LG Electronics Inc v Minister for Justice and Customs

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LG Electronics Inc v Minister for Justice and Customs [2005] FCAFC 214

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – investigation by Australian Customs Service following application for dumping duty notice – failure to terminate investigation under s 269TDA(1) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) – whether CEO of Australian Customs Service satisfied that there had been no dumping – consequences of failure to terminate investigation – whether Minister made an error of law in his construction of ‘Australian industry’ – whether Minister failed to consider whether injury to Australian industry caused by dumping or other causes.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 7
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 269T(4), 269TAE, 269TB, 269TC, 269TDAA, 269TDA, 269TEA, 269TG, 269TL, 269ZC(5), 269ZZA
Customs Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2003 (Cth) s 9
Customs Tariff (Anti‑Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) s 8
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Enichem Anic Srl v Anti‑Dumping Authority (1992) 39 FCR 458 referred to
ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Fraser (1992) 34 FCR 564 followed
Inglewood Olive Processors Limited v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2005] FCAFC 101 referred to
LG Electronics Inc v Minister for Justice and Customs [2005] FCA 233 upheld
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 referred to
Pilkington (Australia) Ltd v Minister for Justice and Customs [2002] FCA 770 cited
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 cited

LG ELECTRONICS INC AND LG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 064 531 264) v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE, GRAHAM CRUTTENDEN, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE, GREG WEPPNER, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE

NSD 507 of 2005

WILCOX, BRANSON AND MERKEL JJ
7 OCTOBER 2005
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 507 of 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LG ELECTRONICS INC
FIRST APPELLANT

LG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 064 531 264)
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
FIRST RESPONDENT

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
SECOND RESPONDENT

GRAHAM CRUTTENDEN, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
THIRD RESPONDENT

GREG WEPPNER, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
FOURTH RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WILCOX, BRANSON AND MERKEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 OCTOBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the respondents’ costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 507 of 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LG ELECTRONICS INC
FIRST APPELLANT

LG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 064 531 264)
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
FIRST RESPONDENT

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
SECOND RESPONDENT

GRAHAM CRUTTENDEN, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
THIRD RESPONDENT

GREG WEPPNER, DELEGATE OF…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read LG Electronics Inc v Minister for Justice and Customs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 214
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of LG Electronics Inc v Minister for Justice and Customs, LGE sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister under the Anti-Dumping Act, which declared that the Act applied to fully automatic washing machines exported from Korea to Australia. The primary judge had rejected LGE’s contention that the Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, and LGE appealed this decision.

The appeal raised several key legal issues, primarily concerning whether the CEO was satisfied that LGE had not engaged in dumping, the consequences of any failure to terminate the investigation, the Minister’s interpretation of ‘Australian industry’, and whether the Minister properly considered other factors contributing to the injury to the Australian industry. The primary judge had dismissed these arguments, concluding that the Minister's decision was valid and that procedural fairness had been observed.

