Liddy v R

Case [2005] NTCCA 8


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Liddy v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 8

PARTIES: LIDDY, Christopher John

v

THE QUEEN

TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO: CA 15 of 2004 (20325700)

DELIVERED: 29 April 2005

HEARING DATES: 29 April 2005

JUDGMENT OF: MARTIN (BR) CJ, RILEY & SOUTHWOOD JJ

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW
Appeal – appeal against sentence – manifestly excessive – plea to assault on de facto wife – fractured cheekbone – facial reconstruction required – event not intended but foreseen as a possible consequence – not manifestly excessive – appeal dismissed.

Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, followed.
Kelly v The Queen (2000) 10 NTR 39, applied.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
Appellant: I Read
Respondent: J Adams

Solicitors:
Appellant: NTLAC
Respondent: DPP

Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Mar0511
Number of pages: 11

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Liddy v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 8
No. CA 15 of 2004 (20325700)

BETWEEN:

CHRISTOPHER JOHN LIDDY
Appellant

AND:

THE QUEEN
Respondent

CORAM: MARTIN (BR) CJ, RILEY & SOUTHWOOD JJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 29 April 2005)

Martin (BR) CJ:
[1] I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons give by Riley.
Riley J:
[2] On 9 March 2005 the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years and six months with a non-parole period of three years and nine months in relation to three assaults committed upon his defacto wife in 2003. The appeal is against that sentence on the sole ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
[3] The first offence in time (count 3) occurred between 1 March 2003 and 31 October 2003. The appellant was at the victim’s flat and was working on a bicycle. They were arguing and the appellant swung a piece of wire, taken from the bicycle, around his head in order to frighten the victim. A brake part attached to the end of the wire dislodged and struck the victim on the ribs. As a result of the assault the victim suffered bruising to her ribs.
[4] The appellant acknowledged that it was clearly foreseeable that the victim may have been struck by the swinging wire. At the same time the victim told the appellant that she would leave and he threatened her by saying, ‘You better not, I'm going to smash your face. I'm going to keep punching till it’s smashed and no one will want to look at you and if that doesn’t work I'm going to kill you’.
[5] The appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of aggravated unlawful assault causing the victim bodily harm. The maximum penalty for the offence is imprisonment for five years.
[6] The second offence in time, (count 1), occurred on 25 October 2003 when the appellant unlawfully assaulted his victim who suffered bodily harm.…

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Liddy v R [2005] NTCCA 8
Case
[2005] NTCCA 8
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Criminal Appeal of the Northern Territory heard an appeal by Christopher John Liddy against a sentence imposed by the Supreme Court. Liddy had pleaded guilty to three counts of assault against his de facto wife, which resulted in significant physical harm to the victim, including a fractured cheekbone requiring reconstructive surgery. The appeal was based solely on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The legal issues before the Court of Criminal Appeal were whether the sentencing judge erred in her exercise of discretion by imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive, considering the nature of the offences, the appellant's guilty plea, and his criminal history. Specifically, the court had to determine if the sentence reflected an error in principle or a misassessment of salient features of the evidence, and whether the sentence was clearly and obviously excessive.

The Court of Criminal Appeal applied the principles established in *Veen v The Queen (No 2)* and *Cameron v The Queen*, which outline the limited grounds on which an appellate court may interfere with a sentencing decision. The court found that the sentencing judge had properly considered the appellant's early guilty plea and his criminal history, which indicated a pattern of violent behaviour and a continuing disregard for the law. The judge also took into account the severity of the assaults, particularly the final assault which involved a deliberate breach of a domestic violence order and resulted in grievous bodily harm to the victim. The court concluded that the sentence, while towards the higher end of the range for one of the offences, was within the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion, considering the gravity of the offending and the need for retribution, deterrence, and protection of the community.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court of Criminal Appeal upholding the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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