Labib v Histon - [2017] WADC 39

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: LABIB -v- HISTON [2017] WADC 39

CORAM: GETHING DCJ

HEARD: 17 MARCH 2017

DELIVERED : 24 MARCH 2017

FILE NO/S: APP 39 of 2015

BETWEEN: ALFRED LABIB
Appellant
AND
MISTY LOUISE HISTON
Respondent

Catchwords:

Appeal from Magistrates Court - Restraining orders - Appeal from registrar's decision striking out appeal on the basis that the appeal was commenced out of time

Legislation:

District Court Rules 2005 (WA) r 15

Result:

Appellant's application for leave to extend the time within which to appeal from a decision of a registrar refused

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: Ms S J Oliver

Solicitors:

Appellant: Not applicable
Respondent: Legal Aid Commission

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172
Armstrong v Saxby [2016] WADC 87
Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36
Butler v Bennett [2007] WADC 107
Dincer v Giancristofaro [2015] WADC 49
Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87
Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker (1993) 11 WAR 26
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338
Jones v Darkan Hotel [2014] WASCA 133
Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65
Simonsen v Legge [2010] WASCA 238
Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48
Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288

GETHING DCJ: For about a month in 2007 Alfred Labib and Misty Histon were in a relationship. As a result of that relationship, Ms Histon fell pregnant, giving birth to their son, Marley, in March 2008. Family Court orders were made at some stage dealing with parental responsibility and access. Since the birth of their son, Mr Labib has desired to continue to have a relationship with Ms Histon. Ms Histon has no wish to have any relationship with Mr Labib. Between 2009 and 2011 she had a violence restraining order in place protecting her from Mr Labib, a restraining order that Mr Labib breached.
In October 2014, Ms Histon sought and obtained an interim violence restraining order against Mr Labib (Interim VRO). Following a trial on 23 December 2014, Magistrate Bayly granted Ms Histon a final violence restraining order for a period of three years (Final VRO). His Honour found that Mr Labib had stalked Ms Histon, and had been doing so for a number of years. I will refer to the decision of Magistrate Bayly on 23 December 2014 as being the Final VRO Decision.
By notice of appeal filed 26 May 2015 Mr Labib appealed the Final VRO Decision to the District Court (Restraining Order Appeal). The Restraining Order Appeal was commenced out of time. On 6 October 2015 the Principal Registrar declined to give Mr Labib leave to commence the Restraining Order Appeal out of time, and struck out the appeal notice for the Restraining Order Appeal. On 16 June 2016 Mr Labib filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Principal Registrar (Registrar Appeal). This appeal was also filed out of time, so Mr Labib required an extension of time for this appeal as well. The application to extend the time within which the Registrar Appeal may be commenced was heard by me on 17 March 2017.
At the conclusion of the hearing on 17 March 2017, I made an order refusing Mr Labib's application to extend the time within which to commence the Registrar Appeal. This had the effect that the decision of the Principal Registrar striking out the notice of appeal for the Restraining Order Appeal remains operative. I also made no order as to costs. I advised the parties that I would publish written reasons at a later date. Those reasons follow.

