Campbell v Allen, Dixon and Anderson

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Campbell v Allen, Dixon and Anderson [2006] NTSC 56

PARTIES:CAMPBELL, Jerry

v

ALLEN, Robert James

and

DIXON, Garnet Alan

and

ANDERSON, Kylie

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:JA 18 of 2006 (20324711)

JA 19 of 2006 (20423225)

JA 20 of 2006 (20517410)        

DELIVERED:  19 July 2006

HEARING DATES:  18 July 2006

JUDGMENT OF:  OLSSON AJ

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – JUSTICES

Appeal against sentence – whether learned sentencing magistrate erred – prior offending at time of sentence treated as breach – whether proper basis in law established to warrant restoration of periods held in suspense-

Appeal against sentence – whether sentence manifestly excessive – whether sentence offends totality principle -

Appeal allowed

Appellant re sentenced

Justices Act (NT)s 177(2)(f)
Sentencing Act (NT) s 43(5),(6),(7)
Liquor Act (NT) s 75(1)(a)

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, followed
Liddy v R [2005] NTCCA 8, followed

R v Faulkner (1972) 56 Crim App R 594, referred to

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:T Aickin

Respondent:  C Roberts

Solicitors:

Appellant:Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service

Respondent:  Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  Ols0606

Number of pages:  14

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ALICE SPRINGS

Campbell v Allen, Dixon and Anderson[2006] NTSC 56
Nos JA 18-20 of 2006 (20324711, 20423225 and 20517410)

IN THE MATTER OF the Justices Act

AND IN THE MATTER OF appeals against sentences handed down in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Alice Springs

BETWEEN:

CAMPBELL, Jerry

Appellant

AND:

ALLEN, Robert James
  and
  DIXON, Garnet Alan
  and
  ANDERSON, Kylie
  Respondents

CORAM:     OLSSON AJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 19 July 2006)

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against sentences imposed by a stipendiary magistrate upon the appellant on 26 May 2006, on the ground that the practical effect of them was to constitute a penalty that was manifestly excessive in the relevant circumstances.

  2. There are three separate files before me, namely Nos. 20517410, 20324711 and 20423225.  It is necessary, briefly, to recapitulate the history relating to each to found a proper understanding of the inter-relationship between them.

    File No 20324711

  3. On 16 July 2004, the appellant appeared before the Kintore Court of Summary Jurisdiction.  He pleaded guilty to an offence of bringing liquor into the Papunya Restricted Area, contrary to s75(1)a of the Liquor Act. Specifically, he conceded that, on 12 November 2003, he had brought no less than 16 two litre casks of port wine into that area.  It was therefore a very serious offence of its type.

  4. A conviction was recorded on the plea and the appellant was sentenced to three months imprisonment.  That sentence was fully suspended, with an operative period of 18 months.

    File No 20423225

  5. On 28 November 2005 the appellant further appeared before the Alice Springs Court of Summary Jurisdiction.  At that time he pleaded guilty to two related offences, both committed on 12 October 2004.  He…

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Details
Case
[2006] NTSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Campbell v Allen, Dixon and Anderson, the appellant contested the sentence imposed by a magistrate in the Northern Territory Magistrates Court. The appellant was convicted of contravening a liquor licensing law and breaching a suspended sentence. The appeal focused on the sentence's severity and whether it contravened the principle of proportionality. The appeal contended that the magistrate had erred by treating prior offences as breaches, that the sentence was excessive, and that it violated the totality principle.

The primary legal issues were whether the sentencing magistrate made an error in law by treating prior offending as breaches and if the sentence was manifestly excessive and contravened the totality principle. The appeal argued that the breach of the supervision condition and the second liquor offence warranted recognition but did not justify the sentence imposed. The appeal also highlighted that the sentence was disproportionate to the appellant's offending conduct, considering his age and limited criminal history.

The court found that while the breach of the supervision condition and the second liquor offence warranted some penalty, the sentence needed to maintain proportionality. The court agreed that the breach of the supervision condition should be acknowledged but determined that the sentence was not significantly impacted by the second liquor offence. The court concluded that the sentence was excessive and violated the totality principle due to the appellant's young age and limited criminal history. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was resentenced.

The court ordered the appellant be resentenced by the learned magistrate, taking into account the principles of proportionality and the totality principle. The court's decision recognised the need to address the breach of supervision and the second liquor offence but emphasised that the sentence should be proportionate to the appellant's offending conduct, age, and criminal history.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

He founded that submission on two features of the relevant circumstances, namely:(a) that, on any view, the appellant had knowingly breached a specific condition of the suspension in not maintaining the supervision of Community Corrections and advising them of his wish to travel to Mount Liebig. Whilst the breach was, perhaps, not as serious as some that come before the Court, nevertheless, it should not be treated lightly; and(b) that, whilst the offence of 21 July 2005 was not a breaching offence, it was certainly a second offence against the Liquor Act and, had it been dealt with on 28 November 2005, it would have stood as an additional breaching offence in addition to the matters then being dealt with. If it had then been taken into account and disposed of, the resultant outcome may well have been more severe than the disposition that actually occurred. In its own right, this second liquor related offence well warranted an appropriate custodial sentence.Conclusion Ms Aickin's riposte to the respondent's argument was essentially to the effect that it simply did not give proper recognition to the relatively young age of the appellant and his quite limited antecedent record. To allow the impugned orders to stand would also be to give rise to a penalty that was disproportionate to the offending conduct and in breach of the totality principle. In my opinion there is force in that contention. Whilst I entirely agree with Mr Roberts that neither the breach of the supervision condition nor the second liquor offence ought to be treated as of little consequence, by the same token, there needs to be a proper sense of proportionality. As to the liquor offence of 21 July, this was of a vastly different order from that which had led to the original conviction. On the most recent occasion, the amount of liquor was small and was only for personal consumption by the appellant. Although I am of the view that a sentence of 10 days imprisonment was not inappropriate having regard to the policy of the legislation and the fact that this was a second liquor offence, I am by no means convinced that, had it been dealt with on 28 November 2005, it would have had a significant impact on the sentencing strategy actually adopted at that time. I consider that it is most likely that the learned magistrate then dealing with the relevant matters would simply have ordered such a sentence to be served concurrently with the custodial periods that were actually restored by her. On the other hand, Mr Roberts is on solid ground when he argues that the breach of the supervision condition must be recognised in some proper manner. Not to do so would clearly undermine the efficacy of supervision orders generally. The hurdle which confronts the appellant in this case is that no true emergency situation prevented him from making proper contact with Community Corrections and, had he done so, he would no doubt have been given approval to visit his sick grandmother. However, he made no attempt to fulfil his obligations in that regard at any stage and his breach was a knowing one. In so saying I by no means ignore Ms Aickin's point that he did apparently fulfil his reporting obligations for about the first four months of his operational period.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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