HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
KIRMANI v. CAPTAIN COOK CRUISES PTY. LTD. (No. 2)
17 April 1985
Constitutional Law (Cth)
Constitutional Law (Cth)—Privy Council—Appeal from High Court—Question as to limits inter se of constitutional powers of Commonwealth and States—Certificate of High Court—Principles governing grant—Practice—Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth)—Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth)—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 74.
Decision
GIBBS C.J., MASON, WILSON, BRENNAN, DEANE and DAWSON JJ. This Court's power to grant a certificate under s.74 of the Constitution is the vestigial remnant of the hierarchical connection which formerly existed between Australian courts exercising federal jurisdiction and the Privy Council.
2. From the beginning it was recognized that the provisions of s.74 which prevented an appeal to the Privy Council on inter se questions were -
" designed, in the first place, to safeguard the right of the people who had framed it, and had voted upon it, to interpret it, and to bring to an end conflicts between Commonwealth and States, by the decision of the Court which that Constitution was calling into existence ...". (Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, at p 628, per Barton J.).And, as Kitto J. later observed in Western Australia v. Hamersley Iron Pty.Ltd.(No.2) (1969) 120 CLR 74, at p 84 -
" The terms of the section and the nature of the questions to which it applies, relating as they do to the inter-relation of the organs of government within the Australian federation, were enough to ensure from the beginning that a proper case for the High Court to transfer to the Privy Council the task of final elucidation could seldom if ever arise."
3. Only once has this Court granted a certificate, and that was 73 years ago in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. The Commonwealth (1912) 15 CLR 182. The fundamental reason which has led the Court to refuse applications over the years was succinctly stated in the judgment of the Court delivered by Dixon C.J. in Whitehouse v. Queensland (1961) 104 CLR 635. Dixon C.J. said, at pp 637-638, that the principle which lies at the root of the section is "that experience shows - and that experience was anticipated when s.74 was enacted - that it is only those who dwell under a Federal Constitution who can become adequately qualified to interpret and apply its provisions".
4. In accordance with that approach this Court has rigorously insisted on maintaining its ultimate constitutional responsibility to decide conflicts between the Commonwealth and the States without the intervention of Her Majesty in Council. The last occasion on which an application was made, and made unsuccessfully, was in Hamersley. At that time the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth) had been enacted. With the subsequent enactment of the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) the hierarchical relationship…
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- Case
- [1985] HCA 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent had breached its duty of care to Mr Kirmani, and if so, whether that breach caused or contributed to his injuries. A further issue was the extent to which Mr Kirmani's own conduct might have contributed to his injuries, thereby potentially reducing the damages recoverable.
The Court considered the principles of negligence, particularly the duty of care owed by a carrier to its passengers and the assessment of contributory negligence. Applying these principles, the High Court found that while the respondent had been negligent in certain respects, Mr Kirmani's own actions were the primary cause of his injuries. The Court held that Mr Kirmani had failed to take reasonable care for his own safety, and that this failure was the dominant cause of the accident.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the order of the Full Federal Court and ordering that the damages awarded to Mr Kirmani be reduced by 75% to reflect his contributory negligence.
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