Liascos v Anastasopoulos and Hodges v Anastasopoulos

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LIASCOS v ANASTASOPOULOS and HODGES v ANASTASOPOULOS [2013] FCCA 2239
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Related applications to set aside two Bankruptcy Notices founded on same judgment debt – Whether applications for order to set aside bankruptcy notices on grounds that the applicants have counter-claim, set-off or cross demand – whether Court is satisfied that debtors have counter-claim, set-off or cross demand.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.30, 33(1)(b), 40(1)(a)(ii), 40(1)(g), 41(6A), 41(6C), 41(7), 43, 44, 52

Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth), rr.2.01, 3.03

Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Forge (2003) 133 FCR 487
Byron v Southern Star Group Pty Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 264
Cambridge v Anastasopoulos [2012] NSWCA 405
Cambridge v Anastasopoulos (No.2) [2013] NSWCA 213
Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No. 4) (1982) 42 ALR 703
Conway v Jackson (2001) 107 FCR 201
Coshott v Barry (2009) 113 ALD 358
Emerson & Anor v WreckAir Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Meng Chang [1998] FCA 941
Hovan v Goycolea-Silva [2003] FCA 234
Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Limited [2011] FMCA 11
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
Lazar v Seccombe [2005] FCA 1652
McPhee v Glentham Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 1508
Northam v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 544
O’Loughlin v Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 925
Phoenix Constructions (Queensland) Pty Ltd v McCracken  [2012] FMCA 855
Re Baker; Ex parte Baker v Staples [1995] FCA 1520
Re Carter; Ex Parte National Mutual Trustees Ltd (1995) 57 FCR 185
Re Geard; Ex parte Reid (1994) 217 ALR 191
Re Halstead; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation  (1991) 31 FCR 337
Re Horwarth; Ex parte Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 587
Re Kim Schekeloff; Ex parte Schekeloff v Hopkins Group Pty Ltd& Rainer Pty Ltd (1989) 22 FCR 407
Re Taylor; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 74 FLR 377
Re Wong; Ex parte Kitson (1979) 27 ALR 405
Shephard v Chiquita Brands South Pacific Ltd [2004] FCAFC 76
Skouloudis v St George Bank Ltd (2008) 173 FCR 236
Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211
Valassis v Bernard [2001] FCA 477
Walsh v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 156 CLR 337
Warner v Frost [1999] FCA 830
Applicant: JIM LIASCOS
Respondent: PETER ANASTASOPOULOS
File Number: SYG 1044 of 2011
Applicant: GREGORY JOHN HODGES
Respondent: PETER ANASTASOPOULOS
File Number: SYG 1046 of 2011
Judgment of: Judge Lloyd-Jones
Hearing dates:

27 September 2011, 30 September 2011

 and 18 April 2013

Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 23 December 2013

REPRESENTATION AT HEARINGS ON 27 & 30 SEPTEMBER 2011

Solicitors for the Mr Liascos:

Ms S. Nash of

Sally Nash & Co Lawyers

Solicitors for Mr Hodges:                  Ms S. Nash of

Sally Nash & Co Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A. Joseph
Solicitors for the Respondent:

Mr G. Gourlas of

George Gourlas Lawyer

REPRESENTATION AT HEARING ON 18 APRIL 2013

Counsel for the Mr Liascos: Mr J. R. Young
Solicitors…
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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 2239
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Liascos and Hodges, sought to set aside a default judgment entered against them in favour of the respondent, Anastasopoulos. The dispute arose from a loan agreement where Anastasopoulos alleged that Liascos and Hodges had failed to repay the principal sum and interest. Anastasopoulos had commenced proceedings against Liascos and Hodges, and upon their failure to file a defence, obtained default judgment. The application to set aside this judgment was heard by Lloyd-Jones J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the default judgment should be set aside. This required the Court to consider the principles governing applications to set aside default judgments, specifically whether there was a "real prospect of success" on the merits of the defence and whether there was a "good reason" for the judgment to be set aside. The applicants contended that they had a meritorious defence to the claim and that there were circumstances explaining their failure to file a defence within the prescribed time.

Lloyd-Jones J applied the well-established principles for setting aside default judgments. His Honour noted that a defendant seeking to set aside a default judgment must demonstrate either that the judgment was irregular or that there are grounds for setting it aside on the merits. In this instance, the judgment was regular. Therefore, the focus shifted to whether the applicants had shown a defence with a real prospect of success and a good reason for their failure to file a defence. His Honour found that the evidence presented by the applicants did not establish a defence with a real prospect of success, nor did it provide a sufficient explanation for their delay.

