Kuchlmayr and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) [2020] AATA 5072 (24 November 2020)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2020/6616
Re:Nicole Kuchlmayr
APPLICANT
AndAustralian Capital Territory
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries AO
Date of Decision: 24 November 2020
Date of written reasons: 16 December 2020
Place:Canberra
The application for review of a decision is dismissed pursuant to subsection 42A(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
........................................................................
Deputy President Gary Humphries AO
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – dismissal pursuant to subsection 42A(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review a decision made pursuant to section 42C of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review decision – application for review dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 42A, 42C, 43AA
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, s 14
Cases
Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722
Secondary Materials
Margaret Allars, ‘Perfected Judgments and Inherently Angelical Administrative Decisions: the Powers Of Courts and Administrators to Re-Open or Reconsider Their Decisions’, Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum, No 30, 2001.
The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, 1859.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Gary Humphries AO
16 December 2020
On 26 October 2020 the Applicant, Ms Nicole Kuchlmayr, sought review of the Tribunal’s decision made on 21 June 2018 in matter number 2017/6255. On 5 November 2020 the parties were directed to provide submissions, by 20 November 2020, on the question of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider Ms Kuchlmayr’s application. The Respondent, the Australian Capital Territory, filed submissions by that date but Ms Kuchlmayr did not.
On 24 November 2020 the Tribunal decided to dismiss the application pursuant to s 42A(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the Act) on the basis that the decision in question is not reviewable by the Tribunal.
Ms Kuchlmayr has sought reasons for this decision. On 24 November 2020, after the Tribunal had made its decision, she provided a submission going to the question of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain her application. Since this submission was received after the deadline for the lodging of submissions, and after the Tribunal had in fact made its decision, the submission was, obviously, not taken into account in reaching that decision. However, I can indicate that, had the submission been considered before my decision was made, it would have had no bearing on the conclusion I reached.
What follows are the reasons for my decision.
BACKGROUND
In 2017 Ms Kuchlmayr sought review in the Tribunal of a reviewable decision made pursuant to s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 in relation to a claim for adjustment reaction with mixed emotional features sustained on 27 May 2016.[1] Her application was given the number 2017/6255 by the Tribunal.
[1] In this decision italics generally indicated direct quotation.
The following year, after discussion between the parties, agreement was reached between them as to the resolution of the matters raised…
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- Case
- [2020] AATA 5072
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it possessed the jurisdiction to review a decision made under section 42C of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth), particularly when the review was sought on the grounds that the underlying factual basis for the consent decision was flawed due to alleged fraud. The Tribunal was required to determine if it had the power to revisit a finalised decision, even if new evidence or allegations of misconduct emerged after the decision was made.
Deputy President Gary Humphries Ao P reasoned that the AAT's power to review decisions is generally limited to specific reviewable decisions outlined in Commonwealth legislation and can typically be exercised only once. The Tribunal lacks a general power to interfere with legal rights or to reopen finalised decisions, unlike courts which may have limited powers to do so and direct parties to appeal. The principle that a decision-maker becomes *functus officio* after making a decision applies equally to decisions made on the merits after a full hearing and those reached by consent under section 42C. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the consent decision of 21 June 2018, as its statutory power to review that matter was exhausted upon its making.
Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed Ms Kuchlmayr's application for review, finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the submission Ms Kuchlmayr lodged on 24 November 2020 she expanded on the matters alleged in her original application. She referred to correspondence with a solicitor representing the Respondent, to the process undertaken within the ACT Health Directorate to respond to Ms Kuchlmayr’s complaint of misconduct against AB, and to the outcome of that process. The submission suggested that neither the Territory nor its insurer was prepared to reconsider her claim for workers compensation, and that she decided to seek merits review of the earlier decision as the AAT has powers to summons documents and people.CONSIDERATION The matters put forward by Ms Kuchlmayr in her original application and in her submission go to the factual basis on which the consent decision of 21 June 2018 was made. Their import, as I apprehend it, is that, had the Tribunal been aware of the matters latterly raised by Ms Kuchlmayr, in particular the matters pertaining to what she says is fraud perpetrated by or on behalf of her employer, then it would not have made the consent decision. The argument would be that, those matters having now come to light, it is appropriate to revisit a decision which was made based on a flawed or incomplete understanding of the facts relevant to its making. Without undertaking a detailed forensic assessment of the matters Ms Kuchlmayr raises, it is fair to say that, on face value, the matters she has put forward may have the gravamen to warrant revisiting her original claim for workers compensation. However, it would be futile on the part of the Tribunal to undertake such an assessment if, having been persuaded that the claim should be revisited, it was unable to grant the relief she sought. Unfortunately for her, in the present circumstances that is precisely the situation the Tribunal faces. The Tribunal has the power to review certain decisions (usually those of government agencies) where they affect the interests of an individual or a certain organisation: ss 25 and 27 of the Act. The decisions which are reviewable by the Tribunal are set out in or under Commonwealth legislation. Over 400 Commonwealth statutes and legislative instruments set out circumstances where the Tribunal may review an administrative decision. Without an act or instrument specifying that a particular type of decision is reviewable, the Tribunal cannot act. Unlike the Federal Court and certain state courts, the Tribunal lacks a general power to interfere to protect the legal rights of citizens. The power granted under a statute to undertake a review of a particular decision can, as a general rule, be exercised only once. It is the power to review a specific reviewable decision; once it has reviewed that decision and decided to affirm it, overturn it or remit it for fresh assessment to the decision-maker, its statutory power to review is exhausted. At that point it is functus officio [Latin: having performed his office], meaning that it no longer has any power to change or reconsider the decision it has made. That principle is the same whether the decision is one made on the merits after a full hearing or one produced as a result of the agreement of the parties (Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722 at [103]). Even the courts have very limited powers to reopen finalised decisions, preferring to direct affected parties to their right to appeal to a higher court.[2][2] Margaret Allars, ‘Perfected Judgments and Inherently Angelical Administrative Decisions: the Powers Of Courts and Administrators to Re-Open or Reconsider Their Decisions’, Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum, No 30, 2001.