Keung v Abbott (No 2)

This matter concerned an application to reopen an appeal and recall orders previously made by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in *Keung v Abbott*. The original appeal arose from disciplinary proceedings commenced by the appellant against the respondents, who were solicitors acting for him in Federal Court litigation. The core of the dispute in the original proceedings was whether disciplinary charges laid by the appellant against the solicitors were out of time, a question that turned on the application of different versions of s 82(2a) of the *Legal Practitioners Act 1981* (SA).

The Full Court was required to determine the legal issues surrounding the court's power to reopen a perfected appeal. Specifically, the court had to consider whether it possessed the inherent jurisdiction or statutory power to set aside its own final orders after they had been perfected, particularly in circumstances where the parties might consent to such a course. The court also had to assess the scope of rule 242 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2066 (SA) in relation to perfected orders.

The court reasoned that the power to reopen a perfected judgment is discretionary and should be exercised with great caution due to the public interest in the finality of litigation. Relevant considerations included whether a stage of the process had been completed, whether a party had presented their whole case, the availability of an avenue of appeal, whether the court had proceeded on a misapprehension of fact or law, and whether the applicant had been afforded an opportunity to be heard. The court noted that authorities such as *NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)* and *Bailey v Marinoff* suggest that a court generally lacks inherent power to reopen perfected orders. The court expressed doubt about the correctness of older authorities that might have suggested a broader power under the predecessor to rule 242, particularly where parties simply consent to reopening. The court found that the equitable jurisdiction to set aside a judgment for fraud, or the supervisory jurisdiction, were not engaged in this case.

The application to reopen the appeal was dismissed.