FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Lees v Asaleo Personal Care Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 264
ORDERS
MLG 2194 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: STUART LEES
ApplicantAND: ASALEO PERSONAL CARE PTY LTD (ACN 005 442 375)
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE RILEY
DATE OF ORDER:
13 APRIL 2022
THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:
1.Pursuant to ss.545(1) and (2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (“the Act”), the respondent pay to the applicant compensation in the amount of $22,552.80 for economic loss in respect of his dismissal on 11 March 2020 in contravention of s.340(1) of the Act.
2.Pursuant to ss.545(1) and (2)(b) of the Act, the respondent pay to the applicant $2,002.44 for interest on the amount of compensation specified in order 1.
THE…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 264
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered several factors to determine the appropriate penalty, including the degree of culpability of the respondent, the presence or absence of contrition, and the need for deterrence. The court found that senior management was integrally involved in the contraventions, and that the respondent showed no contrition, having vigorously defended the proceedings and made no admissions or apologies. The court also noted that the need to ensure compliance with minimum standards did not arise in this case. However, the court emphasised the importance of specific and general deterrence in imposing a penalty. The High Court has previously held that the principal object of a pecuniary penalty is deterrence.
Based on the above considerations, the court imposed a penalty of $1,000,000 on the respondent. The court found that the penalty needed to be significant to achieve the objectives of specific and general deterrence. The penalty was also intended to reflect the seriousness of the contraventions and the lack of contrition shown by the respondent. The court emphasised that the penalty was not intended to be punitive, but rather to promote compliance with workplace laws and deter future contraventions.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Senior management was integrally involved in the contraventions.i. contrition, corrective action and co-operation with the authorities The respondent has shown no contrition. The respondent vigorously defended the proceedings through a two day trial. The respondent made no admissions, has taken no corrective action and has not apologised.j. the need to ensure compliance with minimum standards This issue does not arise.k. the need for specific and general deterrence In Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482; (2015) 326 ALR 476; (2015) 90 ALJR 113; (2015) 255 IR 87; [2015] HCA 46, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ said at [55]:No less importantly, whereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance: “Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]. ... The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act.”(footnotes omitted) Similarly, in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) (2018) 262 CLR 157; (2018) 351 ALR 190; (2018) 92 ALJR 219; (2018) 273 IR 211; [2018] HCA 3, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said at [116]: As has been observed, the principal object of an order that a person pay a pecuniary penalty under s 546 is deterrence: specific deterrence of the contravener and, by his or her example, general deterrence of other would-be contraveners. According to orthodox sentencing conceptions as they apply to the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties, specific deterrence inheres in the sting or burden which the penalty imposes on the contravener. Other things being equal, it is assumed that the greater the sting or burden of the penalty, the more likely it will be that the contravener will seek to avoid the risk of subjection to further penalties and thus the more likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions; likewise, the more potent will be the example that the penalty sets for other would-be contraveners and therefore the greater the penalty's general deterrent effect. Conversely, the less the sting or burden that a penalty imposes on a contravener, the less likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions and the less the general deterrent effect of the penalty. Ultimately, if a penalty is devoid of sting or burden, it may not have much, if any, specific or general deterrent effect, and so it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, to achieve the specific and general deterrent effects that are the raison d'être of its imposition.(footnotes omitted)