by a cheque which is dishonoured the licence is void. Further provision is made for the return of the licence and number plates to the Director General.
Section 23A deals with the cancellation of a vehicle licence in certain circumstances. The circumstances relate to the payment of fees, the vehicle not meeting prescribed standards, the failure of the responsible person to present the vehicle for inspection and the surrender of the licence in accordance with s 28A of the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act 1973 (WA).
Section 24 provides as follows:
"24. Transfer of vehicle licences
(1)Where a person to whom a licence in respect of a vehicle has been granted ceases to be the owner of the vehicle, he shall -
(a)within 7 days after ceasing to be the owner, give notice in writing to the Director General of the name and address of the new owner of the vehicle; and
(b)if the licence had been obtained without the payment of a vehicle licence charge or upon the payment of a reduced vehicle licence charge and unless the provisions of section 19(17) have been complied with, within 7 days after ceasing to be the owner, return the licence and the appropriate number plates to the Director General.
(2)A person who becomes the owner of a vehicle in respect of which a licence has been granted shall, within 14 days after becoming the owner, give notice in writing to the Director General of that fact.
(2a)As soon as practicable after receiving notice under subsection (1)(a) or (2), or otherwise, of a change in the ownership of a vehicle in respect of which a licence has been granted -
(a)if the Director General reasonably suspects that the vehicle does not meet a prescribed standard or requirement relating to the security of the vehicle, the Director General may issue to the new owner a notice requiring that the vehicle be modified so that it does meet the prescribed standard or requirement; or
(b)if the Director General is satisfied that the licence may be transferred under section 17(2) and no application has been made under section 17(1), the Director General may issue to the new owner a notice requiring that an application for the transfer of the licence be made under section 17.
(2b)In subsection (2a) -
'new owner', in relation to a vehicle, means a person who, according to the notice received by the Director General, has become a new owner of the vehicle and, if there is more than one such person, each or any of them.
..."
Section 24B provides as follows:
"24B. Change of nominated owner
(1)If a person is the owner of a vehicle as the result of a nomination for the purposes of section 5(4), the person may apply to the Director General, in a form approved by the Director General, to cancel the nomination.
(2)The application is to include a statement, signed by each person who would be an owner if there had been no nomination, to the effect that they agree to another of them being the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of this Act.
(3)If the Director General approves the application and the applicant pays the prescribed fee, if any -
(a)the current nomination ceases to have effect;
(b)the statement under subsection (2) is to be treated as being a nomination for the purposes of section 5(4); and
(c)the Director General is to vary the licence by changing the name of the person to whom the licence is granted in accordance with the application."
Section 25 provides:
"25. Review
(1)An application for review may be made to the State Administrative Tribunal in any case where an application for the grant, renewal, transfer, or variation of a licence under this Part is refused, or where a licence is cancelled or suspended under section 23A."
Section 27 provides that the Director General shall keep a register of vehicle licences, and enter therein particulars of every vehicle licence granted, and upon the grant or renewal of any vehicle licence, issued to the applicant a registration label evidencing the grant of the licence.
Some observations can be made as to the legislative scheme. Firstly, it is a scheme for the licensing of motor vehicles, not the licensing of owners of motor vehicles. As such, the RT Act defines who is to be regarded as the owner for the purposes of the legislation. The licence holder may not be the sole owner at law. If there are several persons entitled to its immediate possession, that is, they are joint owners, the owner is regarded as the person whose entitlement to immediate possession is paramount, or superior to the other person, or the owner is a person nominated by all owners pursuant to s 5(4).
It is only an owner in this sense who may apply for the grant, renewal or transfer of a licence. Section 17(4) and s 17(5) recognise that one of two or more owners, that is persons who have an entitlement to immediate possession, may apply for the grant or transfer of a licence, but in that event the application under s 17(4) is to be regarded as notice of the nomination of the applicant for the purposes of s 5(4).
When a person ceases to be the owner of the vehicle, that person is required to provide the name and address of the new owner. Within the general framework of the legislation, the new owner may well be one of several persons entitled to immediate possession of the vehicle, or a person whose entitlement has become paramount by reason of the previous owner ceasing to be an owner as defined. But, within s 24(2a) the concept of who is a new owner is taken out of the general framework of the legislation and is given a wider meaning. Where the new owner is the only person entitled to the immediate possession of the vehicle, the meaning is no different. However, if there is more than one person who has become a new owner of the vehicle, each or any of them is to be regarded as the new owner. That extends the meaning of owner as applied elsewhere in the RT Act, because under the definition of "owner" if there are several person entitled to immediate possession, it is only the person whose entitlement is paramount, or where a nomination has been made under s 5(4), that nominated person, who is the owner. The reason for this extended meaning is obvious and that is that until application is made for transfer of the vehicle licence, the Director General is entitled under s 24(2)(a) to take steps to enforce the making of an application for transfer against each or any of the persons who has become a new owner. Once the application for transfer is made, the legislation requires that only the person with the paramount entitlement to possession or the person nominated under s 5(4) be regarded as the owner for the purposes of the legislation.