Proceedings in the Magistrates Court

The application for the Interim VRO was made on or shortly before 27 October 2014. The grounds for the restraining order were as follows:
Since the last restraining order expired in 2011. Alfred has been sending and calling intimidating [sic] and Manipulating [sic] text at least 25 times a day. He has been seen going thru my rubbish and mail. And has been coming around all hours of the night standing out the front yelling Abuse, He takes photos of any car that is parked out the front in my complex and sends them to me On the 20/10/14 he sent a letter out to all my neighbors [sic] that live in my complex. Approximately (20) saying im [sic] running prostitution business and selling drugs and committing Adultery (we never lived together). Iv blocked his number on the 25^th/10/14 but he is still calling from a private number and his text get thru.
I fear for My Son and My Safety as his behaviour is escalating. My son is fearful of him and refuses to go with him.
The interim VRO, which was made on 27 October 2014, was made pursuant to s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (ROA). Among other clauses, Mr Labib was restrained from:
(a)entering, remaining upon or loitering near Ms Histon's residential address, or being within 50 m of the external boundary of this property;
(b)approaching or remaining within 20 m of Ms Histon or any property (including vehicles) under her control; and
(c)with limited exceptions, communicating or attempting to communicate with Ms Histon by any means, including SMS, text messaging or any other electronic means.
The Interim VRO provided that Mr Labib would not breach the order if he was complying with a court order made under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or the Family Law Act 1997 (Cth) allowing him to live with, spend time with, or communicate with a child named in the order.
On 29 October 2014, Mr Labib filed a notice of objection to the Interim VRO. Ms Histon's application was listed for a Restraining Order Final Order Hearing on 23 December 2014.
The Final VRO Decision was made on 23 December 2014 following a trial. Mr Labib gave evidence. He also called two police officers who gave evidence. Ms Histon also gave evidence. In granting the Final VRO, Magistrate Bayly stated that it is 'quite clear that the applicant is being stalked by the respondent, and has been for a number of years' (ts 50). His Honour characterised Mr Labib's behaviour as being 'intimidating, offensive and emotionally abusive' (ts 51). The Final VRO was in the same terms as the Interim VRO, save that the Magistrate strengthened its terms, increasing the distances for the restraints referred to at paragraphs [6(a)] and [6(b)] to 100 m.
The evidence relied on by his Honour was in six parts.
The first part was a letter dated 20 October 2014 which Mr Labib sent to Ms Histon's neighbours in the unit complex in which she resides. That letter read (ts 24, 49 ‑ 50):
We need your help. The female living at [Ms Histon's address] called Misty Histon, is doing drugs and prostitution and adultery by bringing different men and vehicles into your building … She is not a single mum. She has many male partners and she is hiding her prostitution and drug activities. That you see any men in unit … except the child or their father, Alfred or Fred, you contact the police. Please don't tell her about this letter. We will meet you and tell you more. Thanks.
The letter was signed by 'Marley parent'. The distribution of this letter was the catalyst for Ms Histon to have made the application for the Interim VRO.
The second part was the evidence from the two police officers called to give evidence by Mr Labib. Their evidence was that at 5:00 am in the morning of 24 November 2013, Mr Labib called the police and requested police attendance at Ms Histon's unit. On attending at 5:20 am, Mr Labib told the police officers that Ms Histon was in the unit with another man, and complained that she was committing adultery. He wanted the police to intervene. They declined to do so. Mr Labib also gave evidence that he had called the police on 10 other occasions about Ms Histon's activities in her unit.
The third part was the fact that, even on Mr Labib's evidence, he was watching Ms Histon's unit. This is evident from the incident in the previous paragraph. Mr Labib gave evidence that he called police as he saw Ms Histon having sex and being naked with another man in her unit (ts 42). On numerous other occasions he recorded the registration numbers of cars belonging to the people who visited her. There was also evidence that he had gone through her rubbish.
The fourth part was the numerous letters, text messages and telephone messages sent by Mr Labib in which he expressed the belief that he was still entitled to be in a relationship with Ms Histon. This correspondence included demands for sex.
The fifth part was evidence that on occasions Mr Labib had followed Ms Histon.
The sixth part was the Mr Labib gave evidence which made it clear that he had breached the previous restraining order.
By application dated 27 February 2015, Mr Labib sought to cancel the Final VRO. This was heard and refused the same day.
On 26 May 2015, Mr Labib made a second application to cancel the Final VRO. It appears that the catalyst for this application was an attempt by Ms Histon to recover child support from Mr Labib in respect of their son. This application was also heard and refused the same day.

Appeal notice

By appeal notice filed 26 May 2015, Mr Labib commenced an appeal from the Final VRO Decision (being the Restraining Order Appeal). The ground of the appeal was: 'Cancel the order'.

