KMC v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ

KMC  APPLICANT

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)                 RESPONDENT

KMC v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)

[2020] HCA 6

Date of Hearing: 6 February 2020
Date of Order: 6 February 2020
Date of Publication of Reasons: 18 March 2020

A20/2019

ORDER

1.Extension of time for permission to appeal against sentence and permission to appeal be granted.

2.Appeal allowed.

3.The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on 17 August 2017 be set aside.

4.The matter be remitted to the sentencing judge for re-sentencing according to law.

Representation

S A McDonald with B J Doyle for the applicant (instructed by Legal Services Commission of South Australia)

C D Bleby SC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia, with M E Boisseau and F J McDonald for the respondent and for the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia, intervening (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) and Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales, with J S Caldwell for the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office (NSW))

M E O'Farrell SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Tasmania, with J L Rudolf for the Attorney-General for the State of Tasmania, intervening (instructed by Office of the Solicitor-General for the State of Tasmania)

K L Walker QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria, with K A O'Gorman for the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria, intervening (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

G A Thompson QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with F J Nagorcka for the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ. The applicant was charged in the District Court of South Australia with one count of persistent sexual exploitation of a child against s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ("the CLCA"), as then in force. The "Particulars of Offence" alleged that over a period of not less than three days, between 1 March 2013 and 6 February 2016, the applicant committed more than one act of sexual exploitation of the victim, a person under the age of 17 years, by (a) performing an act of cunnilingus upon her; (b) causing her to perform an act of fellatio upon him; (c) inserting his penis into her anus; and (d) urinating on her.

  2. After a trial before a judge and jury, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty. The jury was discharged without being asked any questions as to the basis of its verdict. In August 2017, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years and three days, with a non-parole period of five years, with the…

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Details
Case
[2020] HCA 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by KMC against a sentence imposed by a sentencing judge for the offence of persistent sexual exploitation of a child, contrary to section 50(1) of the *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935* (SA). The appeal concerned the sentencing process following the High Court's decision in *Chiro v The Queen* (2017) 260 CLR 425, which mandated that a sentencing judge must either ask the jury to identify the specific underlying acts of sexual exploitation found proved or sentence on the basis most favourable to the offender. In this instance, it was unclear which alleged acts the jury had found proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the applicant argued he was not sentenced on the most favourable basis.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether section 9(1) of the *Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General's Portfolio) (No 2) Act 2017* (SA) (the Amending Act) applied to validate the sentence, and whether the sentencing remarks adequately identified the acts of sexual exploitation determined by the sentencing court to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant contended that the sentencing judge had not followed the principles established in *Chiro*, as the jury's findings were not clearly identified, and the sentence was not based on the facts most favourable to him.

The High Court reasoned that the applicant was not sentenced on the basis of the facts most favourable to him, which was a requirement of the law as stated in *Chiro*. Consequently, the sentencing was contrary to legal requirements. The Court found that section 9(1) of the Amending Act was not engaged in this case, meaning the provision did not operate to cure the sentencing error. Therefore, questions regarding the constitutional validity of that provision did not arise. The Court granted an extension of time for the permission to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the sentence imposed and remitting the matter to the sentencing judge for re-sentencing according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Extension of time for permission to appeal against sentence and permission to appeal be granted.

2. Appeal allowed.

3. The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on 17 August 2017 be set aside.

4. The matter be remitted to the sentencing judge for re-sentencing according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ
And absent legislative provisions to the contrary, where a sentencing judge takes facts into account in a way that is adverse to the interests of the accused, the facts found to be proved by the sentencing judge must be established beyond reasonable doubt[29]. For the benefit of all involved, the sentencing remarks would, out of an abundance of caution, ordinarily record that this was the approach adopted.[29]Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at 281 [27]; Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47 at 69 [64].Conclusion The applicant was not sentenced on the basis of the facts most favourable to him. His sentencing was therefore contrary to what the law (as stated by Chiro) required. Section 9(1) of the Amending Act was not engaged. Questions of the constitutional validity of that provision do not arise.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