Killen v Commissioner of Police

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   KILLEN -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2014] WASC 427

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   14 MARCH 2014 & ON THE PAPERS BY FURTHER SUBMISSIONS OF 3 & 17 APRIL 2014

DELIVERED          :   14 NOVEMBER 2014

FILE NO/S:   GDA 12 of 2013

BETWEEN:   SCOTT KILLEN

Applicant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :DR B DE VILLIERS (MEMBER)

File No  :CC 285 of 2013

Catchwords:

Appeal - Application for leave to appeal - Jurisdiction of State Administrative Tribunal to conduct review of refusal to issue firearm licence - Whether Tribunal able to determine validity of decision made at first instance - Whether Tribunal's review jurisdiction excluded

Legislation:

Firearms Act 1973 (WA)
Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Leave to amend grounds of appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr P J Marsh

Respondent:     Ms J N Harman

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Waterside Legal

Respondent:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Cases referred to in judgment:

Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117

Dunbar v Commissioner of Police [2007] WASAT 90; (2007) 51 SR (WA) 318

Health Resorts of Australasia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2007] WASAT 60; (2007) 51 SR (WA) 266

Killen and Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 118

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597

Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re Adams and The Tax Agents' Board (1976) 12 ALR 239

The Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50

PRITCHARD J:

Introduction

  1. Mr Killen made an application under the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (the Act) for a firearm licence[1] in relation to a rifle (the rifle) for use for recreational hunting and shooting.  A delegate of the Commissioner of Police (the respondent) refused that application.[2] Mr Killen then made another application for a firearm licence in respect of the rifle, for use in competitions as part of a gun club. The respondent refused that application also (the respondent's decision). The reason for the refusal of the application in both instances was the same, namely that the respondent was satisfied that the rifle resembled a firearm prohibited by reg 26 of the Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA) (the Regulations) and that therefore a licence could not be issued in relation to the rifle, by virtue of reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations.

    [1] Under s 16(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA), a Firearm Licence entitles the holder to possess, carry and lawfully use the firearm named and identified in that licence, and ammunition for that firearm.

    [2] The decision-maker was an officer within the categories of officers…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Killen v Commissioner of Police and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] WASC 427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Killen v Commissioner of Police, the applicant, Mr Killen, sought to appeal a decision by the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) dismissing his application for review of a decision by the Commissioner of Police to refuse his application for a firearm licence. The dispute centred on the Commissioner's refusal to issue a licence to Mr Killen for a specific firearm, which was categorised as a Category B firearm under the Firearms Regulations. The refusal was based on the Commissioner's opinion that the firearm closely resembled a Category D firearm, which is prohibited under the Regulations. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the SAT had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision, given that the Firearms Act and Regulations excluded certain decisions from review. Specifically, the court had to determine if the decision made by the Commissioner under Regulation 26B(2)(a) was reviewable by the SAT or if it was excluded by section 6(1a) of the Act.