Appeal jurisdiction – restraining orders

A decision of a magistrate to make a final order under the ROA may be the subject of an appeal to the District Court: ROA s 64(1)(b)(i). The appeal is to be made in accordance with Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) pt 7: ROA s 64(2).
An appeal pursuant MCCPA pt 7 'cannot be commenced more than 21 days after the date of judgment, unless the District Court gives leave to do so': MCCPA s 40(3). The appeal notice for the Restraining Order Appeal was filed out of time, so Mr Labib requires leave to commence the appeal.
The District Court must decide the Restraining Order Appeal on the material and evidence that was before the Magistrates Court: MCCPA s 40(4)(a). The District Court can give leave to admit other evidence, but only in exceptional circumstances: MCCPA s 40(4)(b); (5). The appeal is by way of a 'reconsideration of the evidence' that was before the Magistrates Court: District Court Rules 2005 (WA) (DCR) r 50(1). This is to be undertaken by way of a rehearing: Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36 [14] (Derrick DCJ); Butler v Bennett [2007] WADC 107 [6] ‑ [10] (Bowden DCJ). As a rehearing, the appellate powers of the District Court are only exercisable if the appellant demonstrates that the decision made by the magistrate the subject of the appeal was the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error: Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 [23] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The onus is on the appellant to demonstrate this error: Jones v Darkan Hotel [2014] WASCA 133 [31] (judgment of the court).

Progress of the appeal

At a directions hearing on 25 August 2015 before the Principal Registrar, Mr Labib was ordered to file and serve further and better particulars of the grounds of appeal, and to do so by 8 September 2015.
Mr Labib filed a four page document on 3 September 2015. It is a combination of factual assertions and submissions. Insofar as it contains factual material, it is not in the form of an affidavit.
The appeal came back to the Principal Registrar for directions on 22 September 2015. On this occasion, Mr Labib was ordered to, within seven days, file and serve an application in the appeal for an extension of time to appeal together with an affidavit in support.
On 21 September 2015 Mr Labib filed a bundle of documents comprising a two page affidavit template which had been completed as a sworn affidavit, but without any substantive content, and 18 pages comprising of typewritten notes, documents and correspondence.
On 6 October 2015 the appeal came back before the Principal Registrar. Mr Labib was present in court, as was counsel for Ms Histon. The Principal Registrar ordered that the notice of appeal be struck out. There is no transcript available from this hearing. However, from the context of the orders made on 22 September 2015, it is clear that the notice of appeal was struck out because it was filed out of time, and the Principal Registrar was not prepared to grant Mr Labib leave to file the appeal notice out of time. The power to order that a notice of appeal be struck out, including on the ground that the appeal was commenced out of time, is one which may be exercised by a Registrar: DCR r 55(3)(f); r 57(2)(b).
By notice of appeal dated 16 June 2016, Mr Labib appealed against the decision of the Principal Registrar striking out the appeal (that is, the Registrar Appeal). The grounds for the Registrar Appeal are described in the following terms:
The judge should have to consider what the plaintiff was saying or things that concern to the plaintiff but it turn opposite as the defendant is the plaintiff and the judge finish talk walk out then I left the court room and misty and her lawyer Mrs Veltmen were inside plus the lawyer assistence [sic]. I want the order to be cancel to allow better communication phone contacts and make family reunion or make family visiting general trying to reach proper solution for my family. having [sic] access to misty and our child I dont [sic] have proper access to them and I want to solve all the differents [sic] or things that are in her thinking or brain.
The Registrar Appeal was listed for directions before a registrar on 26 July 2016. By the time of the hearing, Ms Histon had not been served with the notice commencing the Registrar Appeal. The Registrar Appeal was adjourned to 16 August 2016. In the meantime, on 16 August 2016, Mr Labib filed an affidavit, which is in the following terms:
I don't want her to continue using restraining orders for her personal interest she need to inform the court of any change of her circumstance not to hide. I will cooperate with her and treat her well with respect if she said anything that she is hiding.
1.I want the order to be cancel
2.I want better communication phone contacts
3.I want us to have family reunion
4.I want us to have family visiting life
5.General trying to reach proper solution
6.Having proper access to misty[sic] and marley [sic]
7.I am willing to share things with her and our son
8.I want to solve all the differents [sic] between us
9.I want us to stay in one house and live together if she can accept that
10.I don't want trouble or she course troubles to me and our child
At the hearing on 16 August 2016, the Registrar Appeal was adjourned to 6 September 2016. On that date, counsel for Ms Histon appeared. The Registrar Appeal was adjourned to a hearing before a judge on 2 December 2016. On this date, counsel for Ms Histon was not able to attend, so the Registrar Appeal was relisted to 17 March 2017. The Registrar Appeal was heard before me on 17 March 2017.

