Lee-Anne Oxley as trustee for Storm Oxley, James Oxley, Kiara Oxley and Mia Oxley v Edco Contracting Group Pty Ltd

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:	Lee-Anne Oxley as trustee for Storm Oxley, James Oxley, Kiara Oxley and Mia Oxley v EDCO Contracting Group Pty Ltd and Ors [2015] NSWWCCPD 61
APPELLANT:	Lee-Anne Oxley as trustee for Storm Lee Oxley, James Eric Oxley, Kiara Oxley and Mia Joanna Oxley
FIRST RESPONDENT:	EDCO Contracting Group Pty Ltd
SECOND RESPONDENT:	Shirley Oxley
THIRD RESPONDENT:	Thea Phoebe Kate Neville (in her personal capacity and as legal personal representative of Lilliana Neville and Zanda Neville)
INSURER:	QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited
FILE NUMBER:	A1-6438/14
ARBITRATOR:	Mr B Batchelor
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:	2 June 2015
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	15 October 2015
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION:	Section 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim by and on behalf of dependants of deceased worker; s 4 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; whether claimants dependent upon the deceased; whether deceased and a claimant were in a de facto relationship; s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987; whether child, on behalf of whom a claim is brought, was one to whom the deceased stood in place of a parent; apportionment of lump sum compensation payable to dependants upon death of a worker
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Kevin O'Grady
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:	Derham Houston
First Respondent:	Kaden Boriss
Second Respondent:	Slater & Gordon
Third Respondent:	Penny Waters Armstrong Legal
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	The Arbitrator’s findings and orders found in Certificate of Determination dated 2 June 2015 are confirmed.

BACKGROUND

The late Scott James Oxley died on 17 April 2013 as a result of injuries received by him in a motor vehicle accident which arose out of or in the course of his employment with Edco Contracting Group Pty Ltd (the first respondent). Following the death of Mr Oxley, a number of parties made claims against the first respondent in respect of lump sum payment and weekly payments pursuant to s 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). A claim was made by Lee-Anne Oxley, the former wife of the late Mr Oxley, on behalf of the four children of her marriage to Mr Oxley, they being Storm Lee Oxley, born x xx 2000, James Eric Oxley, born x xx 2002, Kiara Oxley, born x xx 2007 and Mia Joanna Oxley, born x xx 2008. Ms Lee-Anne Oxley, who has remarried since her divorce from the deceased, has made no claim for benefits on her own behalf. It may be seen that each of the children, for whom Ms Oxley acts as trustee, have yet to attain their majority.
A claim was also made against the first respondent by Mrs Shirley Oxley, the mother of the deceased. Shirley Oxley was, at the date of the deceased’s death, a widow and alleged that she was partially dependent upon the deceased for support.
A claim was also made by Ms Thea Neville. Such claim was brought on behalf of Ms Thea Neville herself, and her children, Lilliana Neville, born x xx 2011 and Zanda Neville, born x xx 2013. Ms Thea Neville alleged that, at relevant times, she was in a de facto relationship with the deceased and dependent upon him; that her daughter Lilliana Neville, a minor, was a person to whom the deceased stood in the place of a parent and who was dependent upon him and, further, that her son Zanda Neville, the natural child of the deceased, was dependent upon him as at the date of death. Thea Neville appears in these proceedings as legal personal representative of her children.
The parties are often referred to in evidence before the Commission by their first names and it is intended, for ease of reading, and without disrespect to any of them, to use those first names in the course of these reasons.
The first respondent accepts that it is liable to pay compensation to those entitled following the deceased’s death. Weekly payments of compensation in respect of the deceased’s five children, Storm, James, Kiara, Mia and Zanda have been made by consent to date.
The first respondent acknowledges that a lump sum, being $498,950, is payable to those dependent upon the deceased as at the date of his death. A dispute arose as to the alleged dependency of Shirley and that of Thea and her child Lilliana. In the circumstances, the first respondent submitted that it was a matter for the Commission to determine the questions as to dependency and, if relevant, apportionment of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25 of the 1987 Act.

THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARBITRATOR

These proceedings were commenced in December 2014 by Lee-Anne. The original Application has been the subject of a number of amendments directed by the Commission concerning the joinder of parties. At first the Application cited Lee-Anne as applicant and the four children of her former marriage to the deceased were joined as respondents. Subsequently Lee-Anne appeared as trustee acting on behalf of those children. Given the allegation of dependency made by Shirley, Thea, Lilliana and Zanda, those parties were also joined in the proceedings.
The matter came before Arbitrator Brett Batchelor for conciliation and arbitration on 5 May 2015. At the hearing before the Arbitrator, Lee-Anne and her children were represented by Mr Gaitanis of counsel. Shirley was represented by Mr Hunt of counsel, and Thea, Lilliana and Zanda were represented by Mr Hickey of counsel.
The matter proceeded to hearing on that day and following submissions, both written and oral, the Arbitrator reserved his decision. On 2 June 2015, a Certificate of Determination was issued by the Commission which was accompanied by a Statement of the Arbitrator’s Reasons. The following findings and orders are found in that Certificate of Determination:
“The Commission determines:

Findings
1.       The deceased, Scott James Oxley, died on 17 April 2013 as a result of injuries sustained in an accident which arose out of or in the course of his employment with the first respondent.
2.       At the time of death of the deceased, his former wife, the applicant Lee-Anne Oxley, was not wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased.
3.       At the time of death of the deceased, the children of the applicant and the deceased, namely:
(a)the second respondent, Storm Lee Oxley, born [x xx] 2000;
(b)the third respondent, James Eric Oxley, born [x xx] 2002;
(c)the fourth respondent, Kiara Oxley, born [x xx] 2007;
(d)the fifth respondent, Mia Joanna Oxley, born [x xx] 2008,

were wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased.
4.       At the time of death of the deceased, his mother, the sixth respondent, Shirley Oxley, was wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased.
5.       At the time of death of the deceased, the seventh respondent, Thea Neville, was the de-facto partner of the deceased and wholly or partly dependent for support on him.
6.       At the time of death of the deceased, the eighth respondent, Lilliana Neville, was a child of the deceased being a person to whom the deceased stood in the place of a parent, and was wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased.
7.       At the time of death of the deceased, the ninth respondent, Zanda Neville, being a child of the seventh respondent and the deceased, was wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased.
8.       No other persons were dependent for support on the deceased at the time of his death.
9. The lump sum death benefit payable pursuant to section 25 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, in respect of the death of the deceased, is $498,950.
Orders
10. The lump sum death benefit of $498,950 is to be apportioned in accordance with section 29 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 as follows:
(a)Storm Lee Oxley                   $21,705
(b)James Eric Oxley                  $28,690
(c)Kiara Oxley   $42,910
(d)Mia Joanna Oxley                 $46,402
(e)Shirley Oxley   $4,989
(f)Thea Neville   $189,600
(g)Lilliana Neville   $84,822
(h)Zanda Neville   $79,832
Total   $498,950

11. The first respondent’s insurer, QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited, is to pay to the seventh respondent the following amounts in respect of the eighth respondent, Lilliana Neville pursuant to section 25(1)(b)(i) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987:
(a)$126.80 per week from 17 April 2013 to 30 September 2013.
(b)$128.20 per week from 1 October 2013 to 31 March 2014.
(c)$129.80 per week from 1 April 2014 to 30 September 2014.
(d)$131.50 per week from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015.
(e)$133.10 per week from 1 April 2015 to date and continuing.

12. The amounts apportioned to:
(a)the second respondent, Storm Lee Oxley;
(b)the third respondent, James Eric Oxley;
(c)the fourth respondent, Kiara Oxley;
(d)the fifth respondent, Mia Joanna Oxley;
(e)the eighth respondent, Lilliana Neville, and
(f)the ninth respondent, Zanda Neville,

are to be paid to the NSW Trustee and Guardian for the benefit of those persons in accordance with section 85 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.
13. The amounts apportioned to the sixth respondent, Shirley Oxley and seventh respondent, Thea Neville, are to be paid to those persons.

A brief statement is attached to this determination setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.”

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The grounds of appeal challenge the following findings of the Arbitrator:
(a)     that Thea was at relevant times in a de facto relationship with the deceased;
(b)     that Thea was either wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased, and
(c)     that Lilliana was a person to whom the deceased stood in the place of a parent and was wholly or partly dependent upon the deceased.
The Arbitrator’s decision as to the manner of apportionment of the lump sum payable pursuant to s 25 of the 1987 Act is also the subject of challenge.

ON THE PAPERS

Section 354(6) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) provides:
“(6) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Nos 1 and 6; the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’ without holding any conference or formal hearing and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

THRESHOLD MATTERS

There is no dispute between the parties that the threshold requirements as to quantum and time as found in the provisions of ss 352(3) and 352(4) of the 1998 Act have been met.

