Kowalski and Anor; Repatriation Commission and Anor and

Link copied
Case Copied 56 min read

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2009] AATA 853

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No 2008/3352

VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )
Re REPATRIATION COMMISSION

Applicant

And

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI

Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No 2009/1544

VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )
Re KAZIMIR KOWALSKI

Applicant

And

REPATRIATION COMMISSION

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Deputy President P E Hack SC

Date6 November 2009

PlaceAdelaide

Decision

A. In Application 2008/3352 the Tribunal:

      (1) sets aside the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board of 7 July 2008;

      (2) substitutes a decision that the applicant’s decision of 20 February   2008 be affirmed.

B. In Application 2009/1544 the Tribunal adjourns the application to a date to be fixed.

...............Signed...........

Deputy President

  1. Mr Kazimir Kowalski served in the Australian Army between April 1972 and October 1973. He suffers from a condition called gastro-oesophageal reflux disease (GORD). He made a claim to the Repatriation Commission to have that condition accepted as being “defence-caused” as that expression is used in the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth). On 20 February 2008 the Commission rejected that claim because it was not satisfied that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was defence-caused.

  2. Mr Kowalski sought a review of the Commission’s decision by the Veterans’ Review Board. The Commission, in accordance with what I understand to be its ordinary practice, did not appear before the Board nor make any submissions to the Board as to why its decisions ought to be accepted. On 7 July 2008 the Board determined that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was defence-caused and remitted the matter to the Commission for assessment of the rate of pension.

  3. On 18 August 2008, following the remitter from the Board, the Commission assessed Mr Kowalski’s pension at 10% of the General Rate. The Board affirmed this decision on 3 April 2009.

  4. There are two applications before the Tribunal. In Application 2008/3352 the Commission seeks a review of the Board’s decision of 7 July 2008 accepting GORD as a defence-caused condition. In Application 2009/1544 Mr Kowalski seeks a review of the Commission’s decision to assess his pension for the disability occasioned by GORD at 10%. For the reasons explained in paragraphs [73] to [74] below that latter application is to be adjourned. The Commission’s application is the only application that I need decide.

  5. In that application Mr Kowalski contends that the Commission, having made a deliberate and conscious decision not to attend the hearing before the Board, having made a deliberate and conscious decision not to raise all of its defences or to make any written or oral submissions to the Board, is now precluded by an “Anshun estoppel”[1] from asserting that the Board was wrong to conclude that his GORD was defence-caused. The consequence, Mr Kowalski says, is that the Commission’s application is an abuse of process and must be rejected. In what I understood to be a distinct and separate argument Mr Kowalski also contends that, as a matter of statutory construction, the Commission’s application cannot be treated as a hearing de novo;…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kowalski and Anor; Repatriation Commission and Anor and and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] AATA 853
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kowalski and Anor; Repatriation Commission and Anor, the Federal Court of Australia addressed a dispute concerning the eligibility of Mr Kowalski for a defence-caused disease pension under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986. The primary issue before the Court was whether Mr Kowalski's gastro oesophageal reflux disease (GORD) was attributable to his military service, which would entitle him to a pension. The Repatriation Commission had previously determined that Mr Kowalski's GORD was not caused by his service, a decision that was later reviewed and overturned by the Veterans' Review Board. The Commission sought to have the Board's decision overturned, raising concerns about procedural estoppel, statutory interpretation, and potential bias in the proceedings.

The Court considered whether the Repatriation Commission was estopped from challenging the Board's findings due to procedural irregularities, specifically under the doctrine of Anshun estoppel. The Court held that such estoppel did not apply in this context, as it was not a case of a party taking advantage of its own procedural misstep. Additionally, the Court assessed whether the Commission's application should be treated as an appeal requiring identification of error, or as a de novo hearing. It concluded that the application was indeed an appeal and found no legal error in the Board's decision-making process. Finally, the Court dismissed Mr Kowalski's argument regarding the disqualification of the Commission on grounds of apprehended bias, finding no such bias existed.