The court examined section 269TDA(1) of the Customs Act, which mandates that if the CEO is satisfied there has been no dumping by the exporter, they must terminate the investigation concerning that exporter. The CEO had published a statement indicating no dumping by LGE, but the respondents argued that this did not equate to satisfaction within the meaning of the statute. The court found that the CEO’s failure to terminate the investigation did not invalidate the Minister’s decision, as section 269TDA(1) is not self-executing. Moreover, the court held that the Minister’s interpretation of ‘Australian industry’ was not erroneous and that the Minister had adequately considered other potential causes of injury.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and LGE was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondents’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before the learned primary judge LGE sought judicial review of a decision (‘the Decision’) of the Minister to declare that s 8 of the Customs Tariff (Anti‑Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Anti‑Dumping Act’) applies to fully automatic washing machines (not exceeding 12 kg capacity) (‘the Goods’) exported to Australia from the Republic of Korea (‘Korea’). LGE sought review of the Decision only to the extent that the Decision applies to the Goods exported by the first appellant.background The Australian Customs Service has published a flowchart of the process whereby a declaration that s 8 of the Anti‑Dumping Act applies to certain goods may be made by the Minister. The flowchart is in the following form: The legislative scheme reflected in the above flowchart is described in Inglewood Olive Processors Limited v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2005] FCAFC 101 at [7]‑[17]. We adopt that description. It need not be set out again here. In the present case the application under s 269TB of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) (‘the Act’) that initiated the process represented in the flowchart was made on 25 June 2002 by Fisher & Paykel Australia Holdings Limited (‘F & PAH’). The application requested the Minister to publish a dumping duty notice in respect of the Goods. A screening report dated 9 July 2002 was prepared by the Australian Customs Service (‘Customs’) pursuant to s 269TC of the Act. The report discussed the structure of the Fisher & Paykel group of companies. It noted that Fisher & Paykel Manufacturing Pty Limited (‘F & PM’), a wholly owned subsidiary of F & PAH, produces ‘like goods’ within the meaning of s 269TB of the Act although F & PAH itself does not. The report stated:‘For injury purposes the applicant has presented data from F & PA [Fisher & Paykel Australia Pty Limited] and F & PM in an amalgamated form. Discussions with our policy area advised that it is reasonable, for the purposes of assessing injury, to view the Fisher & Paykel group of companies in Australia (F & P) as a single corporate entity. I agree with this approach. It would be impractical to assess injury to F & PM only and to do so would be to disadvantage the applicant on the basis of its corporate structure.’ The author of the screening report concluded that the application met the requirements of s 269TC of the Act. He or she recommended that the CEO give public notice of the initiation of an investigation as required by s 269TC(4). The CEO gave that notice on 12 July 2002. During the course of the investigation a ‘Preliminary Normal Value Report’ was published concerning LGE. The authors of this document reported that:‘We found that overall the [goods under consideration] were not exported to Australia by LGE at dumped prices.’ The statement of essential facts (‘SEF’) required by s 269TDAA of the Act was published on 17 December 2002. It recorded a finding that LGE had not exported the Goods to Australia at dumped prices. It noted the requirement of s 269TDA(1) of the Act and stated:‘The results of Customs’ investigation, as set out above, show that the provisions of s 269TDA(1) have been satisfied for LGE. Therefore, subject to the Minister’s determination in respect of dumping, Customs will recommend termination of the investigation in respect of LGE.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX, BRANSON AND MERKEL JJ
On 5 October 2004 the proceeding giving rise to this appeal was commenced.decision of the primary judge The primary judge rejected the contention that the Decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the CEO failed to terminate the investigation so far as it related to LGE as required by s 269TDA(1) of the Act. His Honour noted that s 269TDA(1) was not self executing and that had the CEO decided that the occasion for its operation had arisen he would have been required to issue a notice informing F & PAH of its right to have the Decision reviewed. His Honour concluded that the investigation in so far as it related to LGE was never terminated under s 269TDA(1). His Honour also rejected the contention that the Minister did not take into account the considerations required by s 269TAE(2A) of the Act. Section 269TAE(2A) required the Minister to consider whether injury to the Australian industry was being caused by factors other than the exportation of the Goods. His Honour noted that assessment of material injury is a practical exercise and there was no need for the Minister to address theoretical factors not suggested to have any application to the circumstances of the case. The primary judge was satisfied that the decision was not invalidated by any failure properly to identify the ‘Australian industry in respect of like goods’. He rejected the contention that Report No 83 wrongly directed attention to whether the Fisher & Paykel group of companies in Australia had suffered material injury. Finally, his Honour concluded that LGE had not been denied procedural fairness but rather that the relevant requirements of the Act had been scrupulously observed.issues on appeal On this appeal the following issues were argued:(a)whether the CEO was satisfied at any relevant time that LGE had not dumped any of the Goods;(b)if the CEO was so satisfied, what consequences flow from his failure to terminate the investigation so far as it related to LGE;(c)whether the Minister made an error in law in his construction of ‘Australian industry’ by relying on findings made by Customs that F & PAH or alternatively the Fisher & Paykel group of companies in Australia suffered material injury; and (d)whether the Minister failed to consider, as required by s 269TG(2) and s 269TAE(2A) of the Act, whether the dumping of Goods by LGE caused the loss of market share found to have been suffered by the Australian industry producing like goods and whether there were other causes.considerationIssues (a) and (b) – Section 269TDA(1) Section 269TDA(1) relevantly provides:‘If:(a) application is made for a dumping duty notice; and(b)in an investigation, for the purposes of the application, of an exporter to Australia of goods the subject of the application, the CEO is satisfied that:(i)there has been no dumping by the exporter of any of those goods; …the CEO must terminate the investigation so far as it relates to the exporter.’ The SEF published by the CEO pursuant to s 269TDAA on 17 December 2002 includes a statement that the dumping margin for LGE product for the investigation period was in the range 0% to -10%; ie that there had been no dumping by LGE of any Goods. The same statement appears in Report No 63 which was published on 31 January 2003.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX, BRANSON AND MERKEL JJ