FRESH EVIDENCE

An application is made by Lee-Anne seeking the Commission’s leave to tender fresh or additional evidence on this appeal. The admission of such evidence is governed by the provisions of s 352(6) of the 1998 Act, which provide:
“(6) Evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to the decision appealed against may not be given on an appeal to the Commission except with the leave of the Commission. The Commission is not to grant leave unless satisfied that the evidence concerned was not available to the party, and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party, before the proceedings concerned or that failure to grant leave would cause substantial injustice in the case.”
The additional evidence which Lee-Anne seeks leave to adduce is a handwritten document, which is undated, and which appears to be signed by Shirley. That handwriting appears on six separate A4 pages. I note that the first five pages are numbered however a sixth sheet, which appears to have been written by the signatory, Shirley, contains the following wordage:
“I agree that the money should be devided [sic] evenly between the children but not Thea”.
Submissions in support of the admission of this material assert that a substantial injustice would occur if it was excluded. Given the apparent significance which Lee-Anne attaches to this additional evidence, it is surprising that steps were not taken to ensure that the form of the document was not in any way confusing, that it was dated, and that extraneous material did not appear on the face of the document.
The admission of this additional evidence is opposed by Thea. Submissions filed on behalf of Shirley make no reference to Lee-Anne’s application concerning the additional evidence.
Submissions put on behalf of Lee-Anne in support of the admission of Shirley’s undated statement make no reference to the terms of s 352(6). It is of importance to note that Shirley, a party to the proceedings, had provided evidence before the Arbitrator as found in her two statements, the first dated 24 February 2015 and the second dated 23 April 2015. It is also important to note that, as raised in submissions put on behalf of Thea, Shirley was present at the Commission when the matter was conducted before the Arbitrator. It is clear that the handwritten document ostensibly signed by Shirley does not constitute “fresh evidence” but, rather, may be described as “additional evidence”. It is clear that, had Lee-Anne wished to adduce additional evidence at the hearing before the Arbitrator, an application could have been made on that day seeking leave to adduce such evidence. No application was made.
The question arises as to whether, in terms of the sub-section, failure to grant leave would cause substantial injustice. The proper exercise of the Commission’s discretion to grant leave under s 352(6) was considered by Sackville AJA (Ward JA agreeing) in Northern NSW Local Health Network v Heggie [2013] NSWCA 255; 12 DDCR 95 (at [66]) where his Honour stated:
“Section 352(6) permits the Commission to grant leave to adduce fresh or additional evidence if satisfied of the conditions specified in the sub-section. Having regard to the limited nature of the appeal under s 352(5), the basic purpose of the power in s 352(6) is to allow the Commission to admit further additional evidence which, if accepted, would be likely to demonstrate that the decision appealed against was erroneous: CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; 197 CLR 172, at [109], per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ.”
It is argued, in support of the admission of Shirley’s latest statement, that “it is crucial to the determination of this matter that the status and circumstances of [Thea] be clearly established. It was not on the evidence, and if leave is not granted a substantial injustice will occur because a very significant proportion of the available funds will not go [sic, go to] the beneficiaries that the legislation provides for” (at 2.5 of submissions).
It is apparent that the argument as advanced concerns the issue as to whether Thea was relevantly in a de facto relationship with the deceased. It is put in submissions that “the issue of a de facto relationship did not arise until the day before the hearing 4 May 2015”.
In submissions, Thea disputes that the question as to the existence of a de facto relationship did not arise until 4 May 2015. At [3] of submissions opposing this appeal presented on behalf of Thea, the history of the conduct of proceedings is summarised. It is of significance, in my opinion that, as submitted, the facts upon which Thea relied concerning the relationship between herself and the deceased were to be found in her statement which had been attached to her Reply filed with the Commission before the hearing before the Arbitrator. It is relevant to note that written submissions furnished on behalf of Lee-Anne before the Arbitrator prepared by Ms Houston, solicitor, expressly dispute that Thea was relevantly dependent upon the deceased (at [15] of written submissions). Those submissions are dated 4 May 2015 and were relied upon by counsel in the course of argument before the Arbitrator.
The documents on the Commission file include a copy of an email sent by Thea’s solicitors to the Registrar with copies forwarded, as noted on the email, to the solicitors acting on behalf of all interested parties, including Lee-Anne’s solicitor. That email, received on 6 March 2015, included a copy of Thea’s Reply. That Reply is date-stamped by the Registry as being received on 6 March 2015. On this application seeking leave to adduce additional evidence I find that, on the probabilities, Lee-Anne’s solicitors had possession of Thea’s statement concerning, inter alia, her relationship with and dependency upon the deceased as at 6 March 2015.
As noted in submissions put on behalf of Thea, the terms of s 352(6), in particular the reference to “substantial injustice”, was considered by Barrett JA (with whom Macfarlan JA agreed) in CHEP Australia Ltd v Strickland [2013] NSWCA 351; 12 DDCR 501 at [31] where his Honour stated:
“The part of s 352(6) concerning ‘substantial injustice’ does not direct attention to possibilities or potential outcomes. The task is to decide whether absence of the evidence ‘would cause’ substantial injustice in the case. There must therefore be a decision as to the result that ‘would’ emerge if the evidence were taken into account and the result that ‘would’ emerge if it were not. If the result would be the same on each hypothesis, the ends of justice cannot be said to have been defeated by exclusion.”
It is necessary to address the content of Shirley’s undated statement to determine whether failure to grant leave would give rise to a substantial injustice as has been expounded in the Court of Appeal’s decisions noted at [20] and [25] above.
Whilst it is not in dispute that the deceased resided with Shirley at the time of his death, a degree of confusion arose from Shirley’s earlier evidence in relation to, as stated by the Arbitrator, “the precise period(s) during which the deceased resided with [Shirley] up until the time of his death”. That confusion is not, in any significant way, resolved by those matters stated in the document which is the subject of this application. That fact is demonstrated by the assertions of Shirley that the deceased was not living with Thea “at the time of Zanda being conceived” and that the deceased, whilst living with her at Umina, travelled to the Armidale district to collect his belongings “after Thea’s mother ordered him out of her house”. The relevant chronology cannot be confidently determined upon that evidence.
The confusion which arose on the evidence concerning the period during which the deceased had been residing at Umina had been resolved by the Arbitrator given his acceptance of the evidence given by Thea that in early 2012 she, the deceased and Lilliana resided for some time in rental premises on the Central Coast, at Horsfield Bay, until May or June 2012 when they moved to Armidale. The Arbitrator further found that on Boxing Day of 2012, the deceased returned to work on the Central Coast and then resided with his mother at Umina.
Whilst Shirley’s statement contains some detail concerning the likely movements of the deceased and summaries of telephone conversations overheard by her, I am not satisfied that the matters raised would in any significant manner cause doubt as to the Arbitrator’s factual conclusions concerning the deceased’s places of residence from time to time prior to his death. It must also be kept in mind on this application that, as discussed below, the fact that a couple do not at times reside together at the one address is not necessarily fatal to proof of the existence of a de facto relationship between the parties.

There is another aspect of Shirley’s later statement which suggests that its persuasive or probative value is limited. That is that at page four of the statement an assertion is made that, at the time of his death, the deceased was “seeing a lady at xx xxxx Road”. That statement by Shirley appears to conflict with her earlier statement made on 23 April 2015 that the deceased was not, at the time of his death, “dating anybody seriously”. That apparent conflict tends, in my view, to militate against the admission of the document.
The application seeking leave to adduce additional evidence must in my view be refused. There has been a failure to establish that the evidence in question was not available and could not reasonably have been obtained before the proceedings concerned, nor has it been established that failure to grant leave would cause substantial injustice as discussed earlier in these reasons.

THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

The documentary evidence which was before the Arbitrator was noted by him at [14] of his Reasons. It is clear that a slip has occurred and that documents attached to an Application to Admit Late Documents filed on 4 May 2015 on behalf of Lee-Anne had been omitted from the list of documents there noted. That Application had attached to it a detailed statement made by Lee-Anne dated 24 February 2015. It is apparent from the Arbitrator’s Reasons that the evidence found in that statement has been taken into account by him when reaching his determination.
The evidence established that Lee-Anne and the deceased were married on 29 November 2003. It is apparent that Lee-Anne and the deceased had a pre-existing relationship having regard to the date of birth of each of the first two children of the marriage. A divorce order was made in accordance with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) on 31 May 2011, which made provision for divorce between Lee-Anne and the deceased, terminating the marriage on 1 July 2011.
It was also established upon the evidence and accepted by the Arbitrator that Thea and the deceased first met in late 2007. That finding is not the subject of challenge on this appeal. It was accepted by the Arbitrator that a relationship between Thea and the deceased commenced soon after their meeting. That relationship, as stated by Thea in evidence, was “not without difficulties” and there was a separation for a period of 18 months between early 2010 and approximately September 2011. It was during that period that Thea established a casual relationship with Graham Michell. Thea fell pregnant during that relationship and Lilliana was born on x xx 2011.
It was accepted by the Arbitrator that the relationship between Thea and Mr Michell was violent and difficult and that there was at no time a domestic relationship between the two. Serious breaches by Mr Michell of apprehended violence orders had resulted in his incarceration for two periods of six months. Since the birth of Lilliana, Mr Michell, it was accepted by the Arbitrator, has not paid any child support nor has he offered other financial or other support to Lilliana. It was accepted by the Arbitrator that Thea and the deceased again met in September 2011, at which time Lilliana was five months old. The deceased at that time was living with his mother at Umina on the Central Coast of New South Wales. At that time Thea was residing in Armidale. Thea and Lilliana moved to the Central Coast to be with the deceased in early 2012. The deceased and Thea rented a house, it was accepted by the Arbitrator, at Horsfield Bay. The deceased at that time obtained his truck drivers licence.
In about May or June 2012 Thea fell pregnant and a decision was made by Thea and the deceased, as found by the Arbitrator, to move back to Armidale where they resided in a rental property with Thea’s mother and brother in Kentucky South. The deceased obtained work driving trucks for Armidale Removals and resided with Lilliana and Thea in Kentucky South.
At about Boxing Day 2012, the deceased, it was found by the Arbitrator, decided to return to work on the Central Coast and to stay with his mother. Thea supported the deceased in that decision. Thea gave evidence that the deceased’s intention was to try to save some money while he was living with his mother and then move back to the Armidale area to be with Lilliana, his new son Zanda and Thea. Zanda was born only a few weeks before the deceased met his death.
The evidence establishes that, following Lee-Anne’s divorce from the deceased, she married Luke Hardyman. Mr Hardyman has a son, Saxon, who is a child of a former relationship born on x xx 2006. Saxon resides with Lee-Anne and Mr Hardyman permanently. In 2013, a child of Lee-Anne and Mr Hardyman, Indie, was born. Indie also resides permanently with that family.
The evidence otherwise relied upon by the parties was described in detail by the Arbitrator in the course of his Reasons. It is thus not necessary, nor intended, to attempt a summary of that material in these reasons, except where it is relevant to matters raised on appeal. That evidence is addressed below where the grounds of appeal are considered.

Submissions before the Arbitrator

Lee-Anne’s submissions

Counsel appearing on behalf of Lee-Anne made clear at the outset of submissions (T4) that orders were sought which would benefit the four children of her former marriage to the deceased as well as Zanda. Counsel made reference to the evidence of Lee-Anne concerning the health problems experienced by three of her children.
It was disputed that Shirley was relevantly dependent upon the deceased. It was also disputed that a de facto relationship existed between Thea and the deceased and that Thea was dependent upon the deceased. It was further disputed that Lilliana was a person in respect of whom the deceased stood in place of a parent (described in written submissions as not being a step-child of the deceased) and that Lilliana was dependent upon the deceased.
Counsel addressed, firstly, the evidence concerning Lilliana. It was argued that the characteristics of the relationship between the deceased and Lilliana did not meet the description of the deceased standing in the place of a parent as was discussed by Roche DP in James Allen Rose-Barnett & ors by their representative Sharyn Gaye Rose v TA Edison Pty Ltd [2008] NSWWCCPD 10 (Rose-Barnett), between [31] and [48]. Counsel placed emphasis upon the “limited exposure in terms of the relationship between [Lilliana] and … [the deceased]” (at T10.13).
With respect to the position of Shirley it was argued that there was, on the evidence, “some degree of uncertainty” concerning the question of dependency. It was put that any payments made by the deceased to Shirley “were probably not anything more than just paying board and paying for groceries and the like” (T9.30).
Submissions concerning the relationship between Thea and the deceased, it must be said, lacked precision. It seems to have been argued that the evidence concerning the relationship, cohabitation and financial support was scant, and that the “situation” in the last months of the deceased’s life was “equivocal and uncertain”. It was emphasised that there “was no cohabitation in the last few months of the [the deceased’s] life with [Lilliana] or with Thea” (at T11.4).
It was put on behalf of Lee-Anne in written submissions that the lump sum payable should be apportioned by the Commission “equally between [Storm, James, Kiara, Mia and Zanda]” (at [16] of submissions).

Submissions put on behalf of Shirley

Counsel appearing on behalf of Shirley relied upon the written submissions signed by Ms Sharpe, solicitor, dated 22 April 2015. A copy of those submissions remains with the Commission’s file and, thus, they need not be summarised in detail. The evidence concerning Shirley’s means and income, as well as the contributions stated by Shirley to have been made by the deceased during his residency at Umina, were summarised as were the regular financial outgoings borne by Shirley.
It was submitted (at [18]) that the deceased at the time of death was “residing with [Shirley] … having separated from [Thea] in late 2012”. In the course of those submissions, Shirley disputed that Thea and the deceased were engaged at the time of death. It was asserted in those submissions that the evidence demonstrates that the deceased had been “seeing other women who he had spoken to and met online”. It was accepted by Shirley that Zanda was the child of the deceased. It was submitted, as seems to have been accepted by Shirley in her evidence, that “although [Lilliana] was not [the deceased’s] natural child, [the deceased] treated [Lilliana] as his own” (at [20]). It was accepted by Shirley in those submissions that Thea’s description of Lilliana’s state of health was correct. I note that that evidence establishes that Lilliana suffers from Developmental Dysplasia of the hips which required physiotherapy and the wearing of splints; that Lilliana has experienced difficulty with language development and required treatment for same, and that recently there had been a provisional diagnosis of Cerebral Palsy for which Lilliana has been referred to the John Hunter Hospital for further treatment.
The submissions filed on behalf of Shirley contain detailed argument concerning apportionment of the lump sum. It was accepted that Thea was entitled to an apportionment, which was calculated in those submissions as being in the sum of $94,780. Those submissions argued that an appropriate apportionment for Shirley was $83,500. In the case of Lilliana, having regard to her medical conditions, it was submitted that the sum of $200,000 should be apportioned for her benefit and that the balance be apportioned among the natural children of the deceased, Storm, James, Kiara, Mia and Zanda, in sums ranging from approximately $10,000 in the case of Storm to the sum of $41,000 (approximately) in the case of Zanda.

