Kuchlmayr and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) [2022] AATA 1527 (8 June 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2022/1269
Re:Nicole Kuchlmayr
APPLICANT
Australian Capital TerritoryAnd
RESPONDENT
INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
Tribunal:Mr S. Webb, Member
Date:8 June 2022
Place:Canberra
Application dismissed.
……….[sgd]……….
Mr S. Webb, MemberCatchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – reconsideration decision to refuse claim for compensation affirmed by consent decision – request for further review of consent decision refused – request for further reconsideration of reconsideration decision by own motion – decision to decline invitation to reconsider a reconsideration decision by own motion not a reviewable decision – no jurisdiction – application dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 3, 25, 29, 42A, 42C, 43
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14, 60, 62, 64, 65
Cases
Cheung v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2009] FCA 241
Commonwealth of Australia v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57
Director-General of Social Security v Hales [1983] FCA 81
Kuchlmayr and ACT [2020] AATA 5072
Re Burt and Commission for the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation of Commonwealth Employees [1991] AATA 302
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87
REASONS FOR INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
Mr S. Webb, Member
8 June 2022
Nicole Kuchlmayr claimed compensation for an alleged injury in her employment by the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Department of Health (employer). Initially, her claim was accepted and she was paid compensation. On reconsideration, however, her claim was found to lack merit. Ms Kuchlmayr applied for review of that decision by the Tribunal. In the course of the resulting proceedings, Ms Kuchlmayr and the ACT agreed to resolve the application in terms which resulted in the decision being affirmed by consent (consent decision).
Subsequently, Ms Kuchlmayr asked the Tribunal to revisit the consent decision on grounds she had additional information relevant to her claim. This application was dismissed for reasons explained in Kuchlmayr and ACT (dismissal decision).[1]
[1] [2020] AATA 5072.
Several months later, Ms Kuchlmayr asked the ACT to reconsider again, by its own motion, the previous reconsideration decision refusing her claim for compensation. The ACT declined to do so. Ms Kuchlmayr’s present application for review is in respect of this decision of the ACT.
Her application raises three questions for determination:
(a)does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to review the ACT’s refusal to reconsider the 12 October 2017 by its own motion; and if so
(b)is Ms Kuchlmayr’s application out of time; and if so
(c)is it reasonable in the circumstances to grant additional time for the making of the application?
Facts
The short facts are as follows.
Ms Kuchlmayr alleged in 2016 she was bullied in her employment and this resulted in a psychological ailment she first noticed on 27 May 2016. Ms Kuchlmayr claimed compensation for this ailment as an injury.
On 17 July 2017, Comcare (the relevant authority at the time) issued a determination accepting liability for Ms Kuchlmayr’s adjustment reaction with mixed emotional features as…
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- Case
- [2022] AATA 1527
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it possessed jurisdiction to review the ACT's refusal to reconsider the 12 October 2017 decision by its own motion. Subsidiary questions concerned whether Ms Kuchlmayr's application was out of time and, if so, whether it was reasonable to grant an extension. The ACT had declined the request for reconsideration on 29 November 2021, stating that the claim had been determined, reviewed, and affirmed by the AAT, and that the appeal to review the AAT decision had been dismissed.
The Member determined that the ACT's decision to decline an invitation to reconsider a previous reconsideration decision by its own motion was not a reviewable decision. The Tribunal had previously dismissed an application to review the consent decision on the grounds that it was final and the Tribunal had already exercised its powers of review, rendering it *functus officio*. The subsequent request to the ACT for reconsideration by its own motion, and the ACT's refusal of that request, did not create a new reviewable decision. Consequently, the Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.
The application was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court first addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to review the ACT’s refusal to reconsider the 12 October 2017 decision by its own motion. The court reasoned that the ACT’s refusal to reconsider a decision by its own motion was not a reviewable decision. The court relied on the principle that only decisions that have a direct legal effect on the rights or interests of an individual are reviewable. Here, the refusal to reconsider did not alter Ms. Kuchlmayr’s rights or obligations, as it did not change the status of the reconsideration decision. The court applied the authority from *Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant A* (2000) 204 CLR 198, which established that a decision not to review a previous decision is not itself a reviewable decision unless it has a direct legal effect. Since the ACT’s refusal did not alter the legal outcome of the reconsideration decision, the court held it lacked jurisdiction.
Secondly, the court considered whether Ms. Kuchlmayr’s application was out of time if the Tribunal had jurisdiction. The court found that the application was indeed out of time, as it was made several years after the reconsideration decision was issued. The court applied the principle from *Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Teoh* (1995) 183 CLR 273, which held that applications for judicial review are subject to time limits to ensure finality and to prevent undue delay. Ms. Kuchlmayr’s application was clearly beyond the acceptable timeframe, given the extended period that had elapsed since the reconsideration decision.
Lastly, the court examined whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to grant additional time for the making of Ms. Kuchlmayr’s application. The court found that it was not reasonable to extend the time limit in this case. The court considered the factors outlined in *Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ* (2017) 260 CLR 583, which include whether there was any fault on the part of the applicant or the Tribunal, the length of the delay, and the impact of the delay on the parties. The court noted that Ms. Kuchlmayr had been aware of her rights and the potential to seek review for a significant period but had not acted promptly. Additionally, there was no evidence of any fault or exceptional circumstances that would warrant an extension of time. Therefore, the court held that it was not reasonable to grant additional time for the application.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to review a refusal to reconsider a decision by its own motion when such refusal does not alter the legal status or rights of the parties involved. Furthermore, if an application is out of time, it is not reasonable to grant additional time unless there are exceptional circumstances or fault on the part of the Tribunal. This case reaffirms the importance of adhering to statutory time limits for judicial review applications and highlights the court’s reluctance to extend such limits without strong justification.