In relation to the mechanism provided under s 24B to change the person nominated as owner under s 5(4). It must be observed that the procedure can only be followed if a person is the owner of a vehicle as the result of such a nomination.
The Tribunal now turns to consider the specific issues identified for determination.

Issue 1: does the process under s 24B apply?

By letter dated 31 August 2007, the applicant applied for the licence to be varied by substituting her name for that of her former husband under s 24B(3)(c) of the RT Act. In that letter, the applicant stated that she previously owned the vehicle with Tatsuya Shiraishi but that on 9 June 2006, as a result of orders by consent handed down by the Family Court of Western Australia, Tatsuya Shiraishi ceased to be an owner of the vehicle.
The applicant adopts a different stance in her statement of issues, facts and contentions. The applicant now contends that the Family Court order merely dealt with any interest that Tatsuya Shiraishi may have had in the motor vehicle, without determining any specific interest did exist. It was submitted that the order did not result in the applicant becoming entitled to immediate possession of the motor vehicle and did not result in her becoming an owner within the meaning of the term as defined. It is contended that the applicant's entitlement to immediate possession existed prior to the court order. All of these submissions can be accepted, but the fact that the Family Court may not have determined whether or not Tatsuya Shiraishi had any interest in the motor vehicle is not relevant.
On the material before the Tribunal, I am unable to accept that only the applicant was entitled to the immediate possession of the motor vehicle, which would have the consequence that the motor vehicle licence would have wrongly reflected the name of the owner of the vehicle from the outset (even if the name of the applicant's then husband had been correctly spelled). There are statements which the Tribunal will regard as statements of fact in par 52 and following in the applicant's statement to the effect that the applicant and her husband owned another motor vehicle at the time when the Motor Vehicle was purchased and that the Motor Vehicle was purchased because Tatsuya Shiraishi commenced employment, resulting in the family needing two cars. That after the Motor Vehicle had been purchased, Tatsuya Shiraishi drove the other vehicle and that both he and the applicant regarded that as his car and the Motor Vehicle as the applicant's car. However, that information appears inconsistent with the evidence given by Tatsuya Shiraishi under oath in the Magistrates' Court. He testified that he bought the Motor Vehicle "for my new job". Further, he regarded the vehicle as owned by the family in accordance with what he referred to as Asian custom. Although the applicant had made a statement, which was referred to in the Magistrates' Court proceedings, suggesting that she had provided the funding for the motor vehicle, that may at the very least be inconsistent with the sworn evidence of Tatsuya Shiraishi and is any event, not even referred to as an alleged fact in the applicant's statement of issues, facts and contentions. Further, the new position adopted by the applicant is inconsistent with the facts stated in her letter dated 31 August 2007 in which she conveyed that she had previously owned the Motor Vehicle jointly with Tatsuya Shiraishi and that Tatsuya Shiraishi had ceased to be an owner consequent upon the making of the Family Court order on 9 June 2006.
In these circumstances, there is at the very least, uncertainty, as to the basis upon which the Motor Vehicle was first acquired and the rights as between Tatsuya Shiraishi and the applicant concerning the Motor Vehicle. The Tribunal can make no express findings that the applicant's entitlement to immediate possession was at the time of initial registration of the Motor Vehicle paramount to her then husband's entitlement.
By Tatsuya Shiraishi applying for the Motor Vehicle to be registered under his name, he must be taken to have represented, in the light of the evidence given by him in the Magistrates' Court, that he was the person whose entitlement to immediate possession of the motor vehicle was paramount. There is no evidence that Tatsuya Shiraishi was nominated for the purposes of s 5(4). It is clear that at the time when the application to vary the licence was made on 31 August 2007, he was no longer an owner (as defined) of the Motor Vehicle. That is so, whether his right to immediate possession was given up voluntarily at some earlier date, or whether pursuant to the Family Court order in June 2006. On any basis, s 24B therefore provides no mechanism to effect a result by which the applicant is shown on the licence as the owner.

Issue 2: does the Director General have powers beyond those expressed in the RT Act by which to substitute the applicant's name as owner?