Submissions on behalf of Thea

Counsel appearing on behalf of Thea and the children, Lilliana and Zanda, provided detailed written submissions dated 4 May 2015. Attention was given to the evidence of the deceased’s earnings which, it was argued, could be calculated as being $555 net per week plus overtime and shift allowance. Careful attention was given in those submissions to relevant life expectancy tables and the evidence before the Commission concerning relevant income of the various parties and their financial needs. So far as the position of Shirley is concerned it was argued that “the financial dependence of the deceased’s mother is not able to be accurately determined [on the evidence]” (at page 2).
Reference was made to relevant authority concerning the appropriate principles to be applied when an apportionment of death benefit lump sums was under consideration.
The submissions included detailed mathematical calculations concerning the question of apportionment. Ultimately it was submitted that the children of Lee-Anne and the deceased should be paid sums of, in the case of the eldest, Storm, approximately $15,000 increasing to the sum of approximately $32,000 in the case of Mia. It was submitted that the sum of approximately $92,500 was appropriate in the case of Lilliana and that an appropriate sum payable to Shirley would be approximately $5,500. The suggested quantum of Thea’s entitlement was approximately $217,000 and that of Zanda approximately $87,000.
During the course of oral submissions put by counsel representing Thea, attention was, for the first time, given to the terms of relevant legislation, in particular s 21C(3) of the Interpretation Act 1987. That provision concerns the meaning of “de facto partner” as that term appears in the workers compensation legislation and other Acts and instruments. It was argued that, on the evidence, there was at relevant times such a relationship between Thea and the deceased and that Thea was relevantly dependent upon the deceased.

THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION

The Arbitrator’s findings concerning the questions of dependency and the nature of the relationship between Thea and the deceased are noted above (at [9]) where the terms of the Certificate of Determination are recorded.
The Arbitrator summarised the evidence before him in particular detail (between [20] and [56]). That summary included relevant financial detail and evidence concerning the relationship between the deceased and Thea. It was acknowledged by the Arbitrator that the evidence concerning the precise period that the deceased resided with his mother, Shirley, prior to his death was “not clear”. Those findings, noted at [35] above, appear at [56] of his Reasons.
The Arbitrator proceeded to consider the question as to whether Thea was “a dependant of the deceased” (between [57] and [63] of Reasons). The terms of s 21C(3) of the Interpretation Act 1987 were considered and relevant findings were made which led to the Arbitrator’s conclusion that Thea and the deceased were “in a de facto relationship at the time of [the deceased’s] death”. A further finding was made that, at that time, Thea was “partly dependent for support on the deceased” (at [63] of Reasons). A finding was also made that, on the evidence, the deceased had stood in the place of a parent to Lilliana and that she was thus a “child of the worker” as defined in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act. The Arbitrator concluded that Lilliana was partly dependent on the deceased for support at the time of his death.
The Arbitrator proceeded to consider the question as to whether Shirley was dependent upon the deceased. Following a summary of relevant evidence concerning financial matters, the Arbitrator concluded that Shirley was “partly dependent upon the deceased at the time of his death but not to the extent submitted by her” (at [67] of Reasons). An assessment was made by the Arbitrator of the likely quantum of financial support and its probable duration.
The Arbitrator next turned his attention to the question of apportionment. The approach adopted was to calculate probable financial “allowances” in respect of the children and Thea as had been calculated with respect to Shirley. The Arbitrator, using those calculations, calculated relevant proportions of the lump sum having regard to, what was described as, “respective ratios of loss of expectation of support”. Those ratios were then converted to a percentage of the total sum available for apportionment.
The Arbitrator concluded his determination of the dispute by making an order with respect to past and ongoing payments of weekly compensation in respect of Lilliana. The balance of the orders made by the Arbitrator are recorded in the Certificate of Determination as noted at [9] above.

SUBMISSIONS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

This appeal is governed by the provisions of s 352 of the 1998 Act. The nature and scope of such an appeal is as provided by s 352(5):
“An appeal under this section is limited to a determination of whether the decision appealed against was or was not affected by any error of fact, law or discretion, and to the correction of any such error. The appeal is not a review or new hearing.”
The powers of the Commission upon conduct of such an appeal are defined by the provisions of s 352(7):
“On appeal, the decision may be confirmed or may be revoked and a new decision made in its place.
Alternatively, the matter may be remitted back to the Arbitrator concerned, or to another Arbitrator, for determination in accordance with any decision or directions of the Commission.”
The grounds upon which the appellant relies are to be found at [2.8] of the Application filed with respect to this appeal and are as follows:
“1.     The Arbitrator erred in determining that [Thea] was in a de-facto relationship with the deceased at the date of death in that the finding was against the evidence or the weight of the evidence;
2.      The Arbitrator erred in determining that [Thea] and [Lilliana] was [sic] either wholly or partially dependent on the deceased at the date of death of the deceased in that the finding was against the evidence or the weight of the evidence;
3.      The Arbitrator failed to give sufficient reasons in his ‘statement of reasons’ for finding that [Thea] was in a de-facto relationship with the deceased at the date of death;
4.      The Arbitrator failed to apportion the sums awardable by reason of inclusion of [Thea] and [Lilliana] in both lump sum and weekly benefit death entitlements.”
It may be seen that the appellant makes no challenge concerning the Arbitrator’s finding that Shirley was dependent upon the deceased. Notwithstanding the absence of such challenge, it must be noted that the relief sought in the Application is, as expressed therein, “recalculation of the lump sum and weekly benefit amounts be apportioned for the appellant’s children and [Zanda] only”.
Whilst the form of submissions presented in support of the appeal lack precision and are generally unsatisfactory, it is reasonably clear that the real issues which the appellant wishes to agitate are those noted at [10] and [11] above under the heading “issues in dispute”. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding the challenge concerning apportionment, no submission has been put concerning any relevant error on the part of the Arbitrator other than the suggested erroneous inclusion of Thea and Lilliana as being persons entitled to apportionment.
It is proposed to address each ground in turn together with the submissions, such as they are, which have been provided in support of those grounds. It is convenient to note at this point the relevant provisions concerning entitlement (s 25 of the 1987 Act) and dependency (as defined in s 4 of the 1998 Act). I note in passing that the quantum of benefits has, from time to time, been adjusted as permitted by the legislation:
Workers Compensation Act 1987
“25    Death of worker leaving dependants
(1)    If death results from an injury, the amount of compensation payable by the employer under this Act shall be:
(a)  the amount of $425,000 (the lump sum death benefit), which is to be apportioned among any dependants who are wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker or (if there are no such dependants) paid to the worker’s legal personal representative, and
(b)  in addition, an amount of $66.60 per week in respect of:
(i)  each dependent child of the worker under the age of 16 years, and
(ii)  each dependent child of the worker being a student over the age of 16 years but under the age of 21 years.
…
(5)     In this section:
child of the worker means a child or stepchild of the worker and includes a person to whom the worker stood in the place of a parent.
dependent child of the worker means a child of the worker who was wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker.”
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998
“4      Definitions
…
dependants of a worker means such of the members of the worker’s family as were wholly or in part dependent for support on the worker at the time of the worker’s death, or would but for the incapacity due to the injury have been so dependent, and includes:
(a)     a person so dependent to whom the worker stands in the place of a parent or a person so dependent who stands in the place of a parent to the worker, and
(b)     a divorced spouse of the worker so dependent, and
(c)     a person so dependent who:
(i)  in relation to an injury received before the commencement of Schedule 7 to the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment (Dust Diseases and Other Matters) Act 1998—although not legally married to the worker, lived with the worker as the worker’s husband or wife on a permanent and genuine domestic basis, or
(ii)  in relation to an injury received after that commencement—is the de facto partner of the worker.
Note. ‘De facto partner’ is defined in section 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987.
…”

