JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: KILLEN -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2014] WASC 427
CORAM: PRITCHARD J
HEARD: 14 MARCH 2014 & ON THE PAPERS BY FURTHER SUBMISSIONS OF 3 & 17 APRIL 2014
DELIVERED : 14 NOVEMBER 2014
FILE NO/S: GDA 12 of 2013
BETWEEN: SCOTT KILLEN
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :DR B DE VILLIERS (MEMBER)
File No :CC 285 of 2013
Catchwords:
Appeal - Application for leave to appeal - Jurisdiction of State Administrative Tribunal to conduct review of refusal to issue firearm licence - Whether Tribunal able to determine validity of decision made at first instance - Whether Tribunal's review jurisdiction excluded
Legislation:
Firearms Act 1973 (WA)
Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)
Result:
Leave to amend grounds of appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr P J Marsh
Respondent: Ms J N Harman
Solicitors:
Applicant: Waterside Legal
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Cases referred to in judgment:
Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117
Dunbar v Commissioner of Police [2007] WASAT 90; (2007) 51 SR (WA) 318
Health Resorts of Australasia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2007] WASAT 60; (2007) 51 SR (WA) 266
Killen and Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 118
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Adams and The Tax Agents' Board (1976) 12 ALR 239
The Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50
PRITCHARD J:
Introduction
Mr Killen made an application under the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (the Act) for a firearm licence[1] in relation to a rifle (the rifle) for use for recreational hunting and shooting. A delegate of the Commissioner of Police (the respondent) refused that application.[2] Mr Killen then made another application for a firearm licence in respect of the rifle, for use in competitions as part of a gun club. The respondent refused that application also (the respondent's decision). The reason for the refusal of the application in both instances was the same, namely that the respondent was satisfied that the rifle resembled a firearm prohibited by reg 26 of the Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA) (the Regulations) and that therefore a licence could not be issued in relation to the rifle, by virtue of reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations.
[1] Under s 16(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA), a Firearm Licence entitles the holder to possess, carry and lawfully use the firearm named and identified in that licence, and ammunition for that firearm.
[2] The decision-maker was an officer within the categories of officers…
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- Case
- [2014] WASC 427
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework and found that the decision-making process under Regulation 26B(2)(a) was indeed excluded from review by section 6(1a) of the Act. The court held that the Commissioner was authorised to form an opinion that the firearm closely resembled a prohibited firearm, and this opinion was integral to exercising the power to refuse the licence. The court concluded that since the power to make such a decision was derived from section 6 of the Act, and not section 11C, the decision was not subject to review by the SAT. The court further clarified that the basis for the Commissioner's opinion, while relevant, did not affect the exclusion of the decision from review under section 6(1a). The court's reasoning was based on the clear statutory language and the legislative intent to exclude certain decisions from review to maintain the integrity of specific regulatory powers.
Ultimately, the court dismissed Mr Killen's application for leave to appeal, upholding the SAT's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision. The court found no error in the SAT's interpretation and application of the statutory provisions, affirming that the decision was correctly excluded from review. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with no orders for costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the first issue by examining the legislative framework governing firearm licensing in Western Australia. It found that the Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that the respondent's decision was not open to review by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act. The court noted that the Regulations were properly enacted under s 6 of the Act, and that the respondent's decision to refuse the firearm licence was based on an opinion formed pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations, which in turn derived from s 6 of the Act. Consequently, the court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the respondent's decision was not subject to review.
In relation to the second issue, the court considered the proper construction of reg 26B(2)(a) and s 6(1a) of the Act. It held that the question posed by reg 26B(2)(a) does not concern whether the firearm under consideration falls within a description given in the Regulations. Instead, the court found that the question pertains to the exercise of a power under reg 26B(2)(a), which is derived from s 6 of the Act. Therefore, the answer to the question does not determine if s 6(1a) excludes review by the Tribunal.
Regarding the third issue, the court determined that the Tribunal did not err in law when it held that the opinion of the respondent formed for the purpose of reg 26B(2)(a) is excluded from decisions reviewable by the Tribunal by s 6(1a) of the Act without consideration of the basis for that opinion. The court reasoned that the opinion formed by the respondent is an exercise of a power derived from s 6 of the Act, and thus, the basis for the opinion is irrelevant to the question of whether the decision is reviewable under s 22 of the Act.
Finally, the court addressed the fourth issue by examining whether the opinion of the respondent required by reg 26B(2)(a) is a precondition to the respondent's exercise of a power pursuant to that regulation. The court concluded that it is not, and therefore, the holding of the opinion on a lawful and proper basis is not a jurisdictional question for the Tribunal. Consequently, the court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the opinion of the respondent is excluded from review by the Tribunal by virtue of s 6(1a) of the Act.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the exercise of a power derived from s 6 of the Act, such as the formation of an opinion pursuant to reg 26B(2)(a) of the Regulations, is not subject to review by the Tribunal under s 22 of the Act. Furthermore, the basis for the opinion is irrelevant to the question of whether the decision is reviewable under s 22 of the Act.