Consequently, Lloyd-Jones J dismissed the application to set aside the default judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 23 May 2011, Jim Liascos and Gregory John Hodges each filed separate applications to have two Bankruptcy Notices (Notice Numbers 3313 and 3314 of 13 May 2011) set aside with costs. The Bankruptcy Notices were founded on a judgment and orders of Balla DCJ pronounced on 11 March 2011. Liascos and Hodges sought to first extend the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notices and second to have the Bankruptcy Notices set aside. The proceedings were referred from the Registrar’s bankruptcy list and were part heard on 27 September 2011, with the judgment reserved until 30 September 2011. The underlying dispute arose from a lawsuit filed by Peter Anastasopoulos against Liascos, Hodges, and another party for breach of duty as bailees and negligence concerning a motorboat. The District Court entered judgments against each of the appellants for $55,048, $85,416, and an undisclosed amount, plus interest. Liascos and Hodges appealed against those judgments. On 23 May 2011, Liascos filed an application under Rule 2.01 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 seeking to set aside the bankruptcy notice, and the time for compliance with the notice to be extended until the appeal is heard. Hodges filed a similar application on the same date. The Registry extended the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notices to 31 May 2011, with further extensions granted up until 6 September 2011. The proceedings were adjourned multiple times, with costs reserved. On 27 September 2011, the proceedings were transferred to Judge Lloyd-Jones for hearing. The Court heard evidence from Liascos, Hodges, and Anastasopoulos’s representative, Mr Joseph. Liascos and Hodges argued that the Bankruptcy Notices should be set aside and time extended pending the outcome of their appeals against the District Court’s judgment. Anastasopoulos argued that the Bankruptcy Notices should not be set aside, and the time for compliance should not be extended. The Court considered the principles governing the extension of time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice and the validity of the Bankruptcy Notices. The Court found that the Bankruptcy Notices were invalid due to misstatements in the amounts owed and interest calculations, which misled the debtors. Consequently, the Bankruptcy Notices BN 3313 of 2011 and BN 3314 of 2011 were set aside with costs awarded to the applicants.

The proceedings Liascos v Anastasopoulos and Hodges v Anastasopoulos originated as two separate applications filed on 23 May 2011 by Jim Liascos and Gregory John Hodges, respectively, seeking to set aside Bankruptcy Notices issued to them by Peter Anastasopoulos. The Bankruptcy Notices, BN 3313 and BN 3314, were based on a judgment debt arising from a decision of Balla DCJ in the District Court of New South Wales on 11 March 2011. Both Liascos and Hodges filed applications for extensions of time to comply with the Bankruptcy Notices and to set the notices aside. These applications were initially dealt with by Registrar Ng, who extended the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notices. The applications were later transferred to Judge Lloyd-Jones for further hearing on 27 September 2011. The Court heard evidence from Liascos, Hodges, and Anastasopoulos, and considered affidavits and other documentary evidence. On 30 September 2011, the Court completed the hearing and reserved its judgment, which was delivered on 23 December 2013. The Court found that the Bankruptcy Notices were invalid and set them aside with costs awarded to the applicants.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Bankruptcy Notice served on Hodges was effectively served.
2. Whether the applications for an extension of time to comply with the Bankruptcy Notices should be granted.
3. Whether the Bankruptcy Notices should be set aside.

Held
1. Whether the Bankruptcy Notice served on Hodges was effectively served.
The Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Notice served on Hodges was not effectively served, as there was insufficient evidence to prove that Hodges was personally served with the notice. The Court determined that the notice number was not allocated by the Official Receiver and the evidence presented was insufficient to establish effective service.

2. Whether the applications for an extension of time to comply with the Bankruptcy Notices should be granted.
The Court concluded that the applications for an extension of time to comply with the Bankruptcy Notices should not be granted. The Court found that the applicants were not prosecuting their appeals with due diligence, as they had not complied with the procedural requirements of the Court of Appeal and had not made any efforts to pay money into Court or provide undertakings about the non-dissipation of assets.

3. Whether the Bankruptcy Notices should be set aside.
The Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Notices should be set aside. The Court found that the notices were invalid as they contained misstated amounts owing and incorrect interest calculations. The Court determined that the notices were misleading and could not be amended pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act, making them a nullity and of no effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering whether the Bankruptcy Notices served on Hodges and Liascos were effectively served. Hodges claimed he had not been personally served with the Bankruptcy Notice. The court found that the evidence presented did not establish that Hodges had been personally served with a valid Bankruptcy Notice. The court noted that the Bankruptcy Notice received by Hodges did not have a bankruptcy number allocated by the Official Receiver, indicating it had not been issued. Consequently, the court found that the Bankruptcy Notice served on Hodges was not effectively served, and the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice should be granted.

The court then addressed whether the applications for an extension of time to comply with the Bankruptcy Notices should be granted. The court considered various factors, including the applicants' appeals against the District Court judgment, the lack of a stay application, and the lack of evidence of due diligence in prosecuting the appeals. The court found that neither applicant was prosecuting their appeals with due diligence and that the applications for an extension of time should not be granted.

Lastly, the court considered whether the Bankruptcy Notices should be set aside. The court found that the Bankruptcy Notices were invalid because the amounts owing had been set aside by the Court of Appeal and new judgments had been entered. The court held that the Bankruptcy Notices were misleading as they did not reflect the new amounts owed, and thus, they should be set aside. The court also found that the Bankruptcy Notices were a nullity and of no effect, as they could not be amended without resubmission to the Official Receiver. Consequently, the Bankruptcy Notices BN 3313 of 2011 and BN 3314 of 2011 were set aside with costs awarded to the applicants.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Bankruptcy Notices are invalid and of no effect when the underlying judgment has been set aside and replaced with a new judgment, and the Bankruptcy Notices do not reflect the new amounts owed. Additionally, the court may set aside a Bankruptcy Notice when it is misleading or fails to meet essential requirements under the Bankruptcy Act, and it cannot be amended without resubmission to the Official Receiver.