On this appeal the following issues were argued:(a)whether the CEO was satisfied at any relevant time that LGE had not dumped any of the Goods;(b)if the CEO was so satisfied, what consequences flow from his failure to terminate the investigation so far as it related to LGE;(c)whether the Minister made an error in law in his construction of ‘Australian industry’ by relying on findings made by Customs that F & PAH or alternatively the Fisher & Paykel group of companies in Australia suffered material injury; and (d)whether the Minister failed to consider, as required by s 269TG(2) and s 269TAE(2A) of the Act, whether the dumping of Goods by LGE caused the loss of market share found to have been suffered by the Australian industry producing like goods and whether there were other causes.considerationIssues (a) and (b) – Section 269TDA(1) Section 269TDA(1) relevantly provides:‘If:(a) application is made for a dumping duty notice; and(b)in an investigation, for the purposes of the application, of an exporter to Australia of goods the subject of the application, the CEO is satisfied that:(i)there has been no dumping by the exporter of any of those goods; …the CEO must terminate the investigation so far as it relates to the exporter.’ The SEF published by the CEO pursuant to s 269TDAA on 17 December 2002 includes a statement that the dumping margin for LGE product for the investigation period was in the range 0% to -10%; ie that there had been no dumping by LGE of any Goods. The same statement appears in Report No 63 which was published on 31 January 2003. LGE submitted that the only reason that the CEO did not, on or about 17 December 2002, terminate the investigation so far as it related to LGE was his erroneous view that he could not do so ahead of the Minister making a determination in respect of dumping. In Pilkington (Australia) Ltd v Minister for Justice and Customs [2002] FCA 770, which was published on 18 June 2002, Moore J at [13] had stated that it was not clear why the CEO apparently regarded a ministerial determination that goods had not been dumped as a precondition of the power vested in the CEO by s 269TDA(1). It is now accepted by the CEO that a ministerial determination is not necessary before the CEO may terminate an investigation in reliance on s 269TDA(1). The respondents’ submissions drew a distinction between a ‘view’ formed by the CEO on material then available to him that dumping by a particular exporter had not occurred and ‘satisfaction’ that there had been no dumping by the exporter within the meaning of s 269TDA(1). The respondents argued that the SEF was published, as required by s 269TDAA, for the purpose of eliciting submissions (see s 269TEA(3)(a)(iv)). They submitted that, for this reason, views expressed in a SEF are necessarily preliminary. The respondents also placed weight on later requests made to LGE for further information relevant to a determination of whether or not LGE had engaged in dumping as indicating that the CEO was not in fact satisfied that LGE had not engaged in dumping.