FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Liu v Stephen Grubits and Associates (No 2) [2019] FCAFC 42
Appeal from: Liu v Stephen Grubits and Associates (No 2) [2018] FCCA 842 File number: NSD 783 of 2018 Judges: REEVES, KERR AND LEE JJ Date of judgment: 13 March 2019 Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 79
Cases cited: Cross v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd t/as Harbour City Ferries (No 2)[2017] FCCA 1713
Liu v Stephen Grubits and Associates [2019] FCAFC 24
Date of hearing: Heard and determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 1 March 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 23 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr I Chatterjee Solicitor for the Appellant: AHL Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Lambert Solicitor for the Respondent: Michael Green Legal ORDERS
NSD 783 of 2018 BETWEEN: YUNLONG LIU
Appellant
AND: STEPHEN GRUBITS & ASSOCIATES
Respondent
JUDGES:
REEVES, KERR AND LEE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
On 12 February 2019 the Court delivered reasons for dismissing an appeal from a costs order made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA): Liu v Stephen Grubits and Associates [2019] FCAFC 24 (Grubits). That costs order had been made in relation to an application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The unsuccessful appellant had contended that the FCCA had no power to make such an order.
The parties were given leave to file written submissions on the question of costs of the appeal. Both filed written submissions. Their submissions were considered by the Court.
On 5 March 2019 the parties were advised that the Court had determined that there be no order as to costs. The parties were advised that a sealed copy of the Court’s orders would be available the following day. Orders were made accordingly. The parties were advised that the Court did not propose to publish formal reasons in respect of costs unless so requested.
On 7 March 2019 the Court was made aware of a request. These are our reasons.
As a general rule, in an appeal determined by this Court costs follow the event. However, as we observed in Grubits at [13], s 570 of the FW Act provides that a party may be ordered to pay costs with respect to matters arising under that Act only in the circumstances set out in subs (2) (a), (b), or (c) of that section. That constraint applies to this appeal.
Section 570 is in the following…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Liu v Stephen Grubits and Associates (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Bench was whether the appeal was vexatious or without reasonable cause, or whether it constituted an unreasonable act or omission under section 570 of the FW Act. The Full Bench considered whether the appellant's previous conduct in the litigation rendered the appeal improperly advanced, and whether the provisions of section 570 were satisfied. The Full Bench held that while Liu's conduct in earlier proceedings might have been unreasonable, it did not necessarily mean that the appeal was vexatious or without reasonable cause. The Full Bench concluded that Liu's appeal was properly advanced on arguable grounds, and therefore, the conditions for a costs order under section 570 were not met.
The Full Bench rejected the appeal and made no order as to costs, as they were not satisfied that the conditions in section 570(2) had been met to justify a costs order against Liu. This decision highlights the importance of the proper interpretation of statutory provisions in the context of costs orders and the distinction between the conduct of a party in earlier proceedings and the merits of their current appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant filed reply submissions with the consent of the respondent on 1 March 2019. The appellant identified that Lee J had refused leave to appeal on other of the grounds advanced and had made costs orders in favour of the respondent with respect to the appellant’s application for leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision (being the orders made in NSD26/2018).Consideration The appellant’s amended notice of appeal filed pursuant to the orders of Lee J of 14 September 2018 advanced a single ground of appeal. The only issue raised was whether the FCCA had power to make the costs order it had made. That was a question purely of statutory interpretation. The respondent has had the benefit of a costs order in respect of the grounds intended to be pressed but for which leave to appeal was refused. An order for costs in the respondent’s favour was made in the substantive proceedings in the court below, and in consequence of our rejection of the appeal that order stands. We accept that it is implicit that in making such costs orders both the primary judge and Lee J must have been satisfied that the provisions of s 570 of the FW Act had been satisfied with respect to the conduct of the appellant in the proceedings as then before them. However any unreasonable conduct of the appellant in those earlier proceedings is irrelevant to whether or not the appellant instituted this appeal vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or whether his doing so was an unreasonable act or omission. The appeal required this Court to give attention to a significant point of statutory construction neither entirely convincingly addressed by the primary judge nor previously the subject of appellate determination. Whatever the vices of the appellant’s prior conduct of this litigation were, we are unpersuaded that the appeal he advanced as determined by this Court was other than properly advanced on arguable grounds, notwithstanding our emphatic rejection of it. In those circumstances, the provisions of s 570 of the FW Act were not enlivened. We are not satisfied that any of the conditions in s 570(2) have been met such as to justify a costs order being made against the appellant.