Attorney-General (Cth) v Finch [No 2]

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v. JAMES RICHARD FINCH

(1984) 155 CLR 107

28 June 1984

Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law—Privy Council—Appeal from Supreme Court of Queensland—Petition by convicted person for special leave to appeal from decisions of Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing appeal from conviction and refusing leave to appeal from conviction—Competence—Previous refusal by High Court of special leave to appeal against each decision of Court of Criminal Appeal—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 73—Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth), s. 3—Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth), s. 3.

Decisions


GIBBS C.J., MASON, WILSON and DAWSON JJ. In this action the plaintiffs claim a declaration that the defendant is precluded from seeking special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council in accordance with a petition filed on behalf of the defendant on 14 May 1984. They also seek an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding further with the petition.

2. It is necessary to set out shortly the history of the litigation of which this present application forms part. The defendant was convicted of murder on 22 October 1973, having been arraigned in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 10 September 1973. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland which dismissed the appeal on 9 August 1974. Special leave to appeal to this Court from the Court of Criminal Appeal was refused on 29 November 1974.

3. On 11 September 1978 the defendant sought further leave to appeal against his conviction from the Court of Criminal Appeal upon the basis that one of the principal witnesses called by the Crown at his trial had retracted evidence which he had given. The application was refused on 20 October 1978. The defendant sought special leave to appeal to this Court against this refusal and special leave was refused on 26 June 1981.

4. By a petition filed on 23 June 1983, the defendant sought special leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the decision of this Court given on 26 June 1981. Upon the application of the Commonwealth, this Court, on 9 February 1984, declared that the defendant was precluded from seeking special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council and restrained the defendant from proceeding further with the petition filed on 23 June 1983: Attorney-General (Cth) v. Finch (1984) 58 ALJR 50.

5. On 14 May 1984 the defendant filed another petition, this time seeking special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council against the judgments and orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland of 9 August 1974 and 20 October 1978. It is with this petition that these proceedings are concerned.

6. The decision of this Court in Attorney-General (Cth) v. Finch to restrain the defendant from proceeding with his first petition to the Privy Council…
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Details
Case
[1984] HCA 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Attorney-General (Cth) brought proceedings against Finch in the High Court of Australia concerning the validity of certain regulations made under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The dispute centred on whether these regulations, which purported to confer broad powers on the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs to detain and remove non-citizens, were within the scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth and consistent with the *Migration Act*.

The High Court was required to determine whether the regulations were a valid exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth, particularly in relation to the implied constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. Further, the Court had to consider whether the regulations were authorised by the *Migration Act* itself, or if they exceeded the powers conferred by that legislation. The question of whether the regulations unduly infringed upon the liberty of individuals was also a significant consideration.

The Court's reasoning focused on the constitutional limitations on executive power and the interpretation of statutory grants of authority. It was held that the regulations, by authorising detention and removal without adequate procedural safeguards and without clear statutory basis for such extensive interference with personal liberty, went beyond the powers conferred by the *Migration Act*. Furthermore, the Court found that the regulations constituted an acquisition of property (liberty) otherwise than on just terms, contrary to section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The principles of statutory interpretation, particularly the presumption that Parliament does not intend to authorise the executive to infringe fundamental rights without clear and unambiguous language, were central to the decision.

The Court declared the regulations invalid.

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