Appeal jurisdiction – Registrar Appeals

A party who is dissatisfied with a decision of a registrar may appeal to a judge: DCR r 15(1). The appeal is to be by way of a new hearing of the matter that was before the registrar: DCR r 15(6). The appeal is a hearing de novo: Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker (1993) 11 WAR 26, 28 (Malcolm CJ). I am therefore to treat the application which led to the making of the orders the subject of the appeal as though it had not been previously determined. It is not necessary for Mr Labib to establish an appealable error on the part of the registrar.

Leave to extend the time within which to file an appeal

Mr Labib has breached two time limits for filing appeals.
The first is for the Registrars' Appeal. An appeal from a decision of a registrar 'must be commenced within 10 days after the date of the decision or such longer period as a judge or legally qualified registrar may allow': DCR r 15(2). No longer period has been allowed. Mr Labib commenced the Registrar Appeal on 16 June 2016 some 211 days out of time. As discussed at the hearing on 17 March 2017, I have treated Mr Labib as having made an oral application to extend the time within which to file the Registrar Appeal.
The second is for the Restraining Order Appeal. As I have noted [22], an appeal pursuant MCCPA pt 7 'cannot be commenced more than 21 days after the date of judgment, unless the District Court gives leave to do so': MCCPA s 40(3). The date of the decision appealed from was on 23 December 2014. For the purposes of calculating the time for filing documents, the period between 24 December 2014 and 15 January 2015 (23 days) is excluded: Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 3 r 3. Accordingly, Mr Labib was required to have commenced his appeal by 5 February 2015. He did not commence his appeal until 26 May 2015, some 110 days out of time.
From the history of the Restraining Order Appeal which I have set out above, it is apparent that Mr Labib did not file an application for leave to commence the Restraining Order appeal out of time. I have treated Mr Labib as having made an oral application for leave to commence the Restraining Order Appeal out of time at the hearing before the Principal Registrar on 16 October 2016.
It was evident in the hearing before me that Mr Labib has some difficulties with the English language. However, given the written material which he filed and the fact that I could understand him at the hearing on 17 March 2017, I was satisfied that he was not denied procedural fairness by virtue of his difficulties with the English language.
In dealing with Mr Labib's two applications for leave to commence the appeals out of time I am cognisant of the fact that he is a litigant in person. As a litigant in person he should be afforded some latitude. Accordingly, I have approached the documents in which he articulates his case with some flexibility: Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48 [10] (Pritchard J). He is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules: Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 [10] (reasons of the court). I need to be astute to ensure that, in a poorly expressed or unstructured document setting out his case, there is no case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form: Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338 [21] (Beech J); Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288 [15] (EM Heenan J, with whom Murray & Le Miere JJ agreed). At the same time, I also need to ensure that any latitude given to Mr Labib is not unfair to Ms Histon: Glew [10]; Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65 [51] (judgment of the court).
In view of the fact that Mr Labib is a litigant in person with some difficulties with the English language, it is appropriate that I determine the application for leave to commence the Registrar Appeal out of time based on all the material in the District Court file.
The principles governing the grant of an extension of time within which to commence an appeal in the Court of Appeal were considered by that court in Simonsen v Legge [2010] WASCA 238 [8] (judgment of the court):
The relevant matters to consider when a party seeks to extend the time for filing its notice of appeal include the following:
(a)on the expiry of the time for appealing, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment unless the application for an extension of time is granted: Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 64 ALJR 458, 459;
(b)the grant of an extension of time under the rule is not automatic; the object of the rule permitting extensions of time is to ensure that the rules which fix time for the doing of acts do not become instruments of injustice; and the discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the court to do justice between the parties: Gallo v Dawson (459);
(c)nevertheless, the rules of court must, prima facie, be obeyed, and in order to justify a court in extending the time, there must be some material upon which the court can exercise its discretion: Gallo v Dawson (459);
(d)there are, generally, at least four major factors to be considered, although they are not necessarily exhaustive in each case:
(i)the length of the delay;
(ii)the reasons for the delay;
(iii)the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal; and
(iv)the extent of any prejudice to the respondent: Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196, 198; In de Braekt v Powell [2007] WASCA 55 [11]; (2007) 33 WAR 389;
(e)other factors may include whether the delay was intentional, or contumelious, or merely the result of a bona fide mistake or blunder, and whether the delay is that of the litigant or of its lawyers with which the litigant should not be saddled: City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [2009] WASCA 120 [33];
(f)the length and reasons for the delay must be addressed by the applicant and the cogency of the explanation increases as the period of the extension sought increases: Girando v Girando (1997) 18 WAR 450, 454;
(g)in relation to the third matter referred to in subpar (d) above, the time for appealing will not be extended unless the proposed appeal has some prospect of success; the converse of that proposition is not that time must be extended if an appeal has any prospect of success, but rather, the fact that an appeal has some prospect of success is a factor which is to be taken into account, together with all other relevant factors: City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [17]; and
(h)similarly, it is not the law that, whenever an applicant demonstrates an arguable case, or even a strongly arguable case, in the absence of significant prejudice suffered by the respondent, an extension of time should be granted: City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [16].