Grounds one and two

These grounds challenge the Arbitrator’s finding of fact that Thea was in a de facto relationship with the deceased as at the date of death and that Thea and Lilliana were wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased. It is argued that the conclusion as to the relationship between Thea and the deceased “was against the evidence or the weight of the evidence”. In submissions reference is made to the evidence of Shirley who expressed her view that at the relevant time the deceased and Thea “were not in a relationship”. Reference is also made to Shirley’s observation that she had been informed by the deceased that he was “talking to a few ladies online and would tell me that he had been out with them for coffee. He wasn’t dating anyone seriously at the date of his death”. Reference is also made to Shirley’s observation that she considered that the deceased and Thea “may have worked things out and got back together”.

A difficulty arises, having regard to the form of submissions, given that the author immediately addresses the question as to whether the deceased stood in the shoes of a parent with respect to Lilliana. It is proposed to defer that question and to attempt to deal with the issue as to the existence of a de facto relationship.
Submissions include the narrative that “the deceased was living on the Central Coast with his mother for some 18 months prior to the death of the deceased”. It is also submitted that “the de facto relationship between the deceased and [Thea] had dissolved over 18 months prior to the deceased’s death” (submissions [2] and [5]). Those assertions are made in complete disregard of the Arbitrator’s factual findings concerning the residency of the deceased during the year 2012 and his expressed view that, whilst the evidence was in a state of confusion, those circumstances were as outlined between [35] and [37] above.
It is of significance to note that the Arbitrator, correctly in my view, addressed the issue of the existence of such a relationship by reference to the terms of s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987. The appellant has failed to make any reference in submissions to that legislation nor is there any analysis of the Arbitrator’s reasoning. It is helpful, in my view, to consider both the terms of the legislation and the Arbitrator’s analysis of the evidence before dealing with submissions put in support of this ground.
The relevant provisions of the Interpretation Act 1987 appear at s 21C(1), (2) and (3) which provide:
“21C References to de facto partners and de facto relationships
(1)     Meaning of ‘de facto partner’
For the purposes of any Act or instrument, a person is the de facto partner of another person (whether of the same sex or a different sex) if:
(a)  the person is in a registered relationship or interstate registered relationship with the other person within the meaning of the Relationships Register Act 2010, or
(b)  the person is in a de facto relationship with the other person.
(2)     Meaning of ‘de facto relationship’
For the purposes of any Act or instrument, a person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a)  they have a relationship as a couple living together, and
(b)  they are not married to one another or related by family.
A de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in a registered relationship or interstate registered relationship with someone else.
(3)     Determination of ‘relationship as a couple’
In determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple for the purposes of subsection (2), all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including any of the following matters that are relevant in a particular case:
(a)  the duration of the relationship,
(b)  the nature and extent of their common residence,
(c)  whether a sexual relationship exists,
(d)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them,
(e)  the ownership, use and acquisition of property,
(f)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life,
(g)  the care and support of children,
(h)  the performance of household duties,
(i)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
No particular finding in relation to any of those matters is necessary in determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple…”.
The Arbitrator, at [61] of Reasons, addressed each matter raised in s 21C(3) as follows:
“Dealing with those factors in respect of the relationship between the deceased and Thea, I note:
(a)     According to Thea, whose evidence is not contradicted in this regard, she was in a relationship with the deceased from late 2007, with a period of separation from early 2010 until about September 2011. During that time, in 2010, Thea met and was involved in a brief casual relationship with Graham Michell, at which time Lilliana was conceived. The duration of the relationship with the deceased therefore commenced in late 2007, and, according to Thea, continued until the time of death of the deceased, notwithstanding the fact that from Boxing Day 2012 the deceased was living apart from Thea;
(b)     It appears that Thea and the deceased shared common residences from about late 2007, with a period of separation from early 2010 until about September 2011. Thea was then living in North Armidale, and because of the nature of the subsidised rental property, was not allowed to have the deceased stay with her at that property. From some time early in 2012, the deceased and Thea rented a house at Horsefield Bay (central coast) in joint names. In May or June 2012 Thea fell pregnant with Zanda. Between that time and Boxing Day 2012, the deceased and Thea co-habited;
(c)     There was obviously a sexual relationship between the deceased and Thea, resulting in the birth of Zanda (whose birth certificate is attached to the Reply filed on behalf of the seventh – ninth respondents);
(d)     There was a degree of financial dependence of inter-dependence between Thea and the deceased at the times they were co-habiting. This is evident from Thea’s statement dated 6 March 2015 which I accept. The deceased paid rent on the Horsefield Bay property, contributed to household bills, bought clothes and toys for Lilliana and paid for some of her medical expenses. Thea, Lilliana and Zanda moved back to the Armidale area in May or June 2012 and the deceased remained living at those premises (when not away driving trucks) until the end of that year. Again, he paid a share of the household living expenses (rent, electricity and food), paid for fuel on Thea’s vehicle and for the cost of the trucked water supply to the premises;
(e)     Neither the deceased nor Thea appear to have acquired any or any substantial items of property (apart from household items);
(f)      It is apparent from Thea’s evidence that there was a significant degree of mutual commitment to a shared life, with the exchange of jewellery and discussion of marriage. This is supported by what Shirley says when she states that she thinks eventually the deceased and Thea may have worked things out and got back together if they had been able to find a place of their own and were not living with Thea’s mother;
(g)     The evidence of both Thea and Shirley is supportive of the contention that the deceased certainly contributed to the care and support of his child, Zanda, and also to the care and support of Lilliana, who he treated as his daughter;
(h)     It appears also from Thea’s evidence that the deceased assisted with household duties at such times as he was living with Thea and the two children, and
(i)      It also appears from Thea’s evidence that, on occasions in the Armidale area, they would go out together as a couple of [sic, to] local clubs and cinemas.”
Having regard to the matters enumerated at [61] of Reasons noted immediately above, the Arbitrator concluded that Thea and the deceased were in a de facto relationship at the time of death and that Thea was partly dependent for support upon the deceased at that time (at [63] of Reasons). The Arbitrator expressly rejected the assertions found in Lee-Anne’s evidence that such a relationship did not exist.
I am of the opinion that the factual conclusion reached by the Arbitrator was one open to him on the evidence and, more particularly, that his finding as to the existence of the relationship was made in accordance with relevant principle. Argument as advanced by Lee-Anne seeks to place particular emphasis upon the fact that at the date of death, and for some time earlier, the deceased and Thea were not residing together. Such fact does not, of itself, defeat Thea’s argument that the relationship, as defined by the statute, existed in fact. The criteria enumerated by s 21C(3) were considered by Hallen J in Sadiq v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2015] NSWSC 716 (Sadiq), a case where his Honour was concerned with the concept of de facto relationship, albeit in the context of the Succession Act 2006. His Honour made the following observations with respect to the various criteria found in s 21C(3):
