Lesnewski v Mosman Municipal Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:    Lesnewski v Mosman Municipal Council [2005]  NSWCA 99

FILE NUMBER(S):
40309/04

HEARING DATE(S):             3 March 2005

JUDGMENT DATE:               06/04/2005

PARTIES:
Helen Lesnewski
Mosman Municipal Council
Robert J Wright and Carol Wright

JUDGMENT OF:      Hodgson JA Ipp JA Tobias JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:             Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):        L&E 85/02

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:   Pain J

COUNSEL:
A: J Webster SC / S Beverling
1R: P Tomasetti
2R: J E Robson SC

SOLICITORS:
A: Hunt & Hunt, Solicitors
1R: Pike Pike & Fenwick, Sydney
2R: Freehills, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Judicial review - Privative clauses - Allegation of denial of procedural fairness - Whether s 101 of Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 is a bar to challenge to validity of development consent on ground of denial of procedural fairness - Operation of the threefold Hickman principle - Breach of "imperative duty" or "inviolable restraint" - Whether procedural fairness is an "inviolable limitation or restraint".
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Judicial review - Jurisdictional facts - Validity of construction certificate - Requirement that there to be no inconsistency between construction certificate plans and development consent plans - Whether question of inconsistency was a jurisdictional fact.
COSTS - Whether costs orders in Court below should be disturbed - Costs where both sides partially successful on appeal.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000

DECISION:
(1) Appeal allowed in part
(2) Orders made by Pain J on 2 August 2004 with respect to the costs of the proceedings at first instance be set aside
(3) Declare that s 101 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 does not prevent the Land and Environment Court from determining whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness as alleged by her in her Amended Points of Claim dated 2 October 2002
(4) Order that the issue of whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness and, if so, what relief (if any) should be granted as a consequence thereof be remitted to the Land and Environment Court for determination
(5) Order that the costs of the proceedings to date before Pain J be determined by the Land and Environment Court at the conclusion of the remitter proceedings
(6) Order that the appellant pay the respondents' costs with respect to those grounds of appeal which were abandoned at the hearing of the appeal but that otherwise each party pay her, their or its own costs of the appeal

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40309/04
L&E 0085/02

HODGSON JA
IPP JA
TOBIAS JA

Wednesday 6 April 2005

HELEN LESNEWSKI v MOSMAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL & ORS

Judgment

  1. HODGSON JA:  I agree with Tobias JA.

  2. IPP JA:  I agree with Tobias JA.

  3. TOBIAS JA:  Mrs Helen Lesnewski (the appellant) is the owner of 1 Hopetoun Avenue, Mosman (No.1).  Her neighbours at 3 Hopetoun Avenue (No.3) are Mr Robert and Mrs Carol Wright (the second…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a challenge to the validity of a development consent granted by Mosman Municipal Council. The appellant, Ms Lesnewski, alleged she was denied procedural fairness by the Council's failure to provide her with reduced plans when notifying her of a development application lodged by the second respondents for works on an adjoining property. The primary judge had dismissed most of the appellant's challenges, including her claim of denial of procedural fairness, finding that section 101 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (EPA Act) barred such a challenge. The appellant appealed this decision to the New South Wales Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine two primary legal issues. First, whether section 101 of the EPA Act, a privative clause, prevented the Land and Environment Court from considering the appellant's allegation that she was denied procedural fairness. Second, the court considered whether the validity of the construction certificate, which was alleged to be inconsistent with the development consent, involved a jurisdictional fact.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It held that section 101 of the EPA Act did not preclude the Land and Environment Court from determining whether the appellant had been denied procedural fairness. The court applied the threefold *Hickman* principle, which dictates that a privative clause only protects decisions that are a bona fide attempt to exercise the power conferred, relate to the subject matter of the legislation, and are reasonably capable of reference to that power. The Court found that a denial of procedural fairness could mean a decision does not conform to these principles, and thus is not protected by the privative clause. The court remitted the issue of procedural fairness and any consequential relief to the Land and Environment Court for determination. The court also set aside the costs orders made at first instance and ordered that the costs of the proceedings at first instance be determined by the Land and Environment Court at the conclusion of the remitted proceedings. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs for abandoned grounds of appeal, with each party bearing their own costs for the remainder of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed in part

(2) Orders made by Pain J on 2 August 2004 with respect to the costs of the proceedings at first instance be set aside

(3) Declare that s 101 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 does not prevent the Land and Environment Court from determining whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness as alleged by her in her Amended Points of Claim dated 2 October 2002

(4) Order that the issue of whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness and, if so, what relief (if any) should be granted as a consequence thereof be remitted to the Land and Environment Court for determination

(5) Order that the costs of the proceedings to date before Pain J be determined by the Land and Environment Court at the conclusion of the remitter proceedings

(6) Order that the appellant pay the respondents' costs with respect to those grounds of appeal which were abandoned at the hearing of the appeal but that otherwise each party pay her, their or its own costs of the appeal