These principles are apposite to an appeal to the District Court from the Magistrates Court: see for example, Dincer v Giancristofaro [2015] WADC 49 [8] - [11] (Bowden DCJ); Armstrong v Saxby [2016] WADC 87 [39] – [40] (Gething DCJ). They are also apposite to commencing an appeal from a decision of a registrar.
Logically, I must begin by considering the application to commence the Registrar Appeal out of time. However, as the principles I have outlined above require me to consider the merits of the Registrar Appeal, I need also to consider the merits of the application for leave to commence the Restraining Order Appeal. This in turn requires me to consider the merits of the Restraining Order Appeal.
The length of the delay in commencing the Registrar Appeal was 244 days. The length of the delay in commencing the Restraining Order Appeal was 110 days. Whilst these delays may not be a long time in the context of ordinary civil litigation, the delays are significant in the context of an application for a violence restraining order of limited duration, in the present case being three years from 23 December 2014. The combined delays have added almost a year to the time which Ms Histon has had uncertainty in relation to the Final VRO hanging over her.
On the material before me, Mr Labib does not provide a reason for the delays. However, in relation to the delay in commencing the Restraining Order Appeal, from the history of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court, it appears that Mr Labib has sought to try and have the Final VRO cancelled in that court. So it could be said in Mr Labib's favour that the delay was caused by him trying to use other lawful means available to him to cancel the final VRO.
However, given the overall delays, Mr Labib had not advanced any compelling reason why the delays ought not to count against him in the present applications.
As to Mr Labib's prospects of success in the Restraining Order Appeal, as I have set out above, for the appeal to succeed, he is required to identify an error of law, fact or discretion in the Final VRO Decision. In the appeal notice for the Restraining Order Appeal, Mr Labib does not identify any error of law, fact or discretion in the Final VRO Decision. Nor can I discern from Mr Labib's oral submissions before me on 17 March 2017 any complaint which I could characterise as an error of law, fact or discretion. Rather, Mr Labib's position is that the Magistrate made the wrong decision because he relied on the evidence of Ms Histon and because of the impact of the Final VRO on him personally.
Perhaps the widest potential basis for an error of law, fact or discretion is that, if upon the facts a decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust, an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposed in the magistrate: in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 – 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).
The circumstances in which a violence restraining order may be made are set out in ROA s 11A:
11A. When violence restraining orders may be made
A court may make a violence restraining order if it is satisfied that —
(a)the respondent has committed an act of abuse against a person seeking to be protected and the respondent is likely again to commit such an act against that person; or
(b)a person seeking to be protected, or a person who has applied for the order on behalf of that person, reasonably fears that the respondent will commit an act of abuse against the person seeking to be protected,
and that making a violence restraining order is appropriate in the circumstances.
In the circumstances of the present appeal, the term 'act of abuse' relevantly includes 'behaving in an ongoing manner that is intimidating, offensive or emotionally abusive towards' the applicant: ROA s 6(2)(1)(d).
In my view, the evidence which I have summarised above ([11] ‑ [17]) provided an ample basis for the magistrate to have concluded that Mr Labib had behaved in an ongoing manner that was intimidating, offensive and emotionally abusive towards Ms Histon. I can discern no error of law, fact or discretion. In particular, in no way can it be said that the Final VRO Decision was unreasonable or plainly unjust, such that I could infer that in some way the magistrate failed to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposed in him. On the material that was before the magistrate, Mr Labib has not demonstrated that if given leave to commence the Registrar Appeal, and then leave to commence the Restraining Order Appeal, that the Restraining Order Appeal has any prospect of success.