By way of the applicant's statement, and submissions made at the hearing, the applicant has pressed for the existence of an implied power to amend the details of a vehicle's registration. The applicant observes that the Motor Vehicle licence was varied in January 2005 without an application having been made under s 24B. Further, the applicant relies on s 25(1) of the RT Act which provides that an application for review may be made to the Tribunal in any case where an application for a grant, renewal, transfer or variation of a licence under Pt III is refused, or where a licence is cancelled or suspended under s 23A (which is not relevant). The applicant contends that the reference therein to "a variation of a licence" would not be necessary unless it was intended to provide a right of review for circumstances which were wider than the variation referred to in s 24B which refers only to the Director General being able to "vary the licence by changing the name of the person to whom the licence is granted".
The applicant's case is that the implied power should be viewed on the basis that it is the applicant who is, and has been since 1997, the owner of the vehicle (applicant's statement par 54). In effect, the contention therefore, is that the register has at all times wrongly reflected Tatsuya Shiraishi as the owner. The Tribunal places no significance on the misspelling of Mr Shiraishi's name as it is clear that there was no other person to whom the misspelled name could apply.
Whether there is any such implied power is a matter of statutory construction. In this instance, the power for which the applicant contends is a power to amend an error which must flow from a previous decision to record the applicant's husband as the owner of the motor vehicle.
Where a statute confers a power, the donee of the grant will enjoy the rights and powers necessary to the exercise of the primary grant: Re Ralph PhillipSloane v the Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 (Sloane); Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 623. As stated in Sloane at page 443, the question whether a power, right or duty is to be implied into a statute will depend upon the construction of the provision under consideration having regard to its purpose and context, and "other traces of the convenient phantom of legislative intention".
In this instance, the right of review under s 25 is limited to an application for the grant, renewal, transfer or variation of a licence under Pt III of the RT Act. Part III covers the licensing of vehicles and in particular s 15 to s 29 of the RT Act. The right of review cannot therefore be extended to cover a decision which is not made pursuant to any of the identified sections within Pt III.
Section 55 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act) provides that where a written law confers a power, the power may be exercised or performed as often as is necessary to correct any error or omission in any previous purported exercise or performance of the power or duty, notwithstanding that the power or duty is not in general capable of being exercised or performed from time to time.
Under s 3(1) of the Interpretation Act, the provisions of the Interpretation Act apply to every written law, whether made before or after the commencement of Interpretation Act, unless, excluding qualifications attaching to subsidiary legislation, the particular written law expressly provides to the contrary, or in the case of an Act, the intent and object of the Act or something in the subject or context of the Act is inconsistent with such application. There is no express provision in the RT Act to the contrary, nor, in the Tribunal's view, is there anything within the subject or context of the RT Act which is inconsistent with such application.
On the face of it, therefore, if any error is made in relation to an application to exercise any power under the RT Act there is a mechanism by which the error may be corrected, without recourse to any statutory right of review. The ultimate decision would, however, remain subject to review because it must necessarily concern an application for the grant, renewal, transfer or variation of a licence. In the Tribunal's view, it is the power under s 55 of the Interpretation Act, which enabled the respondent to correct the wrong spelling of Tatsuya Shiraishi's name on the licence.
There being no reference in Pt III to any variation of a licence, other than pursuant to s 24B(iii), the applicant's submission that the different terminology used in s 25 concerning the right to review an application for variation of a licence, as indicating the existence of a wider power to vary, is rejected. As there is no evidence to establish any error on the part of the Director General, apart from the applicant's husband's name being incorrectly spelled (and that has been remedied), there is nothing to be corrected under the powers provided under s 55 of the Interpretation Act.

Should the vehicle be transferred into the name of the applicant under s 17 being read with s 24?

On the material before the Tribunal, the applicant's former husband when first applying for the motor vehicle registration in 1997 was to be regarded as the owner of the vehicle on the basis that there were at least two persons entitled to its immediate possession and that his entitlement was paramount. For the reasons given above, there is insufficient evidence to find that the applicant's interest was paramount.
By reason of either the Family Court order in June 2005, or by reason of circumstances which have not been established under which the applicant's former husband may have relinquished his interests and therefore paramount entitlement to possession of the Motor Vehicle prior to that date, the applicant's former husband ceased to be the owner of the vehicle under the RT Act. Although neither the applicant's former husband, nor the applicant, has formally given the notice contemplated under s 24(1) of the RT Act, the Director General was entitled, by reason of the information contained in the applicant's letter of 31 August 2007 to follow the course set out in s 24(2)(a). That is because that subsection specifically states that the Director General may take such steps as soon as practicable after receiving notice under s 24(1)(a) or (2), or otherwise of a change in the ownership of the vehicle. It is to be observed that there is nothing in the documentation which indicates that the Director General has actually followed the steps contemplated under s 24(2a)(v). The evidence is simply that an invoice was issued to the applicant for the transfer and stamp duty, there has been no reference to a notice having been issued to the new owner, namely the applicant, requiring an application for transfer of the licence be made under s 17. That may be a matter which needs to be addressed.

Conclusion and orders

It follows from the above that the applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that the Director General has any power under which to cause the motor vehicle to be registered under the name of the applicant, other than in terms of s 17 and s 24 of the RT Act.
The applicant did not address the question of costs in its written or oral submissions at the hearing and as the applicant has been unsuccessful there is no need to provide an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs.
The Tribunal accordingly orders as follows:
1.The decision under review made on 30 October 2007 refusing the applicant's application for a variation of motor vehicle licence 9LA178 is affirmed.
2.The application for review is dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding [57] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MR C RAYMOND, SENIOR MEMBER