The court examined the statutory framework and found that the decision-making process under Regulation 26B(2)(a) was indeed excluded from review by section 6(1a) of the Act. The court held that the Commissioner was authorised to form an opinion that the firearm closely resembled a prohibited firearm, and this opinion was integral to exercising the power to refuse the licence. The court concluded that since the power to make such a decision was derived from section 6 of the Act, and not section 11C, the decision was not subject to review by the SAT. The court further clarified that the basis for the Commissioner's opinion, while relevant, did not affect the exclusion of the decision from review under section 6(1a). The court's reasoning was based on the clear statutory language and the legislative intent to exclude certain decisions from review to maintain the integrity of specific regulatory powers.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Mr Killen's application for leave to appeal, upholding the SAT's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision. The court found no error in the SAT's interpretation and application of the statutory provisions, affirming that the decision was correctly excluded from review. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with no orders for costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The background facts and the decision at first instance The Act and the Regulations comprehensively regulate the possession, use, storage, licensing, sale, and disposal of firearms and ammunition in Western Australia. One aspect of that regulation is achieved by establishing different categories of firearms and ammunition.[4] That categorisation has implications for various aspects of the regulation of firearms, such as their acquisition, sale and use[5] and for the penalty applicable to certain offences under the Act.[6] The categories of firearms are set out in sch 3 to the Regulations. Relevantly for present purposes, Category B firearms include various kinds of centre fire rifles, including repeating centre fire rifles, while Category D firearms include self‑loading centre fire rifles,[7] which include, but are not limited to, those designed or adapted for military purposes or firearms that substantially duplicate firearms of that kind in design, function, or appearance.[8] In his second application for a firearm licence, Mr Killen indicated that he sought the licence in order to purchase a firearm falling within category B, for use as a member of a gun club in order 'to compete in Combined Services rifle shoots' at his local gun range. The firearm serviceability certificate which Mr Killen submitted with his application indicated that the firearm in question was a 0.308 calibre, DTA (Desert Tactical Arms) make, SRS (Stealth Recon Scout) model, Rifle Bolt Repeater with centre fire ammunition, falling within Category B. The Tribunal's review jurisdiction derives from s 22(2) of the Act, which permits a person aggrieved by a decision made by or on behalf of the Commissioner to apply to the Tribunal for a review. A 'decision' includes a restriction, limitation or condition imposed under the Act.[9] That is an inclusive, and not exhaustive, definition. Clearly, a decision to grant or refuse a licence constitutes a 'decision' for the purposes of s 22 of the Act. [9] Firearms Act 1973 (WA) s 22(1). The respondent's power to grant a firearm licence derives from s 18(6) of the Act. Whether a licence should be granted depends on the respondent being satisfied of a number of matters, namely that the requirements of s 18 have been satisfied, that there are no grounds upon which the application ought to be refused, and in the case of an application for the first issue of a firearm licence to a person, that the applicant has confirmed his or her desire to proceed with the application after 28 days have elapsed following the making of the application for the licence.[10] [10] Firearms Act 1973 (WA) s 18(6). Although the power to grant a licence in s 18 is not limited, on its face, to particular firearms, the Parliament expressly contemplated that certain kinds of firearms should not be licensed. Subsection 6(1a) of the Act indicates that firearms which require the exercise of special precautions may be named in regulations, which prohibit the grant of a licence in respect of those firearms. In so far as it is presently relevant, s 6(1a) provides:… [T]he Governor … may, in relation to any firearm or ammunition which is, because of its nature or characteristics, of a kind requiring the exercise of special precautions and which is named, or falls within a description given in, or is otherwise identified by, those regulations, make regulations ‑(a)directing that no licence, permit or approval relating thereto shall be issued or given;(b)directing that no licence, permit or approval relating thereto shall be capable of being renewed after a date specified in the regulations; or(c)otherwise making such provision as may be expedient in relation thereto,and for the purposes of section 22 the exercise of any power pursuant to those regulations shall not be taken to have been a decision made by or on behalf of the Commissioner.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal's reasons for concluding that it had no jurisdiction to review the respondent's decision The Tribunal concluded[12] that the respondent's decision was not open to review, for the following reasons.[13] First, it had been argued before the Tribunal that reg 26 and reg 26B of the Regulations were in fact made pursuant to s 11C of the Act. The Tribunal held that simply because there was no statement in the Regulations that reg 26 and reg 26B were made pursuant to s 6 of the Act, it could not be concluded that those regulations were made pursuant to s 11C of the Act. Secondly, the Tribunal concluded that the prohibition of firearms and ammunition under reg 26 of the Regulations was consistent with the power granted under s 6 of the Act. Thirdly, the Tribunal held that the powers exercised by the respondent pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations derived from s 6, and not from s 11C, of the Act and the respondent was exercising the power in reg 6B to refuse Mr Killen's application because he had formed the opinion that the rifle closely resembled a firearm which was prohibited under reg 26. Finally, the Tribunal held that a decision made pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations was not open to be reviewed pursuant to s 22 of the Act, by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act.[12] Killen and Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 118.[13] Killen and Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 118 [26]. In summary, the Tribunal found that the respondent was the decision‑maker who was permitted to form the requisite opinion for the purposes of the respondent's decision (this was not a matter in dispute at the hearing), that the respondent was authorised to form an opinion pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations that the firearm closely resembled a firearm prohibited under reg 26, that the power exercised by the respondent arose from reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations which in turn was enacted pursuant to s 6 of the Act, and as a result the respondent's decision was not open to review by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act.[14] The original grounds of appeal, the applications to amend, the grounds, and the amended grounds of appeal [14] Killen and Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 118 [27]. Mr Killen initially sought leave to appeal against the respondent's decision on two grounds:The Tribunal erred in law when it held that:(1)The opinion of the Respondent formed for the purpose of reg 26B(2)(a) [of the Regulations] was excluded from review by the Tribunal by s 6(1a) [of the Act] when it should have held:(i)that the formation of the opinion was not an exercise of any power pursuant to reg 26B; and/or(ii)that the question posed by reg 26B(2)(a) is a question of whether the firearm under consideration fell within a description given in the Regulations and on the proper construction of s 6(1a) the answer to that question determines if s 6(1a) excludes review by the Tribunal or not.(2)The opinion of the Respondent formed for the purpose of reg 26B(2)(a) is excluded from decisions reviewable by the Tribunal by s 6(1a) [of the Act] without consideration of the basis for that opinion when it should have held:(i)The opinion of the Respondent required by reg 26B(2)(a) is (relevantly) a precondition to the Respondent's exercise of a power pursuant to that regulation.(ii)The holding of the opinion on a lawful and proper basis is necessary if reg 26B is to apply.(iii)The lawful and proper basis of the Respondent's opinion is a jurisdictional question for the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed the first issue by examining the legislative framework governing firearm licensing in Western Australia. It found that the Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that the respondent's decision was not open to review by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act. The court noted that the Regulations were properly enacted under s 6 of the Act, and that the respondent's decision to refuse the firearm licence was based on an opinion formed pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations, which in turn derived from s 6 of the Act. Consequently, the court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the respondent's decision was not subject to review.