As I have said, in view of the fact that Mr Labib is a litigant in person, I will allow him to rely on the material he filed in the District Court in support of his applications for leave.
From the extensive material filed by Mr Labib in the District Court, it is evident that he still wants to communicate with Ms Histon with a view to the two of them reconciling and living together in the same house with their son as a family. The following extract from the documents filed by Mr Labib provides a further insight into Mr Labib's position:
Why the Magistry [sic] don't ask her why she don't answer her phone calls or text back if I call and why she blocks my number and not blocking the numbers of other men who are calling her, I have a right to call and text her and visit her and check on her if there is no any information from her and her family and relatives and friends, Magistry doesn't think of any treats or danger that I am worry about not to happen to her and the child.
…
The Magistry need to have secret service personnel to watch any female who come to apply for restraining orders first at least for one year before given them any restraining orders.
Most Killings and families loses comes from the restraining orders that the Magisty given to those who are given the order, the Magistry should force any couple, girlfriend, boyfriends, married or single
Parent or defacto to under go [sic] compulsory mediation it will take time for two different people to come
To agreement but at the end any one will come to see there [sic] interest and reach into lasting peacefully solution.
..
I Demand her, I want her as a partner mother of our son and as a wife. I like her and I love whatsoever Happen or had happen we still family and I still keeping her in my soul and spirits, I have forgiven her. I want her to stop all things that are hindering or affecting the process of stability between us and have Better understanding and forget all the bad evens that had occurred in the past and start a new journey Together and stop threatening each other ,stop hurting each other and cursing each other. I want us to spending substantial and significant time together and share things together.
I want us to open full communication and co-operation including phone calls and be honest and respect Each Other.
No use of any kind of illicit substance drugs and strong spirits and strong alcohol consumption.
No use of any kind of restraining orders to cover affairs or hiding secret affairs or things from each other.
In case of evens happens problems we should go to family counseling [sic] and family relationship centre, church counseling, and family and relatives that likes family.
Both open there heart and mind to each other and accept each other.
Both open full family visiting by allowing each other in to their premises and spend times together
By spending times together both will built more trust and close any different between us.
Talk and understand each other listen to each other without interrupting care for each other.
No Cheating and hiding of affairs no dodgy friends and making false friends who are secret boy friends Or partners.
However, from all the material before me, it is plainly evident that Ms Histon does not want to have anything to do with Mr Labib. That is her right. To the extent that Mr Labib wants to have access to his son, then there are legal avenues available to him through the Family Court.
The additional material filed by Mr Labib in the District Court does not undermine the view which I expressed on the basis of the material before the magistrate that, on its merits, the Restraining Order Appeal has no prospect of success.
The fact that the Restraining Order Appeal has, on its merits, no prospect of success is a compelling factor that leave to appeal out of time should not be granted. There are no other facts outweighing this factor, suggesting that leave should be granted.
In my view, justice between the parties requires the application for leave to commence the Registrar Appeal out of time to be refused.

Final orders

For these reasons, on 17 March 2017 I ordered that Mr Labib's application to extend the time within which to commence an appeal from the decision of the Principal Registrar on 6 October 2015 be refused.
I also made no order as to costs.