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings were heard by Pain J who, on 29 March 2004, made a declaration that the second respondents had carried out certain relatively minor works without consent as required by the EPA Act but, to all intents and purposes, otherwise dismissed the appellant's various challenges to the validity of the consent. Further, in her discretion her Honour declined to grant the appellant any relief with regard to those works which she found to have been carried out without consent. The success of the second respondents in the proceedings was reflected in the orders for costs made by her Honour on 2 August 2004 in their favour. It is against her Honour's various decisions that the appellant appeals to this Court.The relevant facts Each of No.1 and No.3 is in the shape of a parallelogram. Frontage to Hopetoun Avenue runs in a southwest-northeast direction. As a consequence, the dwelling house on No.3 is located or staggered somewhat towards the rear of the dwelling house on No.1. The relationship between the improvements (as currently constructed) on each property is illustrated below: The major aspect of each dwelling house is to the north across Hopetoun Avenue with the consequence that the main living areas of each dwelling have a northerly aspect. However, a bone of contention between the parties arises out of the fact that the kitchen of No.1 directly faces the side boundary of No.3 and, in particular, the swimming pool constructed on that property pursuant to the consent. On or about 15 May 2000 the second respondents lodged with the Council a development application seeking consent to certain additions and alterations to the existing dwelling on No.3 (the application). Those additions and alterations included the construction on the upper level of two balconies, one on the eastern side and one on the western side of the building. It further included the construction of a new swimming pool and surrounds to be located adjoining the western boundary of No.1 and extending from the rear of the dwelling house on No.1 in a northerly direction for approximately one half of the length of that residence. In August 1999 the Council had prepared and adopted a development control plan pursuant to s 72 of the EPA Act. It was entitled "Notifications Development Control Plan" (the Notifications DCP). Relevantly for present purposes, it provided for the notification to neighbours of certain details of development applications lodged with the Council (the requirements) and, in addition, provided for those so notified to receive a reduced (A4) copy of those plans forming part of the application which included the footprint of the proposed development, elevations and the location of windows and the like. On or about 18 May 2000 the appellant received from the Council a notice with respect to the application containing the requirements. However, she alleged that a set of reduced plans did not accompany the letter. However, it does not appear to be disputed that the letter (as required) did advise that a full set of plans could be inspected at the Council Chambers and that submissions could be made within a period of 14 days from the date of notification.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the present case, the three month period referred to in s 101 expired on 6 December 2000 whereas the proceedings were not instituted until 6 May 2002. The findings of the primary judge in her judgment of 9 April 2003 (the first judgment) In her judgment on the preliminary issue the primary judge noted that there were three grounds upon which it was asserted that the consent and the construction certificate were null and void. The first was an alleged failure by the Council to accord natural justice to the appellant because of its failure to include with its letter of notification of 18 May 2000 a reduced (A4) copy of the notification plans referred to in the Notifications DCP (the natural justice ground). The second alleged that the Council's general manager who purportedly granted the consent under delegated authority did not in the relevant circumstances have authority to do so under the terms of the delegation (the lack of jurisdiction ground). Thirdly, it was asserted that the construction certificate was invalidly issued by the Council in breach of Regulation 145(1)(a) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 in that the design and construction of the building as depicted in the plans and specifications accompanying the application for the construction certificate were inconsistent with the plans the subject of the consent (the construction certificate ground). With respect to lack of jurisdiction ground, the primary judge found that, on the authority of the decision of this Court in Sericott Pty Limited v Snowy River Council (1999) 108 LGERA 66, s 101 of the EPA Act barred the appellant's challenge to the power of the general manager to grant the consent. Although a challenge to this finding was included in her amended notice of appeal (and the appellant's written submissions sought faintly to support this ground), at the commencement of the hearing she abandoned this ground upon the basis that this Court had established by its decision in Woolworths Limited v Pallas Newco Pty Limited [2004] NSWCA 422 that s 101 of the EPA Act protected decisions of a council under that Act from jurisdictional error. Of course the decision in that case was not available at the time of the hearing before the primary judge. As to the natural justice ground, her Honour noted that the appellant relied in the main on the dissenting judgment of Spigelman CJ in Vanmeld Pty Limited v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 at 111 [159], 112 [167] and [174] as support for the proposition that a challenge to a development consent based on a denial of procedural fairness was, by operation of what is known as the threefold Hickman principle (R v Hickman; Ex parteFox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615 per Dixon J). not barred by s 101. On the other hand, the respondents submitted that the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in Vanmeld was not binding on her Honour and should not be followed. The threefold Hickman principle was enunciated by Dixon J as requiring a privative clause such as s 101 to be construed as only protecting from challenge a decision that, firstly, is a bona fide attempt by the decision maker to exercise its power, secondly, relates to the subject matter of the legislation and, thirdly, is reasonably capable of reference to the power. The provision does not protect a decision that does not conform to one or more of those conditions or, as they are now referred to, principles. In Vanmeld the Chief Justice considered that the decision in question which was made in breach of the obligation to afford procedural fairness was one which did not conform with the third and possibly the first Hickman principle and therefore was not protected by s 35 of the EPA Act: see at 111 [161].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established