The Court's decision ultimately affirmed the Commission's initial finding that Mr Kowalski's GORD was not defence-caused, thereby setting aside the Board's decision. The Court found that the Board had erred in treating certain medical reports as sufficient evidence of causation without considering the full context of the reports. The Court also adjourned Mr Kowalski's separate application concerning the degree of his disability, pending further evidence and possible appeal processes. The orders included setting aside the Veterans' Review Board's decision and reinstating the Commission's decision, as well as adjourning Mr Kowalski's application for further proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

A. In Application 2008/3352 the Tribunal:

(1) sets aside the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board of 7 July 2008;

(2) substitutes a decision that the applicant’s decision of 20 February 2008 be affirmed.

B. In Application 2009/1544 the Tribunal adjourns the application to a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In that application Mr Kowalski contends that the Commission, having made a deliberate and conscious decision not to attend the hearing before the Board, having made a deliberate and conscious decision not to raise all of its defences or to make any written or oral submissions to the Board, is now precluded by an “Anshun estoppel”[1] from asserting that the Board was wrong to conclude that his GORD was defence-caused. The consequence, Mr Kowalski says, is that the Commission’s application is an abuse of process and must be rejected. In what I understood to be a distinct and separate argument Mr Kowalski also contends that, as a matter of statutory construction, the Commission’s application cannot be treated as a hearing de novo; it was, he said, to be treated as an appeal in the strict sense such that the Commission was obliged to identify an error in the reasons of the Board. And, he said, there was no legal error in the Board’s reasoning.[1] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589.Legislative background By virtue of s 70 of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to a “member of the Forces” where the member is incapacitated from a “defence-caused injury or defence-caused disease”. It is accepted that Mr Kowalski was a member of the Forces. He answers that description, and Part IV of the Act applies to him, because he satisfies s 69(1) (f) of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act. It is not in issue that Mr Kowalski’s GORD answers the description of “disease” in s 5D (1) of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act. What amounts to a defence-caused disease is dealt with in s 70(5) of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act in these terms:“(5)For the purposes of this Act, the death of a member of the Forces (other than a member to whom this Part applies solely because of section 69A) or member of a Peacekeeping Force shall be taken to have been defence‑caused, an injury suffered by such a member shall be taken to be a defence‑caused injury or a disease contracted by such a member shall be taken to be a defence‑caused disease if:(a)the death, injury or disease, as the case may be, arose out of, or was attributable to, any defence service, or peacekeeping service, as the case may be, of the member;(b)subject to subsection (8), the death, injury or disease, as the case may be, resulted from an accident that occurred while the member was travelling, during any defence service or peacekeeping service of the member but otherwise than in the course of duty, on a journey to a place for the purpose of performing duty or away from a place upon having ceased to perform duty; or(c)the death is to be deemed by subsection (6) to be defence‑caused, the injury is to be deemed by subsection (7) to be a defence‑caused injury or the disease is to be deemed by subsection (7) to be a defence‑caused disease, as the case may be; or(d)the injury or disease from which the member died, or is incapacitated:(i)was suffered or contracted during any defence service or peacekeeping service of the member, but did not arise out of that service; or(ii)was suffered or contracted before the commencement of the period, or the last period, of defence service or peacekeeping service of the member, but not during such a period of service;and, in the opinion of the Commission, the injury or disease was contributed to in a material degree by, or was aggravated by, any defence service or peacekeeping service rendered by the member, being service rendered after the member suffered that injury or contracted that disease; or(e)the injury or disease from which the member died is an injury or disease that has been determined in accordance with this section other than this paragraph to have been a defence‑caused injury or defence‑caused disease, as the case may be;Note:The effect of paragraph (e) is that, if the member has died from an injury or disease that has already been determined by the Commission to be defence‑caused, the death is to be taken to have been defence‑caused. Accordingly the Commission is not required to relate the death to defence service or peacekeeping service rendered by the member and sections 120A and 120B do not apply.but not otherwise.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