In relation to the second issue, the court considered the proper construction of reg 26B(2)(a) and s 6(1a) of the Act. It held that the question posed by reg 26B(2)(a) does not concern whether the firearm under consideration falls within a description given in the Regulations. Instead, the court found that the question pertains to the exercise of a power under reg 26B(2)(a), which is derived from s 6 of the Act. Therefore, the answer to the question does not determine if s 6(1a) excludes review by the Tribunal.

Regarding the third issue, the court determined that the Tribunal did not err in law when it held that the opinion of the respondent formed for the purpose of reg 26B(2)(a) is excluded from decisions reviewable by the Tribunal by s 6(1a) of the Act without consideration of the basis for that opinion. The court reasoned that the opinion formed by the respondent is an exercise of a power derived from s 6 of the Act, and thus, the basis for the opinion is irrelevant to the question of whether the decision is reviewable under s 22 of the Act.

Finally, the court addressed the fourth issue by examining whether the opinion of the respondent required by reg 26B(2)(a) is a precondition to the respondent's exercise of a power pursuant to that regulation. The court concluded that it is not, and therefore, the holding of the opinion on a lawful and proper basis is not a jurisdictional question for the Tribunal. Consequently, the court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the opinion of the respondent is excluded from review by the Tribunal by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the exercise of a power derived from s 6 of the Act, such as the formation of an opinion pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations, is not subject to review by the Tribunal under s 22 of the Act. Furthermore, the basis for the opinion is irrelevant to the question of whether the decision is reviewable under s 22 of the Act.