LING CHAN v STUART WOOD and KAI DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
[2013] ACTSC 228 (14 November 2013)
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION – declaration sought that adjudicator fell into jurisdictional error – whether plaintiff’s intention at time of entering into contract was to reside in property – consideration of plaintiff’s intention – Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act2009 s 9(2)(b)
ESTOPPEL – estoppels in pais – whether reliance on representation – absence of reliance – reliance not reasonable in any case
Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act2009 (ACT) s 9(2)(b)
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485
Cardiacos v Cooper Consulting & Construction Services (Aust) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 938
Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (2010) 78 NSWLR 393
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305
Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641
Pines Living Pty Ltd v O’Brien & Anor [2013] ACTSC 156
RJ Neller Building Pty Ltd v Ainsworth [2009] 1 Qd R 390
Standard Chartered Bank v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
No. SC 321 of 2013
Judge: Master Mossop
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 14 November 2013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 321 of 2013
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:LING CHAN
Plaintiff
AND:STUART WOOD
First Defendant
AND:KAI DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
Second Defendant
ORDER
Judge: Master Mossop
Date: 14 November 2013
Place: Canberra
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1. The adjudication decision dated 1 August 2013 was made by the first defendant without jurisdiction and is of no effect.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2. The plaintiff is granted liberty to apply within 14 days in relation to any further or other order necessary to give effect to the Court’s decision.
3. Unless any party notifies my associate by email within 14 days of the making of these orders that it wishes to be heard in relation to costs, the second defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings including reserved costs as agreed or assessed.
At the second defendant’s instigation, the first defendant conducted an adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act2009 (ACT) (SOP Act). That adjudication related to a payment claim given by the second defendant to the plaintiff. The payment claim was made in relation to building work under a construction contract for the construction of a dwelling in Harrison, a newly developed suburb of Canberra.
The principal issue in this case is whether or not the plaintiff intended to live in the house at the time when she contracted to have it constructed by the second defendant. If she did then the contract is not one to which the SOP Act applied and hence an adjudication…
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- Case
- [2013] ACTSC 228
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues that the court had to determine were whether Ling Chan intended to reside in the property at the time of entering into the contract and if so, whether that intention rendered the adjudicator's decision invalid. Additionally, the court had to consider whether there was an estoppel in pais preventing Ling Chan from asserting her intention to live in the property. The outcome of these issues would determine whether the adjudicator had jurisdiction under the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT) (SOP Act) and if the estoppel claim was valid.
The court held that Ling Chan did intend to reside in the property at the time of entering into the contract, which meant that the contract was not one to which the SOP Act applied. Consequently, the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction under the SOP Act, and the adjudication was invalid. The court also found that there was no estoppel preventing Ling Chan from asserting her intention to reside in the property, as there was no reliance on any representation made by her that would give rise to an estoppel. Therefore, Ling Chan was entitled to relief.
The court granted Ling Chan the relief she sought, declaring that the adjudicator fell into jurisdictional error and that there was no estoppel preventing her from asserting her intention to reside in the property.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. At the second defendant’s instigation, the first defendant conducted an adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT) (SOP Act). That adjudication related to a payment claim given by the second defendant to the plaintiff. The payment claim was made in relation to building work under a construction contract for the construction of a dwelling in Harrison, a newly developed suburb of Canberra.
2. The principal issue in this case is whether or not the plaintiff intended to live in the house at the time when she contracted to have it constructed by the second defendant. If she did then the contract is not one to which the SOP Act applied and hence an adjudication under that Act occurred in circumstances where there was no jurisdiction for it to occur.
3. The second defendant also contends that whatever her actual intention, there is an estoppel which prevents the plaintiff from asserting that she intended to live in the house on the property and hence prevents her from asserting that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction.
4. In my view, for the reasons that I set out below, the plaintiff has established that, as at the date she entered the construction contract, she intended to live in the house upon its completion. Further, the plaintiff is not estopped from establishing that intention in these proceedings. Therefore the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction under the SOP Act and the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ling Chan then sought to set aside the adjudicator's decision, contending that the adjudicator fell into jurisdictional error because, at the time of entering into the construction contract, she intended to live in the house upon its completion. If this were the case, the construction contract would not be one to which the SOP Act applied, and therefore the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to make the determination. Ling Chan argued that because she intended to live in the house, the contract was a domestic building contract within the meaning of s 9(2)(b) of the SOP Act, and as such, the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to make a determination in relation to the payment claim.
In response, Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd contended that whatever Ling Chan's actual intention, there is an estoppel which prevents her from asserting that she intended to live in the house on the property and hence prevents her from asserting that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction. They argued that Ling Chan had represented to them that she had no intention to live in the house and had relied upon that representation in entering into the contract. They further contended that it was reasonable for them to rely upon that representation as they had no reason to doubt it.
