Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 163
Hearing dates:31 January 2012
Decision date: 05 March 2012
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Harrison J
Decision:

Appeal dismissed with costs

Catchwords: APPEAL - practice and procedure - discovery - application for further discovery by defendant - appeal from decision of Associate Judge - whether documents subject to 'without prejudice' privilege were discoverable - whether s 131(2)(g) of the Evidence Act 2005 was engaged - whether party claiming client legal privilege has acted inconsistently with the maintenance of privilege - defendant's appeal dismissed
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005
Evidence Act 1995
Insurance Contracts Act 1984
Supreme Court Act 1970
Supreme Court Act 1935
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
Cases Cited: AIG Europe (Ireland) Ltd v Faraday Capital Ltd [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 527
Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1040
Bailey v Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation [2009] NSWCA 100; (2009) 74 NSWLR 333
BNP Paribas v Pacific Carriers [2005] NSWCA 72
Chen & Ors v City Convenience Leasing Pty Ltd & Anor [2005] NSWCA 297
Council of the NSW Bar Association v Archer [2008] NSWCA 164; (2008) 72 NSWLR 236
Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd [1974] HCA 3; (1974) 130 CLR 1
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499
Edwards v Insurance Office of Australia (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 88
Enterprise Oil Ltd v Strand Insurance Co Ltd [2007] EWHC 58 (Comm)
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd [2006] FCAFC 86
In the matter of Idoport Pty Ltd (in liq) (recs apptd); National Australia Bank Limited (& Ors) v John Sheahan (& Ors) [2012] NSWSC 58
Kernaghan v Corrections Corporation of Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1040
Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 413
Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1
Sabre Corporation Pty Ltd v Russ Kalvin's Hair Care Company (1993) 46 FCR 428
Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152
TransGrid v Members of Lloyds Syndicate 3210 [2011] NSWSC 301
Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 38; (1998) 192 CLR 603
Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; (1979) 142 CLR 531
Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd (2009) 262 ALR 738
Category:Interlocutory applications
Parties: Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Marsh Pty Ltd (Defendant)
Representation: T M Faulkner (Plaintiff)
M A Jones SC (Defendant)
Baker & McKenzie (Plaintiff)
Wotton + Kearney Solicitors (Defendant)
File Number(s):2007/265109

Judgment

  1. HIS HONOUR : This is an appeal from the decision of Harrison AsJ in Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 413, in which her Honour dismissed an application by Marsh pursuant to UCPR 49.19 for a review of the…

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Details
Case
[2012] NSWSC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Komatsu Marketing Support Australia Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd, the dispute between the parties involved issues concerning the admissibility of certain documents during the discovery process, and the application of legal privilege. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether documents subject to 'without prejudice' privilege were discoverable, and if section 131(2)(g) of the Evidence Act 2005 applied in the context of discovery.

The court considered the argument presented by Komatsu that the Associate Judge erred in finding that section 131(2)(g) of the Evidence Act applied to discovery. The court noted that while the issue was not argued extensively before it, it did not find any fundamental reason why the section could not apply to discovery. The court reasoned that there could be circumstances, such as when issues emerge during the course of a trial in which evidence has already been adduced, where a party may be required to provide further discovery. As a result, the court dismissed Marsh's appeal from the decision of Harrison AsJ, with costs.

In the context of Komatsu's claim against Marsh, the court found that Komatsu's assertion that its contribution to a settlement was reasonable was not an essential element of its cause of action. Komatsu was still required to prove that it suffered loss and damage and the quantum of that loss, regardless of its assertions concerning the reasonableness of any sum it contributed to the settlement. The court also noted that any legal advice Komatsu may have received concerning the issues in question was irrelevant to the pleaded case against Marsh, as it did not seek to justify or support any particular course of action taken in the Western Australian proceedings.

The final orders of the court were that Marsh's appeal from the decision of Harrison AsJ was dismissed, with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Komatsu relied upon a notice of contention seeking to affirm her Honour's decision upon the single ground that she erred in finding that s 131(2)(g) of the Evidence Act applied to discovery. In the events that occurred, this issue was not argued in detail or at length before me and I am disinclined to express any binding view upon the matter in those circumstances. However, having regard to the terms of the section and of s 131A(2) of the Act, I can detect no obvious or fundamental reason why the section could not apply to discovery. In particular, but by way of example only, I have in mind circumstances where a party may be required to provide further discovery as the result of issues emerging during the course of a trial in which evidence has already been adduced. It follows in these circumstances that Marsh's appeal from the decision of Harrison AsJ should be dismissed with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ward J also referred to what was said by Beaumont J in his dissenting judgment in Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 at 157-8 as follows: In the present case Komatsu has pleaded that its net contribution to the Western Australian settlement was reasonable. To the extent that proof of that fact is an essential element in Komatsu's cause of action against Marsh, it would necessarily bear the onus of doing so. However, a bare assertion in its pleading that the contribution was reasonable will not, standing alone, be sufficient either to establish that it was as a matter of fact or to discharge the relevant onus. Komatsu will still be required to prove both that it suffered loss and damage and the quantum of that loss. In that sense, a pleading that its contribution to the settlement was reasonable is neither an essential nor the only ingredient of its claim, and is probably redundant. The quantum of any loss that Komatsu may become entitled to recover from Marsh will have to be established regardless of its assertions concerning the reasonableness or otherwise of any sum it chose to contribute to the settlement of the Western Australian proceedings. Adopting the reasoning of Gummow J at [67] in Pezzano , it was not within the reasonable contemplation of Marsh and Komatsu that the measure of Marsh's liability to Komatsu would be determined by the conduct of parties over whom Marsh had no control, namely Komatsu and the insurers. Marsh had not undertaken to indemnify Komatsu against any shortfall upon a settlement of litigation between it and the insurers In the Western Australian proceedings, Komatsu was potentially uninsured to the extent that its insurers could successfully rely upon the relevant exclusion clauses. It was prudent in the circumstances, therefore, for Komatsu to take such steps as it could to limit the potentially uninsured liability that it faced at the suit of Kalgoorlie. Termination of the Western Australian proceedings was a step that had this effect and was consistent with such obligation as it had to mitigate its loss. However, Komatsu does not in terms or by implication plead that it took any particular step in the Western Australian proceedings relying upon legal advice or that any element of its cause of action against Marsh can be established by proving that it did so. Nor can it be said that any such pleading arises by inference. As I have indicated, Komatsu presently remains confronted with the not inconsiderable task of establishing the quantum of the loss that it would have been required to bear itself if the insurers had been able successfully to rely upon the exclusion clauses to deny or avoid indemnity to Komatsu in whole or in part. Any legal advice that it may have received concerning those issues is wholly beside the point as the pleaded case against Marsh now stands. It would be different if Komatsu sought originally or at some later stage by amendment to pray in aid the advice that it received either to justify or support some particular course of action that it may have taken in the Western Australian proceedings. At one level such advice would be irrelevant because, "standing alone, the fact that a litigant was advised to settle at a particular figure reveals little or nothing about whether the settlement reached was reasonable": per Hayne J at [130] in Pezzano .