“196. It can be seen that the nine criteria referred to may be grouped into ‘private’ ((c), (d), (e) and (f)) and ‘public’ ((a), (b), (g), (h) and (i)) headings. None of the matters listed is of decisive significance. The criteria are inclusive but not exhaustive. They all, however, suggest a continuing course of conduct and behaviour, not an event at a fixed point of time. No matter how close the involvement in each other’s emotional lives, a conclusion that people are a couple living together involves consideration of the circumstances in which they are living, including the places at which they are living. The test is not primarily locational, but it has a locational element: Dion v Rieser [2010] NSWSC 50, per Bryson AJ at [14].
197.     These criteria are no more than reminders, or indicators, of matters that possibly might be relevant in deciding the question whether the parties lived in a de facto relationship: Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59, per Campbell JA, at [146]. The last paragraph of the section makes clear that they are not to be weighed against each other and given individual weightings of importance. Ultimately, the criteria should be used to assist in determining whether the parties were in ‘a relationship as a couple’. They should not overshadow that central concept.
198.     One might argue that the inclusion of the term ‘living together’ would require physical cohabitation for at least two years. The sub-section makes it clear that a common residence is not the only element of the relationship that the Court must consider, and is not necessarily an essential element to prove. To recognise that acknowledges that, sometimes, couples choose to conduct a shared life without living together.
199. There is nothing in s 21C of the Interpretation Act that requires a couple who are living together to share the same household full time, or to live in one house. The concept of ‘living together’ does not import any concept of proportion of time. Section 21C(3)(c) assumes a common residence, but invites an examination of its nature and duration. Furthermore, because one, or both, members of the couple may also be legally married, or in another de facto relationship at the same time as they are in the subject relationship, it is feasible that the subject relationship might involve the parties living together for only part of the relationship: Moby v Schulter [2010] FamCA 748, per Mushin J, at [140]–[141]. What is important is the nature of the union (as a couple) rather than how it manifests itself in quantities of joint time.
200.     As was pointed out in Re Estate of Sigg (dec’d) [2009] VSC 47, at [7]:
‘In the case of Dow v Hoskins, Cummins J said that the determination of whether a person was living with the deceased should not be construed on narrow, formal, pedantic or merely geographical criteria, but should be considered taking into account the human reality of the personal, emotional and cultural complex. In that case his Honour took the view that he should approach the matter in that broader context. I agree with those observations and would add that it would be wrong to assume that the test of whether people are living in a genuine domestic relationship is to be judged against a model of a couple living together full-time, sharing fully domestic, financial and other responsibilities. That would place people claiming under these provisions at the very disadvantage which the provision is designed to remove. That would be so because people who are legally married live in married relationships in circumstances which vary dramatically from one couple to another, and it would be quite wrong to require that a couple seeking to invoke the provisions of s 51 should be judged by reference to a static model which may not bear a sufficient relationship to the reality of life and the diversity of arrangements existing between legally married couples.’ [Footnotes omitted]”
It was acknowledged by Hallen J in Sadiq that there were considerable variables which existed or affected relationships and that such should be taken into account. When addressing the concept of a commitment of parties to the concept of a “shared life” his Honour made the following observation (at [205]):
“Furthermore, in assessing the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life, it is not essential that there be entire harmony, entire fidelity, entire satisfaction with the relationship, or entire commitment; the degree of commitment may be high even though there are qualifications. Dissatisfactions, infidelities, expressed complaints, grievances, and less than entire commitment are often found in personal relationships, including marriages, and are not inconsistent with a relationship of two parties having a relationship as a couple living together, but not married to one another.”
The relevance of the question of cohabitation in the context of proof that a de facto relationship exists in terms of s 21C was the subject of discussion by Macready AsJ in Barnsley v Riakos (The Estate of Ralph Hodgkinson Clark, late of Vaucluse) [2011] NSWSC 635 where his Honour made the following observations (at [34] and [35]):
“34. It is true that there [sic, there is] nothing in section 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987 that requires a couple who are living together to share the same household full time or to live in one house. Effectively what we have here is the Deceased using his Vaucluse residence as a business base while he spent most of his evenings, if not all, with Susan. It is not surprising that they spent their evenings at Glebe because the Deceased was very untidy and his Vaucluse [residence] could only be described as chaotic. For example a chain saw was left in pieces on a table in the living room for some years waiting to be repaired.
35. As is referred to in a number of cases on this subject (see Dunk v Public Trustee [2003] NSWSC 37 and Ward v Anderson (New South Wales Supreme Court, Waddell CJ in Eq, 6 June 1989, unreported) it is always a question of degree whether there is a de facto relationship.”
Argument as presented with respect to this ground appears to suggest that, as at the date of the deceased’s death, it may be inferred from the evidence of Shirley that any relationship between the deceased and Thea had come to an end. Such an argument was also put by counsel before the Arbitrator. It seemed to be suggested (at T8.37), following reference to Shirley’s evidence, that “there is evidence of an equivocal continuing relationship. It falls short of what the Deputy President says [in Rose-Barnett] is the extent and nature of the relationship. It must be more than just financial support.” Reiteration of that argument on appeal suggests that a rehearing is being sought, a matter expressly precluded by the provisions of s 352(5) of the 1998 Act.
Leaving aside the fact that the Commission in Rose-Barnett was concerned with the question of a person standing in the shoes of a parent, the argument as outlined above tends to blur the distinction between proof of the existence of the relevant relationship and proof of the existence of dependency. The Arbitrator, correctly in my view, addressed the question as to the existence of the de facto relationship and, upon acceptance of the evidence of Thea, concluded that such relationship subsisted as at the date of death. The evidence was, in my view, capable of establishing that fact and the appellant has failed to make out any relevant error concerning that particular issue. As to the question of dependency the Arbitrator, again, accepted the evidence of Thea concerning the financial and other support afforded her by the deceased. It is correct, as argued on behalf of the appellant, that there is little evidence before the Commission which corroborates Thea’s statements concerning these matters. The relevant evidence was summarised by the Arbitrator (between [33] and [40] of Reasons). Notwithstanding the scant evidence concerning the issue of dependency, I consider that it was open to the Arbitrator to conclude as he did concerning this question. Again, in my view, the appellant has failed to make out any relevant error on the part of the Arbitrator.
As earlier noted, argument as presented on this appeal tends to confuse, given that there has been no clear distinction between relevant issues dealt with by the Arbitrator. The appellant in argument challenges the Arbitrator’s conclusion that Lilliana was a person to whom the worker stood in the place of a parent in terms of s 25(5). The Arbitrator’s conclusion concerning this question was reached following his acceptance of Thea’s evidence. That evidence included the statement that the deceased “treated Lilly as if she was his own child and when Lilly started to talk she called [the deceased] ‘dad’”. Thea also gave evidence that the deceased regularly bought clothes and toys for Lilliana and continued to pay the rent on the Horsfield Bay property. The deceased, as stated by Thea in evidence, also paid for some of Lilliana’s medical expenses including leg braces which she required in late 2012.
I am of the opinion that it was open to the Arbitrator to accept the evidence outlined immediately above and that such evidence permitted the Arbitrator’s conclusion as to Lilliana being a person to whom the worker stood in place of a parent. No relevant error has been made out regarding this issue which, I note, has not been squarely raised in the grounds. That evidence was taken by the Arbitrator as establishing that Lilliana was partially dependent upon the deceased and, again, I find that conclusion was reached without error on his part.