The matter of Ling Chan v Stuart Wood and Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd came before the court following an adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT) instigated by the second defendant, Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd. This adjudication pertained to a payment claim made by Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd to the plaintiff, Ling Chan, in relation to building work under a construction contract for a dwelling in Harrison, Canberra. The primary issue before the court was whether Ling Chan intended to reside in the property at the time she entered into the construction contract with Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd. If she did, the contract would not fall under the SOP Act, rendering the adjudication conducted by the first defendant, Stuart Wood, lacking in jurisdiction. Furthermore, Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd argued that an estoppel in pais prevented Ling Chan from asserting that she intended to live in the house, thereby barring her from claiming that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction.
The procedural journey leading to this case included the initial adjudication process, where Stuart Wood determined that Kai Design and Construction Pty Ltd owed Ling Chan a sum of money. Dissatisfied with the adjudicator's decision, Ling Chan sought judicial review of the adjudicator's determination, challenging the jurisdictional basis of the adjudication. The court had to consider the plaintiff's intention at the time of the contract and whether this intention could be established despite potential estoppels raised by the second defendant. The court also had to evaluate whether any representations made by Ling Chan led to a reasonable reliance by the defendants that would give rise to an estoppel.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property at the time she entered into the construction contract?
2. Does the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property mean that the contract is not subject to the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT)?
3. If the plaintiff intended to reside in the property, did the adjudicator fall into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the adjudication under the SOP Act?
4. Does an estoppel in pais apply to prevent the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property?
5. If there was a representation relied upon by the plaintiff, was that reliance reasonable?
6. Are there circumstances that would estop the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property, irrespective of the reasonableness of her reliance on any representation?
Held
1. Was the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property at the time she entered into the construction contract?
The court concluded that the plaintiff had the intention to reside in the property at the time she entered into the construction contract.
2. Does the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property mean that the contract is not subject to the Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT)?
The court concluded that the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property does mean that the contract is not subject to the SOP Act.
3. If the plaintiff intended to reside in the property, did the adjudicator fall into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the adjudication under the SOP Act?
The court concluded that the adjudicator fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the adjudication under the SOP Act.
4. Does an estoppel in pais apply to prevent the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property?
The court concluded that an estoppel in pais does not apply to prevent the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property.
5. If there was a representation relied upon by the plaintiff, was that reliance reasonable?
The court did not conclude that the plaintiff relied on any representation, and therefore did not address the reasonableness of any such reliance.
6. Are there circumstances that would estop the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property, irrespective of the reasonableness of her reliance on any representation?
The court concluded that there are no circumstances that would estop the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property, irrespective of the reasonableness of her reliance on any representation.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In examining whether the plaintiff intended to reside in the property at the time she entered into the construction contract, the court considered the plaintiff's statements, conduct, and the context of the agreement. The plaintiff's consistent statements and plans to move into the house upon its completion were critical. The court found that the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property was clear and present at the time of contracting, establishing this as a fundamental aspect of the case.
The court then turned to the question of whether the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property meant that the contract was not subject to the SOP Act. The court applied the statutory provision of the SOP Act s 9(2)(b), which exempts domestic building contracts from the Act's jurisdiction. Given that the plaintiff intended to reside in the property, the court determined that the contract fell outside the scope of the SOP Act. This interpretation aligns with the statutory intent to protect residential builders from the stringent payment processes designed for commercial projects.
In considering whether the adjudicator fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding with the adjudication under the SOP Act, the court found that the adjudicator did not consider the plaintiff's intention to reside in the property. The adjudicator's failure to address this crucial factor constituted a jurisdictional error. The court relied on previous cases which emphasized the importance of jurisdictional prerequisites in adjudication processes under the SOP Act.
The court also addressed the issue of estoppel in pais. The second defendant argued that the plaintiff should be estopped from asserting her intention to reside in the property. The court examined whether the plaintiff had made a representation that she did not intend to reside in the property and whether this representation was relied upon by the second defendant. The court found that there was no such representation made by the plaintiff, and thus the doctrine of estoppel in pais did not apply.
Further, the court evaluated whether the plaintiff's reliance on any representation, if it existed, was reasonable. The court concluded that since no representation was made, the issue of reasonable reliance did not arise. The plaintiff's intention to reside in the property was clear and not predicated on any alleged representation by the defendants.
Finally, the court considered whether there were circumstances that would estop the plaintiff from asserting her intention to reside in the property, irrespective of the reasonableness of her reliance on any representation. The court held that there were no such circumstances. The plaintiff's consistent intention and planning to reside in the property were not undermined by any equitable considerations. The court's decision underscored the importance of the plaintiff's actual intention in determining the applicability of the SOP Act to the construction contract.