As should be clear, I accept the evidence of Dr Reid and Dr Hetzel and reject Mr Kowalski’s intemperate and unfounded criticisms of them.Conclusion It follows that I would set aside the Board’s decision and would substitute a decision affirming the Commission’s decision of 20 February 2008, that is, that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was not defence-caused. While it is not necessary to do so, it may assist Mr Kowalski if I explain where I would respectfully suggest that the Board fell into error. First, and most critically, it appears to me that the Board treated the matters in the SoP as evidence in themselves. Thus, it regarded as sufficient to establish causation the mere fact that Mr Kowalski suffered from GORD and had been prescribed muscle relaxant drugs. But it failed to appreciate that there was no evidence that Mr Kowalski had GORD in 1973. It appears, for reasons that are not clear to me, that the Board had only the first four pages of the report of Dr Reid dated 20 March 2006. Within that extract was the opinion of Dr Reid that Mr Kowalski’s then current symptoms were due to GORD. Unfortunately the Board did not have before it the balance of Dr Reid’s report which, on page 5, expressed the opinion that Mr Kowalski’s condition of GORD “was not materially contributed to by his employment with the Army”. I imagine that if the Board had had the entirety of Dr Reid’s report the conclusion would likely have been quite different. As the medical evidence available to me makes clear, Mr Kowalski’s symptoms were not evidence of the presence of GORD, they were more likely explained by his ulcer. There was then no evidence of the onset of GORD, merely evidence that Mr Kowalski suffered from it at the time of the hearing before the Board. Moreover, there was no material from which the Board could conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was connected with his service. It is only after there is such material that it becomes necessary for the Commission or the Board or the Tribunal to have regard to the SoP to determine whether the SoP upholds the contention that has otherwise been made out on the evidence.Mr Kowalski’s application At the conclusion of the evidence in the proceedings Mr Kowalski realised that he had overlooked asking questions of the doctors to establish the degree of his disability, that is, questions designed to demonstrate that his assessment of impairment ought to have been greater than the figure of 10% determined by the Commission and affirmed by the Board. With the concurrence of the Board I agreed that it would be best if that proceeding be adjourned to be heard separately at some time in the future if that became necessary. In light of the conclusion that I have reached on the Commission’s application there is now no utility in that application however it would be premature to dispose of that application before the expiry of any appeal period or the determination of any appeal if instituted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the issue of Anshun estoppel. It considered the principles established in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd and subsequent cases, noting that Anshun estoppel applies where a party has made a deliberate and conscious decision not to raise a defence or argument in a prior proceeding. However, the court found that the Repatriation Commission’s decision not to attend the hearing before the Board and not to raise all its defences or make submissions did not amount to the necessary deliberate and conscious decision required for Anshun estoppel to apply. The court held that Anshun estoppel did not preclude the Commission from contesting the Board’s factual findings, as the estoppel only applies within the ascending hierarchy of merits review and not to the Commission’s appeal to the Tribunal.

Next, the court examined whether the Repatriation Commission’s application should be treated as an appeal in the strict sense. The court noted the distinction between an appeal in the strict sense, which requires the identification of an error in the reasons of the prior decision-maker, and a review on the merits, which allows for a fresh consideration of the evidence and arguments. The court held that the application should be treated as a review on the merits, allowing it to consider whether the Board’s decision was correct and whether the evidence supported the conclusion that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was defence-caused.

Finally, the court turned to the substantive issue of whether there was evidence to support the conclusion that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was defence-caused. The court found that the Board erred in its consideration of the evidence, particularly by treating the mere fact of Mr Kowalski’s GORD and the prescription of muscle relaxant drugs as sufficient to establish causation. The court held that there was no evidence that Mr Kowalski had GORD in 1973 and that the Board’s conclusion was not supported by the available evidence. As a result, the court set aside the Board’s decision and affirmed the Repatriation Commission’s decision that Mr Kowalski’s GORD was not defence-caused.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that Anshun estoppel does not apply to a Repatriation Commission appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and such an appeal is treated as a review on the merits. Furthermore, for a claim of a defence-caused disease under the Veterans’ Entitlement Act, there must be evidence connecting the disease to defence service, and the absence of such evidence can result in the affirmation of the Commission’s decision.