Ground three

This ground again challenges the Arbitrator’s conclusion that there existed a de facto relationship between the deceased and Thea. It is asserted that such conclusion was reached without the Arbitrator providing “sufficient reasons” for so concluding. It is clear that the appellant suggests error of law in failing to provide, as the Arbitrator was obliged, sufficient reasons for his conclusion.
I have earlier attempted to summarise the Arbitrator’s reasoning concerning this particular issue. It is plainly stated by the Arbitrator that his conclusion concerning the nature of the relationship was founded upon his acceptance of Thea’s evidence. It is clear that the Arbitrator rejected argument founded upon suggested inferences to be drawn from the evidence of Shirley concerning this issue. In my view, the Arbitrator has discharged his obligation concerning the provision of reasons and no relevant error has been made out.

Ground four

This ground challenges the Arbitrator’s apportionment of the lump sum. The ground asserts that the error arose “by reason of inclusion of [Thea] and [Lilliana] in both lump sum and weekly benefit death entitlements”. I have earlier observed that the relief sought on this appeal is that there be “a recalculation” of both “lump sum and weekly benefit amounts” and that they be apportioned “for the appellant’s children and [Zanda] only”.
The only argument advanced in support of this ground is founded upon the assumption that the challenge made to Thea and Lilliana’s entitlement is upheld. The author of the submissions appears to have overlooked the fact that Shirley was found by the Arbitrator to be entitled to a small portion of the lump sum. That fact has not been taken into account in submissions. It is of more significance to note that the appellant has made no effort to analyse the method adopted by the Arbitrator concerning his apportionment. The only argument advanced is that he erred in relation to the entitlement of Thea and the child Lilliana and, therefore, there should be either reapportionment on this appeal or remitter to another arbitrator to permit such reapportionment.

I have earlier given reasons for my conclusion as to the Arbitrator’s correctness in concluding that both Thea and Lilliana were entitled to compensation pursuant to s 25. No argument has been advanced as to the Arbitrator’s reasoning concerning the apportionment of the lump sum and I conclude that his determination of that issue should not be disturbed. In the circumstances the Arbitrator’s findings and orders must be confirmed. Appropriate orders appear below.

DECISION

The Arbitrator’s findings and orders found in Certificate of Determination dated 2 June 2015 are confirmed.

Kevin O'Grady
Deputy President

15 October 2015

I, STEVEN HAMPSON, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF KEVIN